A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

OF

THE COMMUNICATION FLOW

BETWEEN THE U.S.I.A. AND THE ADMINISTRATION

DURING THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF KENNEDY AND JOHNSON

BY

MAUREEN LYNN WYLLIE

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of the University of Delaware in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Speech-Communication.

June, 1976
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Through the United States Information Agency, the U. S. government speaks to the people of other countries. U.S.I.A. explains American policies and actions to foreign audiences, in their own language, and helps them to understand our values, traditions and way of life. When necessary, the Agency undertakes to correct distortions concerning this country.¹

This definition of the United States Information Agency contains the rationale behind any prominent world power maintaining and utilizing an information agency. Any nation involved in internal affairs today must feel compelled to promote an agency, department, or ministry which would institute a "program of information to other peoples so that their attitudes may be based not on distortion, prejudice, or false stereotypes, but on a balanced basis."² America's realization of this need developed in response to World War I. In 1917, the Committee of Public
Information was created to be the voice which would "plead the justice of America's cause before the jury of Public Opinion." Yet, from that original conception, the program of information dissemination has been modified by two major factors, the communication revolution and the concept of "public diplomacy." The communication revolution of the past fifty years has opened new avenues of access to governments, peoples and policies in every nation of the world. Today, almost any nation has instantaneous knowledge of events occurring in the United States. Yet, that knowledge may not always be complete or properly in perspective. The need for an effort to "explain the facts and underlying principles of our policies, to correct the willful or unintentional distortions about our country" seems evident in such a rapid and expansive communication system. The ability to communicate to such a large audience so fast creates not only possible distortion and misconception, but it expands the whole idea of traditional diplomacy. Modern communication techniques have led to the diffusion of the decision-making process to the mass audience. What has been called "public diplomacy" now recognizes this diffusion of the decision process and
"applies broader criteria to the process of negotiation, tending to consider each of the channels of communication as a legitimate area for diplomatic endeavor." 5

What we are talking about is the real fact that we live in the age of "public diplomacy" — and that today the success or failure of foreign policy undertakings is frequently affected more profoundly by what people think and say than by the workings of traditional diplomacy. 6

I have become increasingly convinced that a coherent public diplomacy - promoting understanding, support and respect abroad for the U.S. and its policies - is an essential element in the conduct of foreign policy. 7

Our government, or any government cannot be solely concerned with explaining policy and plans to another government official; mass media must be utilized to reach the general public. The U.S.I.A.'s emphasis on the written word, radio, television, and motion pictures, as well as traditional face-to-face contact, can provide this avenue. It provides a means of reaching many in the shortest amount of time. According to Leonard Marks, a former U.S.I.A. Director, the Agency aims at specific "target groups," consisting of:
communicators, government or political leaders, professional people and others whose opinions will ultimately shape the policy decisions of their countries -- plus, particularly in emerging societies, the youth, students, and labor groups from whose number leaders will emerge.

The idea of public diplomacy also has a reverse, or boomerang, effect. Not only must an information agency try to make contact with the "target audiences," it must also attempt to decipher their feedback. If certain target groups in foreign audiences now have access to the information that only their governments had in the past, then they can and will respond to the ideas and policies contained in that information. Their response would create "public opinion" in their respective nations. Their governments would note this flow of public opinion and the United States Government must also be aware of it. The United States Government should "take overseas public opinion into account in the determination, enunciation, and explanation of policy." President Kennedy was apparently the first administrator to realize this boomerang effect and to utilize foreign public opinion in policy decision-making. Kennedy's statement of mission for the Agency
encompassed this second function of:

advising the President, his representatives abroad, and the various departments and agencies on the implications of foreign opinion for present and contemplated U.S. policies, programs and official statements. 10

The U.S.I.A., with its various personnel in over one hundred countries, has access to public opinion in other nations and can act as a link in this feedback process. U.S.I.A. employees overseas, through their daily contact with public opinion leaders and others, have a sense of the country's overall attitude toward certain U.S. policies, programs, and strategies. These subjective feelings can be quantified to a certain extent through polls, opinion surveys, and research (for example, "Foreign Reaction to President Johnson's Johns Hopkins Speech on Viet Nam.") 11 Such information can then be utilized in advising the president and his aides.

Purpose of Study

The above section primarily describes the rationale behind the Agency and demonstrates, in part, the "crucial
role which modern communication plays in the relations between nations and ought to play in the shaping and implementation of major national policies on the world scene." Yet, this description of the Agency provides little information on how the Agency operates. This study proposes to examine one portion of that operation, the communication flow between the Agency and the administration. Since the Agency's goal is "to help achieve United States foreign policy objectives" through the various channels mentioned previously, it obviously cannot do this in isolation. It must work cooperatively with the formulators of said policy, the administration and the Department of State. These policy-makers are also dependent, to a certain extent, on the U.S.I.A. as the Agency provides, in part, the information foreign audiences utilize in the formulation of opinion concerning the U.S. and its policies. Thus, U.S.I.A. can play a distinct role in manipulating the formulation of such opinions overseas. U.S.I.A. should also be a factor in providing information to U.S. policy-makers in terms of foreign public opinion and other data concerning the foreign audience which may aid in
choosing the most effective diplomatic channels and instruments of communication for any specific nation.

In light of these observations, it becomes quite clear that there is a crucial interplay between the information source, formulation of foreign opinion, and policy decision-making. It has been stated that the administration has "on tap the advice of a formidable fact-gathering machine in the Department of State and other federal agencies [such as U.S.I.A.]."\textsuperscript{13} This interplay between information and policy decisions makes communication between the administration and U.S.I.A. essential. If the communication lines are weak or fraught with bureaucratic "red-tape," then the usefulness of information passing between the two governmental bodies is reduced. It would seem that as the various nations of the world accelerate the "political and psychological mobilization of their people," then this interplay will become more and more essential to the conduct of foreign affairs.\textsuperscript{14} And the ease of communication between agencies such as U.S.I.A. and the administration will also become more vital so that policymakers can be kept aware of such changing attitudes
and help to prevent communication failures.

This study will examine the communication flow between the U.S.I.A. and the administration. Through a comparative analysis of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, an attempt will be made to determine what factors seem to facilitate communication flow and what factors have a deleterious effect. Various governmental studies have been done, and are currently in progress, dealing with the U.S.I.A. and its ability to communicate and to function in its present organizational state. It is hoped that this study will provide some additional insights into the specific communication channels between the Agency and the administration and how these channels might be improved.

Scope of Study

The study deals with the internal communication lines of U.S.I.A. vis-a-vis the Voice of America and other departments within the Agency and communication between the Agency and the administration, primarily the President. It does not concern itself with communication between the U.S.I.A. and its foreign audiences. Essentially the study views the
relationships, decisions, and information passage which occurs within the U.S. governmental structure.

However, when dealing with an agency which is involved with information dissemination abroad, a certain context must be assumed. The context is the foreign audience and the various "conventions, habits of reasoning and communication, the beliefs and loyalties [of that audience] which vary from country to country and which are inculcated and reinforced by every instrument of the modern national state."¹⁵ This outlook determines, to a large extent, how a foreign audience perceives reality and thus how it perceives other nations and their policies. Since each nation has a specific "national psychology" or way of reasoning and perceiving, then this psychology will affect its reception of information (news, policy information, films, magazines, etc.) from another country.¹⁶ Thus, it must be assumed that U.S.I.A. has to operate within this framework. In other words, its philosophy should reflect the various national psychologies of the countries it deals with. It must realize that "truth, credibility, and objectivity" in American eyes may not be perceived as "truth, credibility,
and objectivity" in foreign eyes. When such terms are used throughout the paper, the context in which they must be considered is assumed. However, the question of how to satisfy the requirements of various "target cultures" and their particular modes of thought is a vital question to foreign affairs in general and one which suggests further research. Although this concept of national psychology and its implications for U.S.I.A. is acknowledged by the author, such considerations are outside the boundaries of this study.

**Type of Study**

The major portion of the study will be historical in nature. The history and development of the Agency and how it evolved from the Creel Committee in 1917 to the permanent agency it became in 1953 is discussed in Chapter II. This chapter will also include a brief description of the fundamental operations of the Agency.

The Kennedy administration and its relationship with the Agency and Edward R. Murrow, the Director of U.S.I.A. during that period, is analyzed in Chapter III. The Johnson relationship with the Agency and the changes he was
responsible for, in personnel, in policy, and in emphasis, are examined in Chapter IV.

The patterns of communication which seem to operate between the Agency and the administration in these two cases are compared in Chapter V. Four specific areas will be delineated as those which tend to influence the communication channels. The two administrations will be utilized as positive and negative examples of the factors influencing communication flow.

Related Research

A good deal has been written on the Agency from a strictly historical point of view, tracing its development from its conception to the present. One example is "A Study of the V.O.A., 1953-1959," by Claude Callison. These studies usually do little with comparison, but simply chronicle events.

Another group of theses and dissertations has been concerned with the effectiveness of the U.S.I.A. This is a question which continually plagues the Agency; how does one
determine what effect the Agency has on its "target audiences." It is a question posed yearly by Congress during the appropriations hearings. The majority of these studies have been done by natives of the various countries under discussion, such as the "Lithuanian Service of the Voice of America," by Paul Labanauskas. 18

Other works have dealt with a specific isolated point in the U.S.I.A. history, but not in the sense that this study attempts to deal with such a period of time. Most of these studies have taken a political event and analyzed it in light of the Agency's handling of the event. "U.S.I.A. Coverage of Civil Rights, 1963-65" and "Crisis and Commentary: A Thematic Analysis of Radio Moscow and Voice of America Broadcasts During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Oct. 19-31, 1962" are two examples of such studies. 19

Still another group of theses and dissertations has dealt with administrative problems and functions, but again, not in the sense to be discussed here. A dissertation, "Propaganda Policy Guidance in U.S.I.A.: A study of Administrative Communication," by Charles Spencer is concerned with
internal policy guidance. It deals with the passage of policy guidelines from the State Department and traces the flow down through the Agency and out to the various country teams.20

A study by Gary English covers the topic, "U.S. Media Diplomacy: Problems in the Politics of Administration."21 Again, this concerns itself primarily with internal functioning and does little with the White House administration relationship. It is foremost an analysis of the decision-making process within the organizational structure.

There is also an investigation of Edward R. Murrow's influence within the Agency during the Kennedy administration.22 It details Murrow's administrative policies, program policies, and his personal influences.

It should also be noted that many internal studies of the Agency exist. When the Agency was permanently established in 1953, an Advisory Committee was also created to yearly supervise the Agency's operations. It reports annually on the Agency's progress and effectiveness. Many
presidentially appointed committees, for example Eisenhower's Jackson Committee, have also had a look at the Agency. Most of these committees were primarily concerned with news coverage, effectiveness, duplication of State Department activities, and the like. Reports of these various committees' findings are all available in the U.S.I.A. archives in the Agency's main offices in Washington, D.C.

A note should also be made of the most recent committee to examine the U.S.I.A. The committee, Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, is headed by Dr. Frank Stanton, former C.B.S. President, and is working out of Georgetown University. This report contains an extensive study of the Agency and offers suggestions for the reorganization of U.S.I.A. It reaffirms the importance of the U.S. Government's overseas informational and cultural programs, and suggests placing the U.S.I.A. activities in several separate agencies (the Department of State, a new Information and Cultural Affairs Agency, and an autonomous agency for the Voice of America).
Footnotes

Chapter I


3 George Creel, How We Advertised America (New York: Harper Brothers, 1920), p. 3.


February 24, 1975, Congressional Record, CXXI, 28.


Bernays and Hershey, op. cit., p. 37.


Ibid.

Ibid., p. 28.


CHAPTER II

HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF
THE U.S.I.A.

For a nation whose founding statesmen affirmed the importance of public opinion in their very declaration of independence, a nation which always has been inordinately sensitive to the good opinion of others, the U.S. has been singularly irresponsible in its international information programs.¹

This quotation seems to sum up the history and development of a permanent United States information program. The U.S. Government followed a rather haphazard, ad hoc approach to the problem of information dissemination abroad. Prior to World War I, little, if any, attention was paid to our "image" overseas. We had a desire to "look good" in the eyes of the world, but it was not considered relevant to foreign policy strategy. With the beginning of World War I, the U.S. Government suddenly saw a need to counteract foreign propaganda and to dispel rumors. But even with that pressure, the U.S. was the last major nation to enter the propaganda arena and its ad hoc agency had
little or no guidance. World II created another similar pressure to propagandize and another hastily organized office of information. It took the Cold War to make the United States realize the necessity of an information program.

Public opinion is a recognizable element in our society that must be taken into consideration. How the United States came to this realization and the rather confused path it took to reach it must begin with the first real roots of our present information program, the Creel Committee.

**Early History**

The Government's first interest in international communication began in 1917 with the United States' entrance into World War I. The war caused the United States to realize the importance of maintaining an agency to disseminate the United States' "side of the story." War seems to breed rumors, exaggerations, and misrepresentations which the U.S. felt it had to counter. Woodrow Wilson created the Committee on Public Information by executive
order 2594 and put at its head George Creel. Creel, as editor of the Rocky Mountain News, was a supporter of Wilson and also assisted in the re-election campaign of 1916. This appointment of past supporters of the incumbent president to the post of Information Director seems to set a precedent followed by most administrations to come. This form of appointment will also figure as a prominent issue in the communication patterns which tend to develop between the administration and the Agency.

Creel characterized his attempts with the Committee as:

... another struggle waged with the same intensity, and almost equal significance attached to its victories and defeats. It was the fight for the minds of men... and the battleline ran through every home in every country.

Creel's attempts at propaganda used few and simple themes aimed at striking hard and fast. The Committee primarily emphasized the written media and used the Government's radio facilities for overseas wireless transmissions.
The Creel Committee had difficulties in convincing the Government of its worth. Even at this early point in the growth of "psychological warfare," problems began to arise. Representative Gillett, a minority leader at the time of Creel's Committee, stated:

We must admit that if any administration has in its power a bureau of public information, as it is called, really an advertising bureau, a propaganda bureau, a bureau of publicity to exploit the various acts and departments of the government, it is a very dangerous thing in a republic, because if used in partisan spirit or for the partisan advantage of the administration, it has tremendous power; and in peacetime I do not think any party or any administration would justify it or approve it.5

Of course, the Creel Committee was operating domestically at this time as well as internationally and Rep. Gillett had more to fear. War exhibits were made for state fairs throughout the United States and domestic showings of Creel made films netted over $878,215.6

The Creel Committee was finally abolished in 1919 as the war came to a close. Attempts at propaganda, or any form of information dissemination, faded into the background
of bureaucratic affairs until 1926. In the period from 1926 to 1930, the Soviet Union, Germany, Japan, and Great Britain began to join an international propaganda game.\(^7\)

The United States slowly responded to this pressure, but not by forming a government-operated agency. Instead, the private commercial broadcasters became interested in international communication.

Private International Broadcasting

From the mid-1930's to the early 1940's, the commercial broadcasters began to ease into the field of international broadcasting. This age of commercial international enterprise was fostered by the U.S. Federal Radio Communication regulations of 1929. These regulations helped to facilitate international short-wave broadcasting by allowing commercial broadcasters to operate relay stations.\(^8\)

N.B.C. began its first direct broadcasting in 1934 and by 1938 it was broadcasting in six different languages.\(^9\)

C.B.S. entered the overseas broadcasting scene later and by 1937 it was broadcasting internationally, with seventy percent of its broadcast in English.\(^10\)
One motivation for the private broadcasters to enter the field was to forestall government intervention in the international broadcasting movement. However, this did not completely curb governmental attempts to enter the area of international broadcasting. In 1937 and 1938, two bills were proposed which would have authorized a government owned and operated international broadcasting station. Representative Cellar and the team of Senators Chaney and McAdoo proposed the two bills. The overall thrust of the bills was to provide a station which would "voice affirmation of President Roosevelt's 'Good Neighbor Policy'" and counter German and Italian propaganda.11 These two objectives, to support U.S. policy and to counter other propaganda attempts, will become a part of the operating philosophy of the U.S.I.A. and its broadcasting branch, the Voice of America.

With the defeat of the two bills, the Government attempted indirectly to control the international commercial broadcasters. In 1939, the Federal Communications Commission passed a regulation which said, in part:
A licensee of an international broadcast station shall render only an international service which will reflect the culture of this country and which will promote international goodwill, understanding, and cooperation. 12

This attempt at "soft" censorship was fought by the National Association of Broadcasters and the concerned commercial stations and the Federal Communications Commission finally repealed it. Thus, governmental interest in international broadcasting ceased for the second time until renewed outside pressure forced the issue once again during World War II.

**Government-Operated International Broadcasting**

As the possibility of a second world war pressed on the U.S. Government, the desire for a government supported broadcasting service grew stronger. Beginning in the late 1930's the Government, primarily through the State Department, created a series of organizations designed to disseminate information abroad. The two most notable attempts, in July of 1941, were the Coordinator of Information headed by Major General William Donovan and the Coordinator of Inter-American
Affairs headed by Nelson Rockefeller. The Coordinator of Information office had both an international thrust (Foreign Information Service, F.I.S.) and a domestic thrust (Office of Facts and Figures, O.F.F.). The Foreign Information Service, under the direction of Robert Sherwood, delivered the first broadcast as the Voice of America following the bombing of Pearl Harbor.

The Voice of America speaks. Today America has been at war seventy-nine days. Daily at this time we shall speak to you about America and the war. The news may be good or bad... but we shall tell you the truth.

The other agency, the Office of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, was primarily concerned with the information effort in Latin America throughout the war.

Confusion began to develop among these several agencies all attempting to accomplish the same thing. The Government resolved the issue by creating the Office of War Information (O.W.I.) on June 13, 1942 as a union of the F.I.S. and the O.F.F. The O.W.I., headed by veteran newsman Elmer Davis, was given the authority, by executive order, to
conduct "foreign information and overt propaganda operations abroad." This propaganda was to be based on "information attributable to the U.S. Government for consumption at home and abroad." Propaganda at this time was a very difficult label for the Government to use. A stigma had been attached to the word which called it "deceit and trickery." The United States was fearful of engaging in propaganda, something which one might have used to label the "utterances of their opponents, but never to their own." Yet, the U.S. Government later came to realize that, "we had to make a case for our views as others were doing for theirs; we had to be advocates, persuaders . . . propagandists." The problem of to propagandize or not to propagandize still haunts the Agency.

The newly created O.W.I. had some difficulties with its attempts to deal with propaganda. It suffered from a lack of funding and a lack of pre-knowledge of military strategies. The reception of too little information too late caused the O.W.I. to be virtually impotent. This problem would plague information agencies in the future and cause stress in the communication patterns between the
administration and the agencies.

Up until this point, government interest in propaganda had only been a factor during a war. There had been little, if any, concern with international broadcasting during peace-time. At the close of World War II, the Government was again faced with the decision of what to do with an agency created for the sole purpose of disseminating war information. On August 31, 1945 the decision was made to abolish the O.W.I., but Truman noted in a speech given at the termination ceremony, "The nature of present day foreign relations makes it essential for the U.S. to maintain information activities abroad as an integral part of the conduct of our foreign affairs." Thus, Truman's concept formulated the idea of "new diplomacy" and laid the groundwork for a permanent information agency. The Foreign Information Service (F.I.S.) of the defunct O.W.I. was then placed under the jurisdiction of the State Department where it was to remain until August 1, 1953.

In 1946, the Department of State renamed the fledging information service the Office of International Information
and Cultural Affairs (O.I.C.). This new office was a consolidation of the State Department's Office of Public Information created in 1944 and the Government's O.W.I. 22 From the start the O.I.C. encountered difficulties; it could not sell Congress on the idea that the U.S. needed a permanent information agency. The result was an immense cutback in appropriations from the forty-five million dollars the O.W.I. had received during the war to a meager twenty-five million. Congress based the cutback on the fact that the O.I.C. was not yet authorized but only acting under a Presidential directive. 23

The O.I.C. was to get a boost from the world situation shortly after this loss of funds. On June 5, 1947, Secretary of State Marshall announced the Marshall Plan for reconstruction assistance to war torn countries. The plan was immediately rejected by the U.S.S.R. and its satellites. The U.S.S.R. established its own propaganda machine designed to "frustrate the Marshall Plan." 24 More propaganda pressure began to filter in from Joseph Stalin himself. In 1947, it could be said of Stalin that: "One man ... more than any other, contributed to the growing sentiment in America that
a strong, permanent information program was a necessity."

The result of such pressure was the creation of the Smith-Mundt Committee on July 26, 1947. Senator Alex Smith of New Jersey and Karl E. Mundt of South Dakota were charged to investigate the foreign service branch of the information service and to determine whether or not the program should be continued. The Committee's report to Congress on January 30, 1948 proposed that:

The U.S.I.S. [Foreign label of the information service] must be the voice of America and the means of clarifying the opinion of the world concerning us. To be effective it must: (1) tell the truth, (2) explain U.S. motives, (3) bolster morale and extend hope, (4) give a true picture of American life, methods and ideals, (5) combat misrepresentation, and (6) aggressively interpret and support foreign policy.

The committee cited the amounts of money being spent by the U.S.S.R. and even war-torn Britain for information dissemination. The U.S. program seemed to be "only a whisper" in reply and the committee suggested that the present system was "wholly inadequate." As a result of such findings and suggestions, Public Law 402, or the
Smith-Mundt Act, was passed on January 27, 1948. This law created the Office of International Information (O.I.I.) and the Office of Educational Exchange (O.E.X.) still under the guidance of the State Department. The first office was to handle media and the latter to cover educational processes. The law was quite significant as it established the basis for a permanent international information agency. The objectives of the act stated that it was:

to enable the Government of the United States to promote a better understanding of the United States in other countries and to increase mutual understanding between people. . . (1) an information service and (2) an educational exchange service.

Soon after the creation of the O.I.I. and the O.E.X. the Cold War surged ahead due in part to the 1949 explosion of the first Soviet atomic bomb. In 1951, President Truman announced that propaganda was one of the "most powerful weapons that the Communists have" and that the U.S. must combat this with, "truth - plain, simple, unvarnished truth." The young information agency benefitted from this urge for a "campaign of truth" with large increases in
appropriations for the following year. The State Department's budget tripled in fiscal year 1951. Programming was also greatly increased on the Voice of America and new transmitters were built. Appropriations for the V.O.A. were increased by $7.2 million for the next fiscal year.\textsuperscript{32}

One year later, during Eisenhower's campaign for the presidency, the idea of "winning the struggle for men's minds" became a minor platform in the campaign. During his days as lieutenant general, Eisenhower had come to realize the importance of "psychological warfare." In a campaign speech, Eisenhower stated:

We must realize that as a nation everything we say, everything we do, and everything we fail to say and do, will have its impact in other lands. It will affect the minds and wills of men there . . . \textsuperscript{33}

This interest in an information program continued once Eisenhower became President. In his first State of the Union message in 1952, Eisenhower re-emphasized that international information dissemination was "essential to the security of the nation." The new President also saw the creation of four simultaneous investigations of the
present information agency, one under Presidential direc-
tive, one initiated by the House Appropriations Committee, 
one by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the 
final investigation headed by Senator McCarthy.  
The President's Committee on Foreign Information Activities, 
headed by William H. Jackson, was established in 1953 to 
make recommendations concerning the information program.
An Advisory Committee for Government Organization was also 
created and headed by Nelson Rockefeller. This Com-
mittee recommended that the information program be con-
solidated into one independent agency, free from the State 
Department. Following this proposal, Eisenhower, by ex-
ecutive order 10477, created the United States Information 
Agency (U.S.I.A.) on August 1, 1953 as an independent 
agency. At this time, the new Director, Theodore 
Striebert, was given the authority over the O.I.I. and O.E.X. 
previously held by the Secretary of State.

During these first administrative dealings with a 
permanent information agency, a "statement of mission" was 
given to the new U.S.I.A. to help guide the output of the 
agency:
The purpose of the U.S.I.A. shall be to submit evidence to the peoples of other nations by means of communications techniques that the objectives and policies of the U.S. are in harmony with and will advance their legitimate aspirations for freedom, progress, and peace.38

Under Striebert's firm leadership, the Agency gained a solid framework from which to build. After three years with the Agency, Striebert returned to private life.

Arthur Larson replaced Striebert in 1956 as Director of the U.S.I.A. Larson, unfortunately, was extremely unpopular with Congress partially due to his "Modern Republicanism" philosophy. After a brief and confused year with the Agency, Larson left to take a position at Duke University.39

In 1957, Eisenhower began to feel more pressure from the Cold War and felt that a more capable director was needed to guide the still emerging U.S.I.A. Thus, George V. Allen, former Assistant Secretary of State, was given the post on November 11, 1957.40 Director Allen viewed the Agency as an "independent, reputable news agency with stories that could be published by anyone."41
with the administration seemed to improve with the new Director and his view of the Agency. Within a few weeks after taking office, Allen was attending Secretary of State conferences every Tuesday and Thursday and meeting monthly with the President.\textsuperscript{42} Allen, due to his belief in "reputable" news reporting, also approved a charter for the Voice of America during his directorship. This "charter" which was signed by Allen on November 1, 1960, later became the rule which was invoked by those in the Voice defending their right to broadcast objectively. The charter became a sore point in later administrative-Agency dealings, especially during the Cuban Missle Crisis and the Viet Nam conflict. The charter states, in part:

The long range interests of the U.S. are served by communication directly with the peoples of the world by radio. To be effective the V.O.A. must win attention and respect of listeners. These principals will govern the V.O.A.:

1. V.O.A. will establish itself as a consistently reliable source of news, accurate, objective, and comprehensive.

2. V.O.A. will represent America, not any single segment of American society.
3. As an official radio, V.O.A. will present the policies of the U.S. clearly and effectively. V.O.A. will also present responsible discussion and opinion on these policies.

By 1960, the U.S.I.A. was a firmly established information agency. However, the purpose of the Agency was still unclear to many who were involved with it. The "long-debated role" of the Agency is still not a closed issue. The problem did, and still does, revolve around the issue that the Agency often does not know what is expected of it:

Unfortunately, in relation to the multiplicity of operations involved in our overseas information posture, none of our recent Presidents has assigned to the U.S.I.A. any clear and effective role.

Functioning of the U.S.I.A.

On a functional basis, the Agency has three major concerns. The first is to gain access to information, policies, programs, and other material that the Agency should be reporting. The second is to use any and all
available communication techniques to convey that material to the varying target audiences of the countries being served by the U.S.I.A. The third is perhaps the most vital concern and that is the hope that the message, however and wherever conveyed, was understood. In handling these three concerns, the U.S.I.A.'s organization can be divided into four major operational sectors. The structure would fall into: (1) the control sector, (2) the geographic desks sector, (3) the service sector, and (4) the field or overseas post sector. The organizational chart at the end of this section depicts where these four sectors lie in the overall structure.

Control:

The control sector would primarily consist of three offices: the Director, the Office of Policy and Plans, and the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information. These three offices act to control or shape the information policy which is being followed by the remainder of the Agency.

The Director has contact with the Department of State and other Government officials involved with foreign
policy decisions. Daily "briefing" meetings are held by the Director to familiarize the rest of the administrative staff of policy changes, etc. The Director at one time sat on the National Security Council as well. He no longer holds that position.

The Office of Policy and Plans primarily acts to insure that the Agency output "accurately reflects and persuasively supports national policy." It takes information from the Department of State and other sources and then prepares "policy guidelines for operating elements of the Agency." In other terms, the office determines what the U.S.I.A. should emphasize and how it should attempt to do this. Interpretation and implementation of policy material are the major concerns at this level in the organization. All other departments take their cues from the Office of Policy and Plans.

The presidentially appointed Advisory Commission on Information, created by Public Law 402 in 1948, acts as a supervisory body for the Agency. Yearly it publishes a report which discusses the effectiveness of the Agency, the
role of the Agency in diplomatic terms, the state of the Agency, and recommendations concerning the Agency. In this way it acts to control the Agency's output and future conduct. Its role is not as immediate as the Office of Policy and Plans, but at least as significant.

Geographic Desks:

The Agency maintains six geographic desks or offices for the various areas it serves: Africa; East Asia and Pacific; Soviet Union and East Europe; Latin America; North Africa, Near East, and South Asia; West Europe. The head of each office is an Assistant Director to the Director and he is responsible for "the direction, coordination, and management of information programs for the country of his geographic area." These offices act as the link between Washington-based U.S.I.A. and the field. Most of the Assistant Directors have been stationed in the geographic area they represent and thus understand the difficulties encountered in processing directives from the home base out in the field, or vice versa. They act as the liaison between the two major arms of the U.S.I.A. which, by nature of their
functions, must be separated. These offices also arrange for media productions specifically tailored to their various field operations and in general attempt to modify overall Agency objectives to fit the particular area they serve.  

**Service:**

The service branch of the U.S.I.A. supplies the means to convey the various messages that the Agency wishes to disseminate. Four Assistant Directors head the four service operations: Broadcasting, Information Center, Motion Picture and Television, and Press and Publications. These four services produce material which supports and explains U.S.I.A. objectives and supply specific material for the Assistant Directors of geographic areas.

The Broadcasting service, better known as the Voice of America, provides "not only direct communication to foreign audiences, but special radio feeds and packaged programs for placement on foreign radio stations." The V.O.A. broadcasts news, editorials, comment, and music through short-wave transmitters in thirty-six languages. It tries to present a fair and objective picture of the U.S. by
placing news stories in context, "backgroundering" an event (providing additional information which may have preceded a news break for members of a foreign audience who would not have had access to that information), book reviews, forums, etc.

The Motion Picture and Television service creates films and video-tape productions to add another channel to the transmission of Agency messages. None of the service's films may be shown domestically without a consent from the Congress (Public Law 89-274 permitted the domestic viewing of an outstanding U.S.I.A. film "John F. Kennedy - Years of Lightning, Day of Drums" in 1965). This service also collaborates with domestic film companies and television broadcasters and distributes some of their productions overseas.

The Press and Publications service handles the production of all printed media. It provides material for placement in overseas newspapers and magazines. The Wireless File, a radioteletype service to all U.S.I.A. posts, is also produced by this service. The service also produces
a mass of other materials for post use: general and regional feature service, photographs and picture stories, "paper show" exhibits, magazines, pamphlets, posters, magazine reprints, and cartoon booklets. 51

Overseas Posts:

U.S.I.A. employees in overseas' posts usually consist of a Public Affairs Officer (P.A.O.) and several officers assigned to him (usually an Information Officer, I.O., and a C.A.O. or Cultural Affairs Officer). The P.A.O. acts as a clarifier and an advisor. He is to handle all in-country aspects of the U.S.I.A. program. Psychological aspects, media watching, implementing programs, and contacting opinion-leaders consume his day-to-day existence. His I.O. handles press conferences, contacting local papers, and writing speeches. The C.A.O. directs the cultural center and handles artistic and creative exchanges and programs. All three officers also act in an advisory capacity to the U.S. Ambassador in their country. They sit in on the daily meetings of the Ambassador's staff and contribute information on the country's overall attitudes and opinions toward U. S. policies. 52
Thus, the origin of the present United States Information Agency can be traced through a maze of offices and organizations to its roots in the Creel Committee created in 1917 by President Wilson. The Creel Committee served as the basis for the State Department's Coordinator of Information and Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, and the more concretely structured O.W.I. in World War II. The Voice of America operation officially began with World War II and made its first broadcast in 1942. The State Department continued to handle all information programs, which underwent a series of changes, until 1950. In 1950, President Truman expanded the overseas information program with his "Campaign of Truth." This expansion lead to a re-examination of the whole matter of information programs under President Eisenhower and resulted in Reorganization Plan No. 8 and the present U.S.I.A., as an independent arm of the executive branch.

The present U.S.I.A. consists of four basic areas; control, geographic desks, service, and the field, which
function as a unit to complete the demands of the incumbent administration. The discussion will now examine the demands and relationships of the Kennedy Administration.
Footnotes

Chapter II


3 George Creel, How We Advertised America (New York: Harper Bros., 1920), p. 3.

4 Ibid., p. 10.


6 Creel, op. cit., p. 7.

7 Henderson, op. cit., p. 28.


9 Ibid.
There is some evidence to suggest that the State Department was involved in creating this regulation.


Ibid.


21 Henderson, op. cit., p. 35.


26 Dennet and Turner, op. cit., p. 516.

27 Ibid., p. 519.

28 Ibid.

29 Henderson, op. cit., p. 32.

30 Public Law 402, Statutes At Large, LXII, Title I, 6 (1948).

31 Harry Truman, "Speech to American Society of Newspaper Editors," quoted in Henderson, op. cit., p. 44.


33 Quoted in Dizard, op. cit., p. 41.
McCarthy ravaged the U.S.I.A., particularly the Voice of America, in his Red Scare searches. Such criticism of the two branches of the new information service was a striking blow to the credibility of each. It was not until Edward R. Murrow became the Director of the Agency in 1961 that the Agency appeared to have recovered from the McCarthy era.


Ibid.

Sorenson, The Word War, op. cit., p. 49.

From a listing of Directors of the U.S.I.A. and the V.O.A. from Mrs. Milton Clemens, Department of Public Information, U.S.I.A. (December 1, 1974).

Henderson, op. cit., p. 52.


46 Ibid.


48 Lawson, op. cit., p. 4-10.


51 Lawson, op. cit., p. 4-10.


CHAPTER III
THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION

When John F. Kennedy became President in 1961, U.S.I.A. administrators felt that the new President had demonstrated a favorable attitude toward the concept of foreign information dissemination in the past. Members of the Agency were anxious to determine if past support for the program would follow through. In 1957, during Eisenhower's infamous "Battle of the Budget," Johnson and Kennedy had genteely "locked horns" over the U.S.I.A. budget issue and provided a rather graphic illustration of their respective feelings toward the overall concept of "psychological warfare" and the Agency's specific role. Senator Lyndon B. Johnson was, at the time, chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee for fiscal year 1958. Unfortunately, for the U.S.I.A., Arthur Larson was the newly appointed Agency Director. To put this issue in its proper perspective, an examination of the situation would be useful.

50.
Larson was a proponent of a political idea that Eisenhower favored called "Modern Republicanism." The concept had been discussed in the book, A Republican Looks at His Party, written by Larson in 1953, then a law professor at the University of Pittsburgh Law School. This issue might have been overlooked if Larson had not made a highly partisan political speech on April 16, 1957, several days preceding the appropriations hearings. The speech called the New and Fair Deals a "somewhat alien philosophy imported from Europe." Although Larson had accepted the commitment to speak before he received the U.S.I.A. post, the speech was actually given while he held the post. Partisan speech-giving while holding a public office was not, and still is not, considered ethical. Coupled with this was Larson's newness to the Agency and his obvious unfamiliarity with its daily operations which made him an unprepared and faltering witness during the hearings. Taken as a whole, the various factors were to lead to an enormous cut in the budget for U.S.I.A. for the following fiscal year. Eisenhower had proposed $144 million for the U.S.I.A., but after Johnson's hearings that figure was reduced to
$90.2 million, a cut of thirty eight per cent and one of the largest cuts to any single agency that year.4

Yet, even with the leadership problem of Larson, Senator John F. Kennedy, and others, still believed in the viability of the program. The day after the hearings, the bill came to the floor of the Senate. Kennedy asked Johnson on the Senate floor if the Senator from Texas did not "believe it would be wise, in view of the activities being undertaken by the Russians, the Chinese, the Egyptians and others, that we should at least continue the program on the level at which it is maintained today?"5 Johnson, obviously did not think it was a wise idea as he was not sure that Larson was "informed of what would be required to continue at the present level."6 Yet, Kennedy persisted in defending the basis of the Agency:

I believe in this program. It is difficult for me to believe that the program is so hopelessly conducted that it is not able to spend as much as it spent last year wisely and well.7

Kennedy's concern was specifically aimed at the new, emerging African nations such as Libya and Sudan and how such a
fulfilling a political obligation. Such an active search for a truly qualified individual was a rather unusual move for a president. In the past, U.S.I.A. directors were:

picked by the president in office . . . not because of their competency in a highly professional vocation - that of professional persuading. They were chosen for irrelevant reasons -- because they could get along with Congress, or a political debt was being paid off . . . .

In this case, however, Kennedy consulted with his own aides and men in the business in an attempt to find a qualified man. Blair Clark, a C.B.S. newsman, suggested both Frank Stanton and Murrow. Tom Sorenson, a Kennedy aide, wrote up a list of qualifications for the post and also suggested Murrow, among others:

Experience in world affairs and knowledge of foreign peoples . . . Should comprehend the "revolution of rising expectations" throughout the world, and its impact on U.S. foreign policy . . . Pragmatic, open-minded, and sensitive to international political currents, without being naive. Understand the potential of propaganda, while being aware of its limitations . . .

In the end, Stanton was actually offered the job first.
When he declined, "Murrow became the choice." He had been suggested to Kennedy as the one candidate who could "tell the American story... with some hope of making it sound credible." Edward R. Murrow seemed to be a logical choice. He had made his first mark in broadcasting with a "new brand of journalism by radio in the European crisis before the war." During World War II, Murrow had "exemplified not only reporting at its most vivid, but also the conviction behind the reporting." He became famous for his on-the-spot broadcasting from a battered London each evening with "London After Dark." In 1944, after nine years abroad as a reporter, Murrow returned to the U.S. as a corporate executive for C.B.S. in the midst of a thriving broadcasting market place. At this point, his "Hear It Now" became the program which added new concepts and dimensions to radio. This program later emerged as the well-known "See It Now" television version, as Murrow smoothly made the transition to the new medium. "See It Now" was the program which carried Murrow's famous attack on Senator McCarthy in 1954. Murrow was continually involved with radio and television,
their impact on the world, and the issues of the day throughout his life. His "independent, imaginative, and incisive reporting helped radio and television to become important journalistic media instead of only channels of entertainment and advertising."15

Murrow, however, was as apprehensive about accepting this new position as U.S.I.A. Director as Kennedy was cautious in choosing. Murrow had always prided himself on his role as a critical surveyor of government and policy. Just one year before he was to take the office of U.S.I.A. Director, he had criticized both N.B.C. and his own network, C.B.S., for "remaining mute" when the State Department had suggested that they "minimize" the visit of Khrushchev to the United States.16 He sincerely resented government influence used to suppress the free flow of news, especially news of an international nature; "I yield to no one in my opposition to government efforts to censor free and complete flow of news."17 Many Congressmen were a bit fearful of Murrow and his stress on objectivity. They were concerned that he would "air our dirty linen" and ignore the "cheerful" side of America.18
Not only did Murrow have an active concern for maintaining objectivity even within the halls of government, he also had an aversion to becoming a part of that government. Murrow was "not too keen to join the Government, indeed any government, which meant to him not only bureaucracy but meant giving up his 'purple cow' thesis that it was 'more fun to cover politicians than to be one.'" Later, as Director of the Agency, he seemed to realize the vital importance of the Government to the Agency's operations. He realized that he must not only work with Government, but that the Government would determine to a great extent what he would do in that post:

I recognize, as I know you will too, that the role of the Agency has limits. We are but one arm of the government. As such, we must respond to the policy of that government . . . . To put it bluntly, U.S.I.A. can be no better than the policies which it supports and explains.

Further support for the fact that Murrow was obviously not coming into the U.S.I.A. as a political mannequin, lay in Murrow's attitude toward the Kennedys. Murrow had "little respect" for Kennedy's father which stemmed from his days as a London correspondent.
while Kennedy, Sr. was Ambassador to England. He was also skeptical of J.F.K. when he was nominated by the Democratic Party in 1961. Murrow made the comment during the primaries that Kennedy "frightened" him and that he felt Kennedy would have become a "McCarthyite overnight" if it seemed to his advantage. His opinion of the new President was certainly not reminiscent of the usual "friendship" or political relationship between the director and the president which had often been the case previously. (Note the relationships of Creel and Wilson, and Larson and Eisenhower mentioned previously.)

Murrow's view of the President was apparently modified to a certain extent as he observed the then presidential candidate's "skill and courage" in the televised Nixon-Kennedy Debates of 1960. Through the debates, Murrow came to "appreciate" the candidate more than he had previously.

In spite of Murrow's view of the government, the Kennedy administration was honored to have such a well-known figure joining its ranks. Murrow's reputation and
prestige could only be seen as a boon to the Agency which had suffered extensive blows during Senator McCarthy's Hearings. Murrow, by virtue of his past experience and rather controversial work, brought status to the Agency; a fact that was to affect the communication patterns which would develop between the Kennedy administration and the Agency.

Murrow had rather specific ideas about the operation of the Agency that he intended to employ in his new post. He viewed the Agency as an institution that must realize its role as a persuader as well as an informer:

We not only seek to show people who we are and how we live; but we must also engage others in the delicate, difficult art of human persuasion, to explain why we do what we do.  

Yet, Murrow never lost sight of his objectivity and his vow to present the truth, if and when he could find it. A credo which he delighted in using seems to sum up this interplay of persuasion and truth:

To be persuasive, we must be believable,  
To be believable, we must be credible,
To be credible, we must be truthful. It is as simple as that.25

Whether it was "as simple as that" was an issue tested over and over again throughout Murrow's directorship.

More important than Murrow's ideas about truth and persuasion were his ideas regarding the administration of the Agency. Aside from his "activist philosophy of operation," he believed the Agency should have an advisory role in the making of foreign policy.26 Up to this point, the U.S.I.A. had been "denied opportunity for a systematic input into foreign policy decision making at the highest level."27 Not that it hadn't been suggested before, however. Creel had been given Cabinet rank during Wilson's administration, according to the executive order which created the Committee of Public Information.28 The first Advisory Commission report in 1949 also indicated that the government should consider using the information media "as entering into rather than being apart from the formulation and projection of policy." The report recommended placing an information specialist on the Policy Planning Staff.29
In 1968, the Fascell Report, which developed from a series of hearings held by Congressman Dante Fascell to explore the future of U.S. public diplomacy, suggested quite stridently that:

unless and until the Agency is able to contribute its proper input to the formulation of policy and the preparation of its exterior, visible shell, our government will not begin to practice public diplomacy with any significant level of proficiency. 30

Murrow agreed with this view of the Agency. The important issue to him was that he be "informed in advance of policies and their formulations" so that he could be "in on the takeoffs, and not just the crash landings." 31 He was not interested in creating policy, but at least being aware of its creation so he wouldn't have to read the morning paper to discover what it was he was to be reporting. Murrow, at the council of William Paley, Chairman of the Board at C.B.S., and others, insisted upon this role in decision-making when he took the post. However, it is obvious that Murrow's view of this role was entirely realistic:
... it was suggested when I came down here that this Agency could only operate effectively if it had (1) prior access to information and (2) an opportunity to be heard on policy before policy was made. I have no complaints on that score, at the same time, I have no illusions that I am monopolizing the making of policy. But I do have the opportunity to be heard.32

The Role of John F. Kennedy

Since Edward R. Murrow had taken the U.S.I.A. directorship not as an administrator, but, as he hoped, a participant in policy-making, he endorsed the Kennedy view of U.S.I.A. as a direct policy-tool.33

Kennedy and Murrow had similar attitudes toward the Agency and its proposed role. First, developing these attitudes in more abstract terms, it will be seen that this agreement laid the foundation for the specific, concrete actions which would follow. A parallel view of the Agency was essential to formalize the change in communication patterns which followed. Murrow and Kennedy both shared the view that the Agency could only be as persuasive as the policies it emanted:

Propaganda is far more what we do than
what we say. Propaganda of the deed is far better and one thousand times more lasting than propaganda of the word. Words can supplement or bolster, but can never substitute for actions. We will be known far more by what we are than by what we say we are.34

They also realized the complexity and care with which the "delicate art of persuasion" must be applied to those actions. Although Murrow proposed to let policies speak for themselves, he "echoed" Kennedy's sentiments that "it is a dangerous illusion to believe that the policies of the U.S. can be encompassed in one slogan or adjective, hard or soft, or otherwise."35

The most critical intersection of their thoughts lay in the perceived role of the Agency within international affairs. That is, not the problem of what should the Agency do, but what role shall it play in the overall foreign policy, diplomacy, and international relations picture. It would appear that both the President and Murrow viewed the Agency as a critical juncture between the administration and foreign relations. It would appear that both visualized a reciprocal relationship between the administration and
the Agency and not the previous lack of communication. It would appear that both "saw the U.S.I.A. as important and integral part of the country's day-to-day foreign affairs apparatus."36

Resulting in part, from this basic intellectual agreement on the role and function of the Agency, several concrete policies were developed by the Kennedy administration. Up to this point in U.S.I.A. history, few clear, definitive statements existed for the guidance of the Agency. It seemed to flounder continually between a number of perceived roles and its actual role. With Kennedy and Murrow, the situation appeared to have improved. Not that the Kennedy directive was an end-all, but at least it developed a direct, clear and understandable description of what was expected. It gave the Agency a foothold from which to work. The Kennedy directive of 1963, although officially pronounced by the President, could best be characterized as a "putting together of what Ed Murrow had already been 'putting into practice' since 1961."37 Again, the unity of the two men served as a foundation for the concrete step of 1963:
The Mission of the U.S. Information Agency is to help achieve foreign policy objectives by

(a) influencing public attitudes in other nations and

(b) advising the President, his representatives abroad, and the various departments, and agencies on the implications of foreign opinion for present and contemplated U.S. policies and programs and official statements.38

This document was probably most effective in that it endorsed, in writing, a specific goal and aim for the Agency. Such a definition of purpose alleviated to a certain extent the difficulty in developing communication ties between the administration and the U.S.I.A. The Agency was told in specific terms whom to see about what. The statement was even seen as "revolutionary" by one observer:

An explicit acknowledgement that the Agency's mission was to be persuasive. . . appears less revolutionary in practice than the explicit injunction of the Kennedy statement providing that the Agency was to serve as an advisor to the government on foreign opinion implication of all its activities and hence have an important advisory role in the formulation of the very policies it would seek to publicize abroad.39
The second concrete action taken by Kennedy to improve Agency-Administrative relations was to re-emphasize the role of the U.S.I.A. director in the National Security Council. The N.S.C. was established in 1947 as a unit to have a "role in national policy-making" and to instill "voluntary coordination" between the various members of the Council. The statutory members of the Council consist of the President, the Vice-President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, and a few statutory advisors such as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\textsuperscript{40} Eisenhower had initiated the practice of adding three principal counsellors and several lesser ones to the N.S.C. meetings.\textsuperscript{41} Under Eisenhower, Striebert was the first U.S.I.A. Director to sit on the N.S.C. meetings, but he attended more in the role of an "observer" than as an advisor.\textsuperscript{42} Striebert and other lesser counsellors sat around the sides of the room and not at the table with other full members of the N.S.C., and made few comments.\textsuperscript{43}

Kennedy's awareness of the boomerang effect of "public diplomacy" and subsequent emphasis on the advisement
role of the U.S.I.A., tended to sharpen the position of the U.S.I.A. Director on the N.S.C. The Ball-Sharon-Free task force, established by Kennedy to study various aspects of foreign affairs, especially the U.S.I.A., recommended that the U.S.I.A. director be the "principal 'psychological' advisor to the executive branch and [that he] continue to participate in meetings of the N.S.C."^44

Although Murrow was granted this "full-seat" on the National Security Council, some would argue that the N.S.C., as a working unit, was not given the same importance in the Kennedy administration as it had been given in Eisenhower's:

... the plain fact was that the organization [the N.S.C.] itself, the linchpin of Eisenhower's Administration, was relegated by Kennedy to a much inferior role.^45

It will be suggested later that the seat on Council was, in itself, a raise in status for the Agency.

The Kennedy Charisma

The Kennedy personality added another factor which was conducive to improved relations between the Agency and
the administration. It was mentioned previously that Murrow's prestige and influence were important factors in his ability to cope with both the Agency and the President. It is a widely held assumption that Kennedy's charismatic personality also acted as an aid in coping with people and departments under his jurisdiction. His youth, personality, and energy could only be a benefit to an Agency attempting to create a favorable image of the U.S. abroad. Kennedy was, as Wilson Dizard so aptly put it, "an easy guy to sell." In other words, both Kennedy and his wife were popular figures overseas and were openly welcomed. Pictures of them both could be seen even in the most squalid huts of African nations during his presidency. Such an overseas image obviously put less strain on the U.S.I.A. operations. In fact, Kennedy's reputation and charisma became a "prime asset to the U.S.I.A., a persuasive symbol of the goodness and greatness of America." Tom Sorenson in The Word War describes four bases for this effect of Kennedy overseas:

First, he was a man of his times, young,
vigorous, and full of hope.

Second, he was one of the few world statesmen since World War II to talk of peace as an achievable goal.

Third, he was the first American President to see Civil Rights as a great moral issue.

Fourth, his obviously heartfelt determination to help other nations break the cycle of poverty, ignorance, and disease, restored many a skeptical foreigner's confidence in America.49

The Relationship Between Kennedy and Murrow

Another significant factor in the development of communication lines between the Agency and the Administration is the relationship which develops between the director and the president. The discussion so far has touched on the influence of Kennedy's and Murrow's mutually held attitudes concerning the Agency, the concrete actions which were taken, and the effect of both individual's personalities. Three more aspects can be developed here which directly impinge on the communication patterns between the two parties.

The first aspect deals once again with the personalities of the two men. Often, the respect or disrespect
between two such parties within an organization can destroy or maintain the organizational structure.\textsuperscript{50} Mutual trust obviously opens communication possibilities and a lack of trust closes off the lines. Murrow and Kennedy were both strong personalities in their own right. Kennedy was previously described as having been a "prime asset to the U.S.I.A." based, in part, upon his favorable international image. Murrow's aura was also briefly mentioned in terms of his well-known role as a London correspondent during the war, as creator of the C.B.S. "See It Now" series, and as a straightforward newsman. Sorenson again reports on the influence of Murrow's reputation:

Not the least of those who added new lustre to American prestige was ... Ed Murrow. His credentials of character, sympathy, and goodwill were widely known to the literate of countries big and small. They trusted Ed Murrow, therefore, they believed him.\textsuperscript{51}

Wilson Dizard further supports this view by commenting that the re-emphasized seat on the National Security Council was due more to Murrow's prestige than to any other factor.\textsuperscript{52}

These two strong personalities could have resulted
in conflict or a development of mutual respect. It would
seem, through their views on the Agency, the Kennedy di-
rective, and other actions, that the latter occurred in the
relationship between the two. This build-up of mutual con-
fidence would seem to have enhanced the communication lines
which existed.

The second aspect involves the interplay between
Murrow and his Deputy Director, Don Wilson, a former employee
of the Time-Life Corporation. According to Henry Loomis, a
former V.O.A. director from 1958 to 1965, the "ideal" re-
relationship between these two should be structured in the
following manner. One should be non-partisan and a pro-
fessional in the field. The other should be partisan and,
if possible, also a professional. This relationship, in
Loomis' terms, does two things: first, it allows for a
close, personal relationship between the partisan member and
the president, and second, it provides an internal check
and balance system. Murrow and Wilson formed a very
good example of Loomis' "ideal" structure. Wilson was very
much a "Kennedy man" and thus had access to the President
in a personal sense. Murrow, on the other hand, appeared
to be non-partisan and was most definitely a professional. Thus, he supplied the "integrity and ability to fight back when he felt it was necessary." In light of Loomis' insights, it would appear that Murrow and Wilson had another asset which would have improved communication lines.

The final aspect of the Kennedy-Murrow relationship is derived from the role of the National Security Council seat. The advisory seat on the N.S.C. was influential for two primary reasons. First, although Kennedy's use of the N.S.C. was limited, the seat provided the "official" access route to the President. Paul T. Grimes, in referring to the role of Frank Shakespeare as U.S.I.A. director under Nixon, states, "The predecessors [Murrow, Rowan, and Marks] attended National Security Council sessions and thus officially had the ear of the President." 

Second, the seat on the National Security Council gave prestige to the Agency. The Agency had just barely crept through the McCarthy hearings of the 1950's and any addition to their status ranking was a welcome benefit. It would seem that the N.S.C. seat, in an advisory capacity,
would enhance relationships with other agencies as well as with the President. A study of the N.S.C. as an interdepartmental coordinating device supports this notion that participation in the N.S.C. does enhance status ranking of an agency or department. 57

**International Factors**

Because of the nature of the Agency, international affairs directly affect its daily operations and resultant dealings with the administration. The Agency must deal with the image the United States is creating for itself through its foreign policy interactions. Two events occurred within the Kennedy administration which had a direct and very striking effect on the U.S.I.A. The two incidents referred to are the Bay of Pigs fiasco of April, 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis of August, 1962. These two incidents are useful as a device through which to demonstrate the Presidential relationship with the Agency during a crisis. The U.S.I.A. was, obviously, also involved in many other aspects of the administration as deeply as it was in these two. For example, the first
successful U.S. space orbit was quite useful to the U.S.I.A. Ed Murrow suggested that in Europe and the Far East the orbit was "viewed as a triumph for foree men. Many regarded the flight as a morale booster for the non-communist world." 58

However, the Bay of Pigs incident was one example of lack of U.S.I.A. input. The covert nature of the invasion helped to keep not only the U.S.I.A., but members of the Cabinet and the National Security Council completely unaware of its proposed execution. 59 The plan's conception was a product not of Kennedy's administration, but of Eisenhower's administration. 60 Since early 1960, a Cuban exile army had been training under the Central Intelligence Agency's (C.I.A.) guidance for an invasion of Cuba. 61

As Kennedy came into office, the plan was almost irrevocable; the force was trained and ready to put its training into effect. 62 By March 11, 1961, the National Security Council met to consider the invasion plan in detail. As Director of the U.S.I.A., Murrow should have attended the meeting, but his appointment had not yet been
confirmed by the Senate. 63

The plan moved ahead swiftly from the March 11 meeting. There was never any question of whether the program would be successful or not. The C.I.A. assured the young President that it would be. 64 On April 4, 1961, the National Security Council met for the second time. Murrow had been confirmed by the Senate on March 15 and was sworn in on March 21. 65 Thus, he should have been at the April 4 meeting, but he was not asked to be present. 66 Had he been there, he would probably have made, in his promised capacity as an advisor, two vital suggestions. One, that the plan, whether successful or not, would establish the New Frontier as a "mere military demarcation line, and no propaganda would have an easy time persuading the rest of the world of the genuineness of high American pretensions." 67 Second, the U.S.I.A. had in its research files a survey showing that Castro was growing in popularity and thus, the hope of rallying other Cubans with the liberation force was groundless. 68 Yet, Murrow obviously did not have the opportunity to present this information.
Murrow was still not aware of the plan the day before it was to occur. Murrow's contact with the invasion schedule initially came from a N.Y. Times correspondent. He immediately attempted to confirm the report through Allen Dulles, C.I.A. Director, but to no avail. McGeorge Bundy, the President's advisor, finally contacted Murrow about the issue, but it was about two days late.

The rest of the incident is well-known. The basic point of interest here is that this issue helped to create in the President's mind a need for more advisement in such matters, especially from such men as Murrow. As Alexander Kendrick puts it, "the Bay of Pigs brought Murrow into the Administration with both feet." Murrow was moved to an inner committee to formulate a new counter-insurgency program. It was obvious that the President had realized that advisement was even more important than he had initially believed. The issue as a whole, and Murrow's opposition to it, helped to increase the relationship between the President and the Director to a "cordial one, based on mutual respect." Yet this increased relationship still had some
faults which will appear in the discussion of the next incident, the Cuban Missile Crisis.

On October 14, 1962, the first "rude beginnings of a Soviet medium-range missile base" were spotted in the San Cristobal area of Cuba by an American U-2 plane. This was the beginning of the Cuban Missile Crisis of the Autumn of 1962. Although Kennedy had just experienced the results of lack of advisement in the Bay of Pigs incident, the initial stages of the 1962 crisis were also "enjoined to the strictest secrecy." Murrow had been in Persia inspecting information libraries and other operations when he developed pneumonia. This was not Murrow's first bout with pneumonia, he had suffered from respiratory illness in the past and would continue to be susceptible to such illnesses in the future. However, this case of pneumonia forced the Director to return home. He arrived in Pawling, New York on October 12, two days before the U-2 plane had discovered the missile site. Ironically, the U.S.I.A. Director had to remain in bed for the two weeks of the crisis, again being denied his input function in policy-making.
The early moments of the crisis revolved around the choice of several alternative courses of response to the Soviet threat. The choices were: (1) do nothing, (2) bring diplomatic pressures and warnings to bear upon the Soviets, (3) undertake a secret approach to Castro, (4) initiate indirect military action by means of a blockade, (5) conduct an air strike, or (6) launch an invasion. The choices were rather quickly narrowed down to two possibilities by an executive committee (ExCom) created by the President shortly after the crisis had arisen. The ExCom held two meetings on October 16 in which the alternatives became a choice between an air strike and a blockade. On Thursday, October 19, the blockade was chosen as the only possible choice if outright conflict was to be avoided. At this point, two vital decisions concerning the crisis had been made on the advice of State, Defense, and the C.I.A., without the council of the U.S.I.A. Contrary to Murrow's desire to be in on the "takeoffs" this time and Kennedy's expressed desire for more complete advisement, the U.S.I.A. came as an after-thought, although it was eventually included. Deputy Director Don Wilson, acting for Murrow in
his absence, was briefed on the issue the day the choice to blockade was made.82 Had Murrow been well, perhaps the President would have made an earlier contact with the U.S.I.A., yet this can only remain a surmise. At any rate, Wilson was finally officially included in the ExCom meetings as of October 22.83

These ExCom meetings formed the planning sessions for the remainder of the crisis. By Saturday, October 20, concrete drafts had been proposed for the speech Kennedy was to make on Monday night and for the statement declaring the blockade.84 It was at this point that the U.S.I.A. became important to the crisis and to the President. The message and statement proposing an official blockade could only be effective if heard. Thus, the U.S.I.A. was assigned to do what it knew best, to disseminate a particular piece of information as fast as possible. Therefore, the Voice of America, normally using only short-wave transmitters in the U.S., had to hook up to nine private medium wave (AM) stations in Florida to broadcast for twenty-four hours. They carried the Presidential speech in Spanish to Cuba and all of Latin America.85 The U.S.I.A. also used radio,
television and film, news releases and photographs, and helped to convince "much of the world that the Russians were entirely responsible for the deadly encounter... and that an American response, whatever it might turn out to be, was necessary." Most pressure to broadcast was felt in the immediate news source, the Voice of America. V.O.A. was useful as it could broadcast rapidly any new development, and yet, because of this, it had more "obligation" to be exact and supportive of what the administration was doing in this deliberate "power play." Due to such feelings of pressure from the White House, the U.S.I.A. made its own decision to send a high-ranking policy official down to the V.O.A. to "supervise personally all broadcasts touching on the Crisis and to keep news and commentary truthful, but at the same time to assure that neither the situation or the U.S. government's views are misrepresented." The V.O.A. seemed complacent enough with this "parental" influence during the height of the crisis, but it exploded with resentment once the situation had been resolved. The Voice felt that the U.S.I.A. interference had been a direct violation of the charter approved in 1960.
by George V. Allen. Henry Loomis, director of the Voice at the time of the Crisis, called the Voice's broadcasts "monolithic in tone" and in a letter to Murrow stated:

During the Cuban Missile Crisis, in our judgement, we [V.O.A.] were required to distort and concentrate our programs at the expense of credibility and relevance to our audience. . . . If news analysis restricts itself to merely repeating in different words what the President or the Secretary of State says, it becomes . . . increasingly dull, and it reveals, increasingly, a propaganda motivation.88

This controversy brought to a head the policy differences between the V.O.A. and the U.S.I.A. which had been building during the Kennedy administration. Though the V.O.A., being an organizational arm of the U.S.I.A. was supposed to follow administrative policy, it had tended to become a "free-wheeling procedure. . . not the Voice of any particular American administration, but as the voice of an open American society."89 Yet, foreign governments saw the Voice as the policy arm of the administration in power and as such, in the Crisis situation, the U.S.I.A. overlordship could be justified. Murrow himself was torn between these two perceptions of the Voice. As a former broadcaster he could
It is vital that our broadcasts not mislead either our enemies or our friends about the nature, intent and implications of our actions and purposes. Therefore, V.O.A. commentaries and analyses on foreign affairs should at all times... reflect the nuances and special emphasis of the policies and intentions of the U.S. government.

However, in speaking with Loomis on the Crisis issue of 1962, he felt, in looking back on the incident, that the pressure by Kennedy during the incident was backed with evidence as to why the V.O.A. was being restricted. He felt that Kennedy had more "self-confidence" than his successor and that this caused less directives with no explanation attached to them. It had been quite obvious that national security was in danger during the delicate confrontation. Kennedy had played a "brinkmanship" game, and, luckily, had won.
Conclusion

Two main concepts seem to characterize the Kennedy administration's relationship with the U.S.I.A. and Ed Murrow. The first is perhaps the most obvious and yet, in many ways, the most important. It is simply the personalities of the two men. Each man acted as an asset to his respective portion of the government, the administration and the Agency. Each man created a new atmosphere for the post he held and through this effect increased respect for himself and for the other. Murrow, through his reputation, his shrewd decisions, his sound advice, gave the "much battered, oft-confused Information Agency new inspired leadership, new direction, new competence, and new stature." Just by virtue of his name and his mode of operation, he brought the Agency out of the level of burocratic insignificance it usually held. Murrow brought the outward appearance, and, it would seem, inward belief, in "unwavering idealism and... healthy cynicism" that gave a fresh approach to "propaganda." He was not harrassed by the usual concerns from outside observers that
the director was an "administration man," dedicated to supporting its policy in all cases. He believed that, "Communication systems are neutral. They have neither conscience nor morality, only a history. They will broadcast truth or falsehood with equal facility. Man communicating with man poses not the problem of how to say it, but more fundamentally, what is he to say?"  

In the same respect, Kennedy had a similar "style" about him. He preferred to base his "propaganda" on policy rather than "substitute propaganda for the carrying out of policy" as his successor was accused of doing. He had appealed to the foreign audience in a way that made him an asset in "building foreign confidence in the United States." There was a sense of justice and of objectivity about him as well as there was about Murrow. Murrow remarked that, "this Agency, with the President [Kennedy]'recognizes the value of daring and dissent' and greets 'healthy controversy as the hallmark of healthy change.'"  

Both men had an air of individuality, competence,
and belief in what they were doing. And, most importantly, they respected each other. Kennedy wrote to Murrow on the tenth anniversary of the U.S.I.A.:

In the critical times of the last two years, the Agency, under your leadership, has demonstrated an imaginative skill and maturity that would do justice to an organization with many decades of experience rather than just one.

And Murrow remarked in a letter to J. Robert Oppenheimer concerning his impressions of the two presidents with whom he served:

I have had great difficulty in trying to reach some judgements regarding that young man's relations to his time. I saw him at fairly close range under a variety of circumstances, and there remains for me a considerable element of mystery - and maybe that is good. I always knew where his mind was, but I was not always sure where his heart was.

......

My experience with Lyndon Johnson was rather the reverse. I was never in doubt where his heart was, as he was generally beating me over the head with it.

The second concept involves the specific channels of communication and how they were utilized. Due in part
to Murrow's personal influence and in part to the role the U.S.I.A. played in the Kennedy administration, the Agency was brought from the "dog house to the White House." The Agency made this move based on several fundamental gains, communicatively and prestigiously. First, the U.S.I.A., although still having difficulty with appropriations, had greatly increased its overseas posts and the areas in which it had posts, had erected new V.O.A. transmitters in North Carolina, had increased its broadcasting hours per week, and had opened new television studios in Washington. Second, the U.S.I.A. director had been granted an advisory seat on the N.S.C. Although in reality this role was somewhat neglected, it helped "boost the prestige of the U.S.I.A. and elevate the morale of its personnel." At least the U.S.I.A. made it to the second half of the Cuban Crisis ExCom meetings, if not to the first. In the past and in the upcoming administration, the U.S.I.A. was, and would be, denied even that access.

Thus, the first real communicative contact between the two segments appears to have occurred here. Eased by the prestige and respect each man brought to his respective
office, by the concrete actions of the re-emphasized National Security Council seat and the new mission espoused in the Kennedy directive, and by the fact that the U.S. overseas image had not yet been tarnished by the Vietnam conflict, the communicative channels were open and operative.
Footnotes

Chapter III


2. Ibid., p. 185.


6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.
9 Evans and Novak, op. cit., p. 188.


13 Kendrick, op. cit., p. 453.

14 Blair Clark, a former Harvard classmate of Kennedy and co-worker of Murrow at C.B.S. news, suggests this split between the two men: Stanton, if you want someone to deal with Congress about appropriations, and Murrow, if you want someone to tell the American story with some credibility. (Based on Kendrick, op. cit., p. 452)


16 Ibid., p. 447.

17 It is interesting to note that this comment was made in a speech concerning the "Harvest of Shame" incident. This involved Murrow, as U.S.I.A. director, trying to prevent the B.B.C. from showing a documentary, "The Harvest of Shame," which he had created when still with C.B.S. The documentary dealt with the plight of migratory workers in the U.S. and Murrow, in his new role, felt it was representative of a product harmful to the U.S. overseas image.


27 Bernays and Hershey, *op. cit.*, p. 42.


30 Bernays and Hershey, op. cit., p. 42.

31 Kendrick, op. cit., p. 456.


33 Kendrick, op. cit. p. 464.


35 Kendrick, op. cit., p. 467.

36 Lawson, op. cit., p. 4-13.


41 Ibid., p. 903.

42 Sorenson, The Word War, op. cit., p. 82.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid., pp. 119-120.

45 Kendrick, op. cit., p. 462.


47 Ibid.


49 Ibid., p. 217.

50 Note the increased use of T-group training and other devices aimed at increasing the legitimacy of interpersonal relationships in large-scale organizations. See Warren Bennis, Beyond Bureaucracy (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1966).

52 Wilson Dizard, interview, op. cit.

53 It is assumed that professional has two meanings in this case. One, that a professional is an individual with an extensive background in mass communications, journalism, and international relations. Second, that a professional is one who acts in a "professional" manner. That is, one who is assumed to follow the canons of journalism, one who can be considered "objective," in the journalistic sense of the word.

54 Henry Loomis, President of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, personal interview, Washington, D.C., March 17, 1975.

55 Ibid.

56 Bernays and Hershey, op. cit., p. 302.

57 For further details on this concept, see Hammond Pauly, "The National Security Council as a Device for Inter-Departmental Coordination," American Political Science Review, LIV (December, 1960), 899-910.


59 Kendrick, op. cit., p. 461.

61 Ibid.

62 Ibid., p. 269.

63 Kendrick, op. cit., p. 462.

64 Sorenson, Kennedy, op. cit., p. 269.

65 Kendrick, op. cit., p. 462.

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid., p. 463.

68 Ibid., Thomas Sorenson in The Word War also confirms the existence of this report.

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid., p. 464.

72 Ibid., p. 467.

73 Sorenson, Kennedy, op. cit., p. 673.

74 Ibid., p. 676.
The members of the ExCom included Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary Robert McNamara, Director of the CIA John McCone, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Aides McGeorge Bundy and Ted Sorenson.

...
88 Ibid., p. 239.
89 Kendrick, op. cit., p. 485.
90 Ibid.
91 Sorenson, The Word War, op. cit., p. 239.
92 Henry Loomis, President of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, personal interview, March 17, 1975, Washington, D.C.
93 Kendrick, op. cit., p. 484.
95 Kendrick, op. cit., p. 504.
96 Ibid., p. 50
97 Ibid.
100 Sorenson, The Word War, op. cit., p. 220.


CHAPTER IV

THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION

No man in American history became President with a greater relish for power or with more experience in its exercise than did Johnson. Nor did any President assume the office with a prospect so spectacular in its opportunities and so difficult by the very nature of his assumption.

Following the assasination of John F. Kennedy, the transferal of power to Lyndon Baines Johnson was amazingly fast. The U.S.I.A. found itself faced with a new President with his own plans for "propaganda," before it had time to complete its coverage of the past President's death. As the tension of November 22 began to ease, the U.S.I.A. and Murrow prepared themselves for a President whose past treatment of the Agency since 1957 had not been exceedingly supportive.

So that a parallel might be more easily drawn between the two administrations, the first aspect of Johnson's
previous attitude toward the U.S.I.A. to be examined will involve the Senate hearings of 1957 during Eisenhower's "Battle of the Budget." As previously mentioned, Johnson was chairman of the Appropriations Committee and Arthur Larson, the "Modern Republicanism" apostle, was the newly appointed U.S.I.A. director. Johnson was determined to cut the U.S.I.A.'s budget and set the tone of the questioning with a heavy note of sarcasm which he continued to use throughout the session:

I can understand some of the difficulties involved in your position. You yourself put the situation quite well in a recent speech before a Lincoln Day audience when you said: "What we do and what we are is one hundred times more important than what we say." Your agency is fundamentally a saying agency.2

Johnson continued the testimony maintaining only the barest "facade of courtesy" while allowing the "knife of ridicule to cut through."3 In one instance, Johnson asked Larson about specific films the Agency had shown recently, then commented, "Do you screen them carefully for any alien philosophy that might be in them?" This comment was directly related to the unfortunate speech made by Larson a
few days earlier in which he called the New and Fair Deals part of an "alien philosophy" imported from Europe.

Johnson moved on to treat Larson condescendingly in front of his own employees and the other Senators. Larson had begun to complain, rather verbosely, that Johnson was giving an "incorrect picture of the U.S.I.A." during the hearings. Johnson responded with a series of comments which made Larson even more uncomfortable:

Larson: Mr. Chairman, that is not correct and I can demonstrate methodically, point by point, figure-by-figure that that is not correct.

Johnson: Let us do it quietly now. Explain these figures in the case of Italy, Pakistan, and in the case of Turkey. These are the three countries. We do not have to be loud about it. You be as quiet as you want to.  

Larson received no backing from the seven Republicans on the Committee, most of whom were conservatives or supporters of Johnson anyway. And thus, the comments continued, bringing Larson and the U.S.I.A. to one of the lowest periods it had experienced since the McCarthy probes. Johnson criticized the Agency for its use of the funds appropriated the
previous year when he had again chaired the Committee. Johnson referred to the increase of $26 million that U.S.I.A. had received and stated that the Agency had not utilized the money for new book programs or educational programs but,

It had added two hundred employees, in defiance of the most generous friend the Agency has had.

The only thing that became clear is that the U.S.I.A. never abandons an activity, but only increases its personnel and spending, unless an abrupt halt is ordered by an outside authority.

Finally, the bill, with funds for U.S.I.A. cut thirty-eight per cent by Johnson's Committee, came to the floor of the Senate for approval on May 15, 1957. Johnson congratulated himself on the reduction in funds and on compiling 1,249 pages of testimony, "one of the largest and longest records of any subcommittee in the history of the Senate." He had also compiled one of the most demeaning records for the U.S.I.A. Johnson, at the outset of the Senate's discussion of the bill, stated:

The committee does not believe that a
larger sum can be justified until the Agency reaches a point of control where it can present detailed explanations and adequate justifications.

Some discussion accompanied the bill, including the previously mentioned support for the U.S.I.A. by Kennedy and others. However, the bill, with all its reductions intact, was finally passed by a vote of sixty-one to fifteen. And Johnson, in some concluding remarks summed up his overall attitude, at the time, toward the U.S.I.A.:

There is not one scintilla of evidence which would justify the assertion by a judicious, prudent man that the 90 million that we have recommended will be wisely spent.

As Vice President, Johnson's relationship with the U.S.I.A. had not been a cordial one either. On trips abroad, the Vice President's outbursts and rages caused continual embarrassment for U.S.I.A. and State Department officials. Such actions, later known as the "Johnson Treatment" to White House aides, became "legendary." Murrow also encountered some difficulties with Mr. Johnson and was "vexed by what he . . . considered thoughtless, if not
arrogant, behavior by the restless, under-employed Vice President on his several trips abroad."

Johnson's special demands for a particular brand of Scotch, a particular type of shower fixture, and a particular size of bed; . . . his haggling over purchases, his erection of a plywood partition in the Istanbul hotel to separate him from others in his party; his vocal preoccupation with crowds and other incidents . . . were quickly reported back to Washington by word of mouth. 12

The press, accompanying Johnson on his overseas trips, often picked up these incidents and wrote "harsh, if truthful, accounts of the [Johnson] Private Person." 13 This kind of reporting was a problem which would reach "crisis proportions" during his Presidency. Not only was the press critical of Johnson, but Johnson continually reported complaints he had about U.S.I.A. officials lack of publicity for him and lack of properly arranged receptions and conferences. 14 During his Vice Presidency, it would appear that Johnson had a rather low regard for the Agency and that he "was not very discreet about keeping his negative opinions to himself; derogatory comments here and there were quickly noted by newsmen and government officials
Thus, the Agency was a bit apprehensive of Johnson's rapid accession to the presidency. They had finally received a substantial degree of certainty as to what their function was under Kennedy, and now, although the U.S.I.A. mission remained "essentially as it had been defined," a new personality and set of international incidents were confronting them. 16

Appointment of a New Director

In the midst of the presidential transition, Johnson attempted to keep as many members of the "New Frontiersmen" as possible to maintain a front of continuity. 17 Among those he desired to incorporate into his administrative machinery was Edward R. Murrow. Murrow, as noted previously, appeared to have brought prestige and credibility to an Agency usually submerged in anonymity. Yet, the U.S.I.A. Director had far graver problems than making the decision to remain through the transition. In September, 1963, Murrow had entered Washington Hospital Center for observation and testing. 18 Murrow, was, at the time,
smoking over seventy cigarettes a day. The explorations and testing showed a spot on the left lung and the cancerous lung was removed October 16, 1963. Murrow's convalescence was extremely slow and he was unsure of his ability to continue as U.S.I.A. Director. After the assassination, Murrow became an infrequent overseer of the Agency due to his illness. His conscience bothered him and he soon realized it was simply a question of picking a proper time to resign. In November, Murrow wrote to Johnson explaining that it was his "duty to ask you to accept my resignation." Murrow had hoped to resign within the next few months. However, his health deteriorated more rapidly than expected and by December Murrow sought an appointment with Johnson to make his resignation formal. For seven days Murrow could not make contact with the White House. Johnson would not shatter the careful image he was creating by allowing Murrow to resign before he had a successor. Finally, the President accepted Murrow's resignation on January 20, 1964, thereby losing what might have been one of the strongest foundations to the Agency's new found status. Murrow pressed for
Don Wilson, his Deputy Director, to be given the role of director, but Johnson had "his own man in mind and Wilson was a personal friend of Robert Kennedy." It was a well-known fact that Johnson and Bobby Kennedy were not on friendly terms.

The President, already feeling the strain of his new burdens, suddenly had to find a replacement for Murrow. Johnson felt that the presidency could not risk any top-level vacancies; any vacancy could "impair confidence" in the new government, and Johnson could not allow that. Thus, a new director had to be rapidly chosen to fill the U.S.I.A. post.

The President's choice was Carl T. Rowan, a journalist, and the first black man to fill this position. In Thomas Sorenson suggests that he submitted Rowan's name to Johnson in response to a presidential request made through his brother, Theodore, still a White House aide. Although Rowan was a former newspaper reporter for the Minneapolis Tribune and an author in his own right, he was "an unknown quality as a propagandist."
Rowan, however, had just served two years as a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and had earned the then Vice President Johnson's "admiration" when traveling with him abroad on his excursions. Thus, Rowan may have been an unknown quality as a propagandist, but he was not unknown to the President. As Vice President, Johnson had been quite impressed with Rowan's success at arranging publicity engagements overseas and had just previously appointed Rowan Ambassador to Finland. Perhaps Rowan was also viewed as a selective figure-head for Johnson's envisioned plan of a "Great Society" where poverty would be non-existent and racial equality would reign.

Rowan, upon returning from Finland to take the post of Director in February, 1964, adopted a rather "Johnsonian formula," and instructed the Agency that the "best propaganda is the wisest use of truth (emphasis added)." Much of this attitude had been formulated while Rowan was still in the State Department. There he had expressed himself "in favor of news direction (emphasis added)." This notion appeared to move with Rowan into his new post and to result
in tension, especially between the V.O.A. and the U.S.I.A. Policy Office. Some critics viewed such an attitude, with respect to the Kennedy administration, as follows: "If there had been news management by the Kennedy Administration, . . . there would be news management multiplied by the Johnson Administration." 

During Rowan's one year in office, his V.O.A. Director also felt that the news management attitude had followed Rowan to the U.S.I.A. and resigned because of it. Henry Loomis, director of the Voice for seven years, three with Murrow, finally gave up his post "in protest against attempts to 'distort the image of America' by suppressing reports of opposition to the war in Vietnam." Loomis resented Rowan's attempts to bring the Voice "in line" with policy guidance from the State Department and White House. In his resignation speech of March, 1965, Loomis commented:

To sweep under the rug what we don't like, what does not serve our tactical purposes, is a sign of weakness. To acknowledge the existence of forces and views in disagreement with policy-makers, to take these into account in the formulation of our output . . . is good, persuasive propaganda.
Rowan, of course, defended the Voice and the U.S.I.A. against such criticism from Loomis, the New York Times, and the Washington Post, stating there was little or no pressure from the White House. Yet, within the year, Rowan also resigned from his post with no apparent explanation. It has been suggested that Rowan "disaffected by the drastic alteration in U.S.I.A. purpose and methods, could not serve his presidential patron any longer." Donald Wilson, Deputy Director since Murrow's term, also resigned around this same period. Several critics viewed the three consecutive resignations rather negatively:

If there was a policy dispute at the top of U.S.I.A., it is well that any opponent of practical propaganda should be eliminated. It may be hoped that President Johnson has decided to use the U.S.I.A. to influence foreign opinion with more finesse.

But there is good ground to believe that he is unhappy with the present state of his administration's public information setup and/or its ventures in propaganda. Certainly the President is an apostle of the art of persuasion.

Within the year, Johnson had again lost his U.S.I.A. Director, his Deputy Director, and the Director
of the Voice. Johnson was also involved with a confrontation in Vietnam, racial disturbances at home, and a rather poor overseas image of the United States.

The next man appointed by the President to attempt to change this overseas image was Leonard Marks, "a longtime friend and associate of President Johnson." Marks' law firm, Cohn and Marks, had represented KTBC (AM, FM, and television complex) of Austin, Texas for quite some time, and Marks was a "close advisor to the station owners, Lady Bird and Lyndon Johnson." This relationship would not seem to parallel the less personally bound conditions under which Murrow was appointed in 1960. Although some critics saw the friendship of the President and his Director in a roundabout way as potentially useful to Marks:

Mr. Marks is a personal friend of the President and conceivably could resist the all pervasive qualities of the President, whose all pervasive qualities are well-known.

Although Marks and the President were close friends, his experience did not seem to justify his appointment, in light of the responsibilities of the job. Granted he was
a communications lawyer and he had had a brief stint with ComSat, the Communications Satellite Corporation, but he had little background with political or international relations. Yet, to President Johnson, his friendship with Marks and Marks' dealings with the Johnson broadcasting interests, "constituted experience and dedication enough in the field of political communication." 41

After taking office in September, 1965, the U.S.I.A., under Marks, did not escape the criticisms leveled at the Agency earlier. Marks seemed to be much more "an administrator and manager who strived to find ways and means of sharpening and tightening the Agency's performance in achieving its mission," than a fighter for freedom of the Voice. 42 He reorganized the U.S.I.A. and instituted the Planning-Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) which "tied budget and program-planning more closely to objectives -- and thereby strengthened Washington control over the field." 43 In Marks' concern for organization, he also made several changes in personnel during his three year term (9/65 - 12/68). In the fall of 1965, four new assistant directors were appointed and John Chancellor of N.B.C.
entered the V.O.A. director's post. Marks was satisfied with his new leadership; "at the top level I am well supported. We all came in as a team." Yet, even with the new leadership, Marks found it difficult to create a brighter image for the U.S. in the face of incidents like the Birmingham riots and Little Rock. However, with John Chancellor as head of the Voice, there seemed to be less friction between the parent Agency or policy-makers and the broadcasting unit than there had been in the past.

Chancellor had a slightly different view of the Voice and commented upon his acceptance of the post:

"Context will be our pre-occupation, we will send no false signals to enemies or spectators. . . our task is to make the policies of the Government of the United States clearly and explicitly understood with no chance for misunderstanding."

Chancellor also agreed, as Loomis had not, that a Policy Officer should clear all Voice commentaries. Yet, he so strongly toed the line himself that it was rarely necessary for the U.S.I.A. Policy Officers to step in. Overall, Chancellor's relationship with the Voice and Marks was
more conservative and thus more congenial than Loomis' had been. In an open letter to the editor of the *The Nation*, Chancellor summed up his term this way:

> While I worked at the Voice of America, I thought our policy machinery was in good balance, and so did most people. But I don't think I won the hearts and minds of that little band of freedom-at-any-cost civil servants who would like to run their own independent radio station.48

Yet, Mr. Chancellor did not remain long at the V.O.A. either. In 1967, John Daly, former C.B.S. newsman, took over the V.O.A. directorship when Chancellor returned to N.B.C. Daly's appointment was met with a rather biting memorandum from Richard J. Walton, a former principal U.N. correspondent for the Voice. Walton had resigned in May of 1967, shortly before Daly took office. In his open memorandum published in *The Nation*, Walton accused the Johnson administration of giving "precious little" authority to any V.O.A. director.49 U.S.I.A., in Walton's view, had too much power as the policy makers to "kill or modify something they thought would be too embarrassing to the Administration."50 Walton also brought to question the
relationship of Johnson and Marks and how this might have affected the censorship of the Voice. Walton suggested that if Daly were to ask Marks to allow an unfavorable story to be broadcast he would be "asking Mr. Marks, a personal friend of the President, to approve for broadcast something embarrassing to the Johnson administration. Mr. Johnson does not encourage his subordinates to embarrass him." Although Daly had said he would advocate "full and fair coverage of the Vietnamese situation," Walton also reminded him that Congressman John J. Rooney had redefined Daly's job a bit differently than Daly had envisioned it:

His job is purely administrative. It has to do with contracts and purchases of equipment, and where he does get into programming he should realize his job is to promote our way of thinking.

Daly probably did not totally accept all of Walton's comments, but on June 6, after just nine months in office, John Daly "angrily resigned." Daly's resignation revolved around charges of "executive undercutting" by U.S.I.A. Director Marks. While Daly had been overseas, Leonard Reed, chief of the World-Wide English Division,
had been transferred to the press service of U.S.I.A. over Reed's protests and without Daly's agreement to the transferal. Reed was later characterized as one of V.O.A.'s "most intelligent, imaginative, and effective executives, one who believed that the V.O.A. should tell the truth, and as one who made no secret of his conviction that V.O.A. should be an independent agency, free to practice objective journalism free from the U.S.I.A." In retrospect it is interesting that Reed, a fighter for freedom of the Voice, was chosen as the pawn in the "undercutting" rather than some other minor V.O.A. employee.

Johnson's View of the Agency's Role

Much of Johnson's view of the Agency and how he perceived its function relates to the quotation with which this chapter begins. Johnson had lofty goals and made a "hard use of power to achieve them." He saw the U.S.I.A. as one means of achieving those goals. He would utilize U.S.I.A. in his plans, but would not want the Agency to advise him as to how it should be used or what part it should play; "Johnson would look at the U.S.I.A. as a
public relations outfit. He certainly would want no council from it on substantial matters of state."\textsuperscript{56} Johnson saw
the Agency, not as a separate unit, but as a definite part of the government. He did not appear interested in establishing the Voice as an independent, reputable news agency.
At the swearing in ceremony of Marks, Johnson remarked;
"In this era, the U.S.I.A. has the most valuable role to fulfill. It is the most important arm of our government."\textsuperscript{57}

Johnson's desire for "good publicity," mentioned previously with regard to his Vice Presidency, was also a factor coloring his view of the Agency. Johnson has been characterized as hypersensitive, having intense personal reactions to criticisms, and harbouring a fierce sense of competition.\textsuperscript{58} These characteristics would lead Johnson to view the Agency in light of its ability to improve his image overseas:

The new President saw things differently. A man without the kind of "style" attributed to Kennedy, he expected a style could be created by the manipulation of the instruments of image-making.\textsuperscript{59}

Although Johnson had definite views concerning what
it should do, he was uncomfortable with the existing U.S.I.A. structure created to handle this "most important aspect" of his government. Since 1957, Johnson had stressed his desire for a strong information service aimed primarily at propaganda and also his belief in the inefficiency of the existing Agency designed to do that:

I am anxious to see us have the best information service in the world. I think we lost every propaganda war. I think we lost W.W. I to the Kaiser, I think we lost W.W.II, as far as propaganda is concerned, to Hitler.60

As discussed previously, several colleagues viewed Johnson as having a "low regard for the Agency's staff, a view carried over from his days as a Senate critic of U.S.I.A.'s budget."61 Johnson had made derogatory comments on several occasions concerning the Agency and its members which the Agency had not forgotten. Johnson was not convinced that the U.S.I.A. was doing all that it could in the area of propaganda. And as President he would utilize, to the fullest extent, the machinery at his disposal:

Instead of basing propaganda on policy, his [Johnson's] would be to substitute
propaganda for the carrying out of policy. He preferred consensus to conviction. He seemed to regard power as justified by itself, not by the uses to which it could be put, let alone the restraints it required. 62

**Johnson the Man**

John F. Kennedy took office as a youthful, handsome, energetic new hope for America. Lyndon Baines Johnson took office as an un-elected successor to an assassinated President, as a man forced to create a "sympathetic response between the new President and the millions of American citizens who had loved the old," and as a man whose appointment to the Vice Presidency had been "hotly opposed by the liberal core of his own party." Such a set of circumstances could not have been more ominous.

Johnson's first few months in office were not conducive to aiding an agency whose job was to present a favorable view of the United States. In addition to the problems involved with the rapid transferal of power, the emergence of new national and international preoccupations brought more new emphasis in the Johnson Administration than did any
other aspect, including the Johnson personality. The disturbance in Vietnam, the racial problems in the U.S., and the poverty issue were to play a more important role in deciding communication ties between the U.S.I.A. and the Administration than did such issues in Kennedy's term.

However, the Johnson personality was not without some effect. References were made earlier to Kennedy's charisma and the ease with which the U.S.I.A. could "sell" his image abroad. In the case of Johnson, the image did not lend itself so easily to promotion overseas. The "Johnson Treatment" abroad as well as nationally has been mentioned previously as a problem which "would reach crisis proportions during his presidency." It was also a problem which would cause tension for the U.S.I.A. as well. The fact that Johnson lacked the "style" attributed to Kennedy, also added to the difficulty of publicizing the new President. Johnson himself admitted the lack in early 1968 at a broadcaster's meeting in Chicago; "I understand . . . my own shortcomings as a communicator." And other authors and critics have also noted Johnson's peculiar manner of speech-giving and general approach to
He described the "American System" in phrases of one syllable as far from the high style of Kennedy as the Pedernales is from the Charles. It was a country man's idiom, explicit, to the point, unadorned. It would be heard again and again in the Johnson presidency. 66

Johnson was a man who seemed prone to the old political "spoils" system of appointing his own men, especially to positions like director of the U.S.I.A. He seemed to be willing to repay past political favors with a select post appointment. Rowan, for example, appeared to have been rewarded for the deference he had shown the President in the past. As Vice President, Johnson had been impressed with Rowan's ability to publicize him at the right time and place and in the correct manner. However, the emphasis on this aspect of their relationship may have been a factor in Rowan's resignation, as mentioned previously. Another appointment to the U.S.I.A. seems to clarify this point and to support the generalization. On March 20, 1965, Johnson announced the appointment of Howard B. Woods as "second Associate Director" of the U.S.I.A. 67
Rowan, as Director of the U.S.I.A. at this time, had been called a few days earlier by Johnson personally and asked to "create" a position for Woods in the Agency. Woods, another black, was the editor of Argus, a Negro paper in St. Louis, but more importantly, he was "one of the few Negroes of any note to support Johnson for President in 1960, and Johnson did not forget." The Johnsonian idea of remembering was to assign a post in his government to a past political supporter. Woods had been originally selected for a Federal Communications Commission (F.C.C.) spot, but certain Republicans felt that Woods was insufficiently non-partisan for that post, so Johnson turned to the U.S.I.A. Thus, Johnson was able to pay off a political debt and put a supporter in his "public relations outfit" with one appointment. However, as the position had been an unnecessary addition to the U.S.I.A., Woods resigned a year later due to lack of responsibilities.

Marks, as discussed previously, seems to have been similarly rewarded by his U.S.I.A. post. Marks, a close friend of the President, apparently had been chosen to head an agency designed to do that same President's bidding.
Such an appointment does not seem to reflect the searching probe to find a highly qualified individual that characterized the 1960 Murrow appointment.

The Relationship Between Johnson and His U.S.I.A. Directors

Two major conditions seem to characterize Johnson's relationship with his two directors. The first is the condition of reward; a job placement in return for favorable past political relationships. The second is the condition of friendship; a job placement in response to a personal friendship. These two conditions may work for or against the development of communication lines between a president and his U.S.I.A. director. Perhaps the choice lies in the motivation behind the appointment. The conditions could increase communication lines as in the case of Donald Wilson who was a "Kennedy man" and thus had access to the President, or at least his close advisors, in a more personal sense. Or the conditions could decrease communication lines as in the case of wielding friendship or reward as pressure to do or act in a presidentially approved manner. Or there might be continual strain as the two possibilities pulled against each other, and caused internal tension within the Agency.
Rowan would fall into the first condition. He was apparently placed in the directorship of the U.S.I.A. because in the past he had supplied the President with beneficial press coverage and promotion. Once Rowan took office, it would appear that this previous behavior was relied on to aid the U.S.I.A. in its functions. Although Rowan continually denied the existence of pressure from above, Loomis and other critics have disagreed with him. In 1965, the *New York Times* commented:

Policy differences and charges of censorship are ruffling relations between the Voice of America and its parent agency, U.S.I.A. Longtime V.O.A. staff members . . . complain their most valued asset, credibility with listeners, is being sacrificed in favor of putting a high polish on the Johnson Administration's policy lines.

Loomis, V.O.A. director under Rowan, felt that Rowan had "directed more pressure" on the Voice than did Murrow. He stated that Rowan would "preview" all editorials and commentary to be broadcast on the Voice and would edit such material himself. Certain stories, such as planes being shot down in Laos when the United States was not authorized
to have military aid in that country, were actually prohibed by Rowan and the U.S.I.A. Policy Office. Loomis also commented that Rowan did not maintain the same kind of relationship Murrow seemed to have had with the President and thus Rowan tended to "hand down more directives with no explanations as to 'why'" something was being ordered.  

In a Washington, D.C. Evening Star article of April, 1969, Rowan offered another possible explanation for Loomis' rather strident criticisms of the U.S.I.A. four years earlier. Loomis had been selected as Deputy Director of the U.S.I.A. by President Nixon in 1969 and had testified at his confirmation of post hearing that he had, as Director of the Voice in 1965, "fought a gallant, almost single-handed struggle to keep the U.S.I.A. from distorting America's image by sending managed news abroad." Rowan was writing in defense of his position as head of the U.S.I.A. during the same period. On February 6, 1965, Rowan stated that he had attended a N.S.C. meeting in which the Defense and State Departments had suggested that a "fitting and proper response" be made to the Viet Cong.
bombing of the American base at Pleiku. The decision was made to go ahead with a reprisal bombing. After a second N.S.C. meeting the next day, Rowan briefed Loomis and others of the serious step being taken. An order was issued by Rowan dealing with V.O.A. commentaries which said, in part, that Rowan wanted to "insure that no commentator went on the Voice with a challenge to Russia or implication that the bombings were meant to be an insult to Kosygin." Several hours later, Rowan was told of a V.O.A. commentary, about to go on the air, which "virtually declared war on the Soviet Union." Rowan called Loomis in and told him "in some pretty graphic language that he had been either inexcusably irresponsible, or was manifesting a notion that he could run the V.O.A. independent of it parent agency." Rowan then personally pre-viewed all commentary on the Voice for the next few days. Rowan states that Loomis "sulked and pouted" for days and that they finally agreed he should resign. Some months later Rowan heard of Loomis' "face-saving fabrication" about leaving the Voice due to White House pressure. Rowan concludes that there "simply was neither dictation from the White House nor
an effort to use the V.O.A. dishonestly." Some truth may be found in both sides of the issue.

Marks falls into the second condition, that of friendship. Whether or not the pressure was exactly as Walton had expressed it in his memorandum of August, 1967, appointing a personal friend to such a position allows the assumptions and accusations concerning such pressure to be made. It is more difficult to make such assumptions when the man appointed to the U.S.I.A. directorship has previously made the comment that the President who appointed him "would have become a McCarthyite overnight" if it seemed to his advantage. Marks' legal involvement in the Johnson broadcasting interests and other factors point to the fact that there were at least grounds for the possibility of the exertion of pressure. Marks himself tended to support this view in a comment he made after his term as Director. When asked to sum up the Agency's "greatest achievement" during his term of office, Marks' reply was simply, "We stayed out of trouble."

The comment was made in discussing Kennedy and Murrow.
that the U.S.I.A. had its own check and balance system which aided in developing communication lines. The system revolved around the concept of having a non-partisan, professional director and a partisan (also a professional, if possible) deputy director. Both Rowan and Marks were obviously not non-partisan. Marks would also have difficulty qualifying as a professional in the sense the term was used to describe Murrow. Rowan could perhaps better qualify as a "professional," although his broadcasting experience was limited. Thus, their inherent relationship with the President made both their roles more susceptible to emotional pressure and party pressure. The check and balance type of system would have difficulty operating in this kind of relationship.

Rowan and Marks both still sat on the Security Council yet little mention is made of this function in most of the literature. As stated earlier, Johnson was more prone to "consensus than to conviction," and would desire "no council from U.S.I.A. on substantial matters of state." 76 Wilson Dizard, Chief of Plans and Operational Policy Staff at U.S.I.A., characterized U.S.I.A.'s role in
Vietnam as rather extensive, especially in the area of counter-insurgency programs (these programs were actually begun during the Kennedy administration). This could be pointed to as an example of U.S.I.A.'s input into the system during the Johnson administration. However, although the U.S.I.A. was involved here, the involvement was not always viewed in a positive sense. If the U.S.I.A. was involved in counter-insurgency programs, the V.O.A. still seemed to be operating under policy pressures. A past V.O.A. Director, Foy Kohler (1949-1952), reported the following concerning V.O.A. broadcasts dealing with Vietnam:

... news citations and comments seem to be obviously selected to bolster the official government position; correspondingly there is a notable lack of hard news ... and this is precisely when hard news is wanted by the Russians.

Overall, Johnson's relationship with his Directors was perceived, at least by outside critics and some past employees, as interference and unnecessary exercise of pressure. Much of this problem perhaps lay in the overriding emphasis of the Vietnam situation. The pressure to create a favorable image of the United States in this case
proved to tend more toward censorship than just "propa-
ganda." Yet, the number of criticisms such as the fol-
lowing which appeared all through the confrontation can-
not be negated solely on that concept:

The smoldering feud between the V.O.A. and
the makers of U.S. foreign policy grows
from the White House on down.

But now [under Johnson's Administration]
the news broadcasts carried on the V.O.A.
present an almost unrelieved picture of
U.S. righteousness in foreign affairs
and V.O.A. officers fear that per-
manent damage may have been done to the
credibility of programs.

The Voice's broadcasts have been criticized
as only larded with a propaganda line in-
spired by the White House.79

Other critics, past employees as well as those
active during the Johnson Administration, also touched on
the issue of governmental intervention during this period.
George V. Allen, a former U.S.I.A. director (1957-1960),
remarked in late 1963:

The fault lies in considering, or thinking
of, the U.S.I.A. as a propaganda agency . . . .
It cannot be repeated too often that cre-
dibility should be the most important
objective of any government information
service.80
Henry Loomis, another adamant voice against Johnsonian tactics, has already been mentioned. His view of the situation was supported by several Washington commentators. One example of such support was found in a Washington Post article of March, 1965, "Since raids on Pleiku, say Voice officials, they have been chafing under the heaviest censorship in their history."81

One final piece of evidence can be added to the case charging Johnson's administration with attempts at censorship. In January, 1964, Clark Mollenhoff, a member of the Presidentially-appointed U.S. Advisory Commission on Information Policy, wrote to acting Director of U.S.I.A., Don Wilson, concerning a recent U.S.I.A. film. The film in question was "March on Washington," directed by George Stevens, depicting the Negro march on Washington in the early 1960's. Mollenhoff stated in his letter:

I do not regard it as a U.S.I.A. function to present one-sided drama on what is wrong with America. With all of our faults, we are a long way ahead of any other nation in real freedom and economic opportunity. We can admit our faults and seek to correct them, but this doesn't mean we should do a propaganda job against our own self-interest.82
Wilson had just commented a few months earlier that "the work of our Agency in providing perspective to the picture of race relations in the U.S. has been competitively slow." 83

**National and International Factors**

International and national events obviously greatly affect the U.S.I.A. and therefore the communication lines between the administration and the Agency. It must, at all costs, try to present an "objective" picture of the United States, yet one which supports the policy lines of the administration in power. As noted in Chapter II such a demand causes an inherent paradox. This paradox seems to have been heightened during the Johnson administration. At least three major conditions helped to create tension and dissatisfaction between the two departments by increasing the strain between reporting "objective" news and keeping "in line" with policy directives. Such tension served to reduce the communication ties between the two departments. In 1968, George Gallup, national pollster, in a statement before the Subcommittee on
International Organizations and Movements, summarized the three conditions as follows:

Public opinion surveys in many nations around the world - representing the views of over half the free world population - clearly show that America's image abroad has become badly tarnished during the last five years and particularly during the last two years. Three factors are chiefly responsible: (1) the war in Vietnam, (2) race relations, (3) crime and lawlessness, vividly portrayed by the recent assassinations of Martin Luther King and Bobby Kennedy.84

Johnson, admittedly, had a number of problems confronting him during his administration. Perhaps some of these problems overcame any other aspects which may have had a greater influence in the Kennedy - Murrow relationship. Wilson Dizard comments that at least Johnson's perception of the U.S.I.A. and its function was "largely in terms of Vietnam."85

Because of the presidential concern with such issues, the U.S.I.A. also had to be overly concerned with Vietnam and the other incidents mentioned above. These issues worked together to create for the U.S. a "self-assumed
role of world-gendarme which tended to grate because of its underlying assumptions of righteousness and correctness. The U.S.I.A. was faced with the task of altering such a view of the United States. And not only was this country characterized by other nations as a "gendarme," but also as a "sick society," one which was:

riddled with violence, undermined by social and racial conflict, subject to domination by "reactionary circles," supported by the assassinations of Martin Luther King and Bobby Kennedy, and "right-wing conspiracy theories," voiced in connection with the assassination of President Kennedy.

Thus, the U.S.I.A., as well as the President, was faced with a much more difficult task than had been experienced in the Kennedy administration. During the Johnson presidency, the world image of America suffered greatly. The need to rebuild the image of the U.S. partially caused the resultant tension which developed between the Agency and the Administration. The Agency attempted to report "objectively," while the President appears to have requested that the tools of "image-making" do more than that. Coupled with these disparate views of U.S.I.A.'s
functions during this period, where the personality conflicts which seemed to flare throughout the Johnson administration. Five major officials within the U.S.I.A. resigned during a three year period under what would appear to be less than friendly terms. Henry Loomis apparently left because of undue pressure from the White House to send "managed news" abroad. Carl Rowan resigned under rather nebulous terms, although, as suggested previously, there may have been Presidential pressures here also. Don Wilson resigned primarily because of his past affiliation with President Kennedy. John Chancellor supposedly resigned to return to the more lucrative field of commercial broadcasting. John Daly resigned due to "executive undercutting" during Marks' term as Director.

Such resignations would seem to indicate a "turbulent environment" within U.S.I.A. during the Johnson administration, as well as outside the Agency. Newspaper and magazine critics would seem to support this view of the Agency. The environment, the personality conflicts, the charges of Presidential pressures, and other conditions present during the Johnson administration would tend to lead
to the conclusion that what might be labelled a "communication breakdown" occurred during this period.
Footnotes

Chapter IV


2 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Departments of State, Justice, The Judiciary and Related Agencies, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, on H.R. 6871, 85th Congress, 1st sess., 1957, 474.

3 Evans and Novak, op. cit., p. 186.


5 Evans and Novak, op. cit., p. 186.

6 Ibid., p. 187.


8 Evans and Novak, op. cit., p. 187.

10 Ibid., 6967.


14 Kendrick, op. cit., p. 498.


17 Kendrick, op. cit., p. 498.

18 Ibid., p. 495.


20 Kendrick, op. cit., p. 495.

22 Kendrick, op. cit., p. 500.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Evans and Novak, op. cit., p. 344.

26 Sorenson, The Word War, op. cit., p. 221.


29 Kendrick, op. cit., p. 503.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.


35 Sorenson, The Word War, op. cit., p. 244.

36 Kendrick, op. cit., p. 510.


40 Editorial, Courant (Hartford, Connecticut), September 11, 1965 (U.S.I.A. Archives).

41 Kendrick, op. cit., p. 512.

42 Lawson, op. cit., p. 4-13.

43 Ibid., p. 4-14.

44 John Chancellor is presently the anchorman for the N.B.C. nightly news program.

45 Lawson, op. cit., p. 3-2.


54 *Ibid*.


58 Evans and Novak, op. cit., p. 2.

59 Kendrick, op. cit., p. 497.

60 Senate Appropriations Hearings, 1957, op. cit., p. 495.


63 Evans and Novak, op. cit., p. 335.

64 Ibid., pp. 329-330.


66 Evans and Novak, op. cit., p. 347.

67 Public Papers of the Presidents, op. cit., p. 302.


69 Ibid.

70 See footnote #26 and #27 under Chapter IV

72 Henry Loomis, President of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, personal interview, March 17, 1975, Washington, D.C.


74 Kendrick, op. cit., p. 447.

75 Ibid., p. 512.

76 Ibid., p. 500.


82 Clark Mollenhoff, letter to Donald Wilson, Acting Director of the U.S.I.A., January 20, 1964 (U.S.I.A. Archives).


86 Lawson, op. cit., p. 2-11.

87 Ibid., p. 2-24.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Ever since the beginning of the U.S.I.A. . . ., the activity has suffered from a lack of a definite goal, a definite strategy — and a lack of coordination with other governmental bodies. It has had problems of structure, administration, organization, programming, and personnel. It has had problems of facilities for transmission of news, of construction, of research, of evaluation of its work, and of adequate continuing financial support.

The U.S.I.A. and the administration are fundamentally at odds with each other. Each perceives the role of one, that is, the Agency, in a different sense. The U.S.I.A. generally attempts to see itself somewhere in the middle of mirroring events happening in this country and presenting those events honestly and yet, maintaining a "comingling of the 'shopkeeper's philosophy,' of displaying only those things of which we are proud." The result is an agency attempting to disseminate information, policy, and news to the rest of the world as unobtrusively
as possible to prevent ruffling the administration and thereby maintain a budget for the next fiscal year. The administration, dependent entirely upon the individuals in power, tends to view the Agency as anything from an educational exchange program to a "public relations outfit" designed to create a new and spectacular image of the United States. This dichotomy initially makes communication between the two parties extremely difficult. Neither is comfortable with, of even familiar with, the concepts the other holds of the Agency. This lack creates uncertainty and ambiguity which tends to reduce the effectiveness of available communication channels.

This issue is supported throughout the Agency's history by a continually recurring theme of lack of "fundamental operating assumptions" for the U.S.I.A. The Agency has been left with only a vague, ambiguous definition of its duties. If a sector of a government, or an organization of any type, is not aware of its role, communication with other sectors about its function becomes an almost impossible task. In a bureaucracy such as the U.S. Government, a clearly specified role becomes essential, "a . . .
role is a crucial unifying idea, one which may bring about a conceptual rapprochement between personality and organization, and more surely, will yield important practical returns." Yet, since its conception with the Creel Committee, a United States information service has virtually been without an operable set of working assumptions.

The Voice of America, for several reasons, supplies the most visible example of U.S.I.A.'s lack of a clearly defined role. V.O.A. is the most immediate medium U.S.I.A. employs, i.e., it has the ability to broadcast world-wide in seconds, and therefore is more susceptible to criticism. Its broadcasts can also be monitored by anyone in the U.S. owning a short-wave radio receiver and thus it is more accessible than some U.S.I.A. media, such as print which is sent exclusively overseas. Therefore, the Voice provides a useful example of the problems encountered over this issue. Criticisms and comments leveled at the Voice in the past, and recently, tend to support the concept of dual and conflicting roles. As discussed previously, the V.O.A. charter contains an inherent paradox which faces both the broadcasting element and the U.S.I.A. itself:
The long-range interests of the U.S. are served by communicating directly with the peoples of the World by radio. To be effective, the V.O.A. must win the attention and respect of listeners. These principles will govern V.O.A. broadcasts:

1. V.O.A. will establish itself as a consistently reliable and authoritative source of news. V.O.A. news will be accurate, objective, and comprehensive.

2. V.O.A. will represent America, not any single segment of American society. It will therefore present a balanced and comprehensive projection of significant American thought and institutions.

3. As an official radio, V.O.A. will present the policies of the United States clearly and effectively. V.O.A. will also present responsible discussion and opinion on these policies.

The Voice must both portray American society and deliver the policy of the U.S. Government. The two roles are difficult to combine in any one broadcasting philosophy.

John Chancellor, V.O.A. Director during Leonard Marks' Directorship, expressed this point in the following comment:

I'd like to say that the V.O.A. is the
point at which two disciplines intersect: journalism and diplomacy. There is always friction at this intersection, and there always will be. The diplomats often think bad news should be ignored and the journalists believe in explaining it.

V.O.A. officials are continually referring to attempts to "tell the story of American society in a more positive way without any sacrifice in factual accuracy." Yet, that statement in itself is a fallacy. Omission of negative elements is a sacrifice to factual accuracy. And so the Voice continues to juggle the opposing forces and results in such stormy resignations as those of Henry Loomis in 1965 and John Daly in 1968.

However, even as the situation stands, effective communication would have to exist between the U.S.I.A. and the administration for the Agency to function. Through a critical survey of the two governmental sectors, several factors emerge as determinants in the communication patterns. The factors can generally be classified into four categories. The group of factors in each general category can be considered neutral. They are neither positive or negative,
but only factors which appear to influence the communication which occurs. They can be useful or harmful with equal facility. The administrations studied seem to provide examples of each possibility. The four categories can be loosely labelled as: (1) the role assigned to the Agency, (2) the administrative leadership of the U.S.I.A. and the White House, (3) the environment, (4) the organizational concept.

(1) The Role of the Agency

The role of the Agency, more precisely the perceived role of the Agency, has been a recurrent theme throughout the paper. This lack of a well-defined role seems to be the origin of the initial communication problem. Because the Agency has no specific role it is constantly playing a game of chance, in an attempt to discover what is and what is not expected of it. The United States founded an information dissemination program largely in response to the pressures of two world wars. Yet, in 1960, the U.S. was not involved with a world war. The United States continued to operate an information program due to
the pressures of a cold war, and the "art of communication became the art of polemic." Yet, in 1960, the U.S. was not in the midst of a cold war, and that kind of communication pattern had gone out of style. The United States also continued on information program as part of an anti-Communist "campaign-of-truth." Yet, was the U.S., in 1960, still willing to participate in an ideological word-game? Thus, the U.S.I.A., following a variety of haphazard guidelines in the past, needed a new directive. President Kennedy finally redefined the Agency's mission in January, 1963. However, it must be noted that the new directive was actually initiated by Edward R. Murrow, the Director of U.S.I.A. during Kennedy's administration, and not by the President. The directive gave the Agency a two-fold objective: (1) to influence public attitude in other nations, and (2) to advise the President, his representatives abroad, and the various departments and agencies, of the implications of foreign opinion on U.S. policy-making. Although this was a small effort at defining the role, it was, at least, clear and precise. However, the Agency would still define itself in slightly different terms, even though it would
Perhaps due to the popularity of President Kennedy and the influence of Edward R. Murrow, the U.S.I.A. mission was not revised for several years, importantly not through the Johnson administration. There was no re-emphasis of the role, nor a redefinition of it at that time. It remained essentially as it had been defined under Kennedy. Both Rowan and Marks operated under the same guiding principle, although it appears that the advisement role was relegated to a much more inferior position, as Lyndon Johnson's personal view of the Agency took precedence.

Two things become obvious. One, that a guiding directive or mission is required for U.S.I.A., a directive which is agreed upon by both parties and therefore is satisfactory to both parties. Yet, secondly, the directive must be flexible. That is, in the face of constantly changing national relationships, ideas, and values, and constantly evolving forms of technology and mass media, the directive must be capable of changing also. If these two conditions are not maintained, the Agency is left to
flounder and fall subject to presidential whims.

The role of the Agency also encompasses another important aspect. The concept of advisement on policy-making decisions has been a sore point with U.S.I.A. throughout its history. In light of its functions, research studies, and public opinion polls, the U.S.I.A. would appear to be useful to the administration in making decisions regarding foreign policy. Placing the U.S.I.A. at this point in public diplomacy would seem to benefit all parties concerned. Several organizational theorists see such a shift "from delegated to shared responsibility, from centralized to decentralized authority, ..." as allowing decisions to be made at the "critical moment" and facilitating the cooperative group effort rather than the individual decision. Reflecting on the events and decisions surrounding the Bay of Pigs incident, for example, the benefits of such "shared responsibility" can easily be surmised.

In 1963, President Kennedy assigned to U.S.I.A. the task of advising American policy-makers on overseas
public opinion as a factor in foreign policy considerations. Although the Kennedy Directive seemed to have been more effective on paper than in practice, it opened the mechanisms for change. Had the emphasis been maintained during the Johnson administration, an improved system might have resulted. With Johnson's perception of the Agency as a "public relations outfit," this function was still not truly active. Johnson's concern with Vietnam and the special needs there may also have inhibited the implementation of such an advisement function. Nevertheless, the reduced input certainly did not aid communication ties between the two, but merely removed another possible line of feedback.

(2) Leadership

Although, perhaps an obvious point, the individuals who head both the Agency and the administration are effective agents in increasing or decreasing communication flow. Since the Agency is still intimately identified with the administration in power, the president and his overall attitude toward public diplomacy and propaganda is important to the U.S.I.A. functions and manner in which the Agency fits into
the existing communication patterns. By similar reasoning, the assumption can be made that "more than in most government departments, the Agency's administrative philosophy reflects the personality of its incumbent director." In other words, the director may change the outlook and function of the Agency to suit his own personal interests or those of his presidential patron.

In examining communication flow, the U.S.I.A. director is, perhaps, the administrator who must concern himself more closely with facilitating transmission of information between the two parties. Since the Agency is in a subordinate position vis-a-vis the White House, it is essential that it have an administrator capable of bridging the bureaucratic rank difference. Thus, the first question to be posed is what kind of individual can be more successful with this attempt. Three persons held the position during the administrations studied and several comments may be drawn from them. As suggested previously, Murrow appears to have been one of the best possible choices for the position. He was a "professional," recognized and respected. Because of this he brought prestige to the
Agency, as well as a strong administrative command. With such a set of conditions, the U.S.I.A. and Murrow were more respected, and thus more relied on in advisement matters. If a superior (i.e., the White House) believes there is competency in a subordinate (i.e., the U.S.I.A.) the superior would be more willing to consult the lower agency and therefore increase communication. The more mutual trust and confidence that is developed between the two parties, as discussed in Chapter III with regard to Kennedy and Murrow, the greater the possibility for shared participation in decision-making and higher effectiveness in implementing decisions made.11

Carl T. Rowan, Director of the U.S.I.A. during Johnson's first year as President, was in a unique position regarding his directorship. He could be considered a professional in many ways, yet he also had personal ties with Johnson that Murrow had not had with Kennedy. As mentioned previously, Rowan had been a useful public relations man in Johnson's Vice Presidential tours. This relationship put the two men on a slightly different level. In such an association, there might have been more emphasis on
supporting U.S. Government policy rather than the promoting of mutual understanding abroad. Instead of using the communication lines for building mutual trust and confidence, the lines would often seem to have been used for suppression and omission tactics. In comparison with the emphasized role of input during the Kennedy administration and the fact that Murrow not only sat on the N.S.C. (as Rowan did), but on other inner committees as well, the reduced role in Johnson's administration is striking. The following statement seems to give a modern organizational point of view of the same issue:

Most commonly strived for:

(5) the development of better methods of "conflict resolution;" rather than the usual bureaucratic methods of conflict resolution which include suppression, denial, and the use of naked and unprincipled power; more rational and open methods are sought.

A similar approach can be utilized to discuss Leonard Marks, U.S.I.A. Director during the last three years of Johnson's administration. Marks did not have the professional nature of Rowan, which allowed Rowan to maintain
his own integrity, nor did he have the less personally bound relationship that Murrow had with Kennedy. Marks was a personal friend of Johnson and in one sense this would increase his access to the President. However, the comment was made that Johnson would want little council from U.S.I.A. on matters of state. It is also a widely accepted assumption that Johnson operated with a "network style." In other terms, he had many friends in various agencies that could be relied on in time of need for support and loyalty, but were not maintained as advisors. Thus, the communication would seem to be increased, but in only one direction. Johnson could request favors of his friends, but the friends were not encouraged to respond similarly:

To ask Mr. Marks to allow an unfavorable story to be broadcast would be like asking a personal friend of the President to approve for broadcast something embarrassing to the Johnson Administration. Mr. Johnson does not encourage his subordinates to embarrass him.

This kind of appointment of a personal friend also permits outside criticisms and accusations of Presidential pressure to be made. Whereas, an appointment such as Murrow's was
assumed to reflect a more professional and thus "objective" point of view, and was less likely to lend itself to criticism. National criticism of the Agency can only add to the friction in lines of communication. If the Agency is to maintain this delicate balance between honestly reflecting the American society and producing "white propaganda," then it would appear that the individual to head U.S.I.A. must be strong enough and credible enough in his own right to hold it together. 16

(3) The Environment

Perhaps the most all-encompassing aspect in the discussion is the state of national and internal affairs. An organization cannot exist in isolation, especially an organization such as the U.S.I.A., designed to explain and support U.S. foreign policy. It must consider the environment in which it exists. Organizational experts have defined the environment as a "field of forces which contain casual mechanisms and pose important choices for the firm [or, in this case, the Agency]." 17 Depending on the state of international affairs, the Agency may or may not have a
difficult job. If the United States has a favorable image in world events, then the U.S.I.A. has more useful material with which to create its "propaganda." However, consider the Vietnam encounter, the poverty issue, racial conflict nationally, and three assassinations of the Johnson administration. Obviously, these events created a difficult situation for the U.S.I.A. The environment made it difficult to place the United States in a brighter context. Evans and Novak, writing on the Johnson period, would call Vietnam the "malignant cancer of the Great Society, somber and oppressive. It infected all else in 1966 - a bloody, insoluble dilemma that did not lend itself to the brilliant weapons of power developed by Lyndon Johnson during thirty-five years in politics."18

There is also the likelihood that a president, during favorable national and international conditions, can be less concerned with how his information service is handling the news than can a president who is well aware of slipping U.S. popularity overseas and lack of support at home. A "turbulent environment" creates tension which make bureaucratic mechanisms most problematic and thus
creates weak communication ties fraught with lack of trust and confidence. 19

(4) The Organizational Concept

Finally there is the fundamental concept of the organizational structure itself. The U.S.I.A. handles four basic functions. Two of the functions appear to have "an extremely close relationship with the formulation and execution of foreign policy," whereas the other two functions can be considered supportive and "more removed from day-to-day policy concerns." 20 The first two involve: (1) official articulation of policy and, (2) the advisory function initiated by the Kennedy administration. The second two involve: (1) the exchange of persons programs and, (2) the dissemination of general information.

The first two functions require access to policy-makers in a sense which will ensure detailed knowledge of what that policy is. The second two functions require only guidance from policy-makers and knowledge of long range, but not short range, goals. Thus, the two sets of functions, one requiring immediate and continuous policy
guidance and the other requiring less strict contact with policy, can be seen as falling into two rather different organizational structures. All four functions are handled, at the present, by one agency, the U.S.I.A., with some assistance from the State Department. This organizational pattern evolved from a history of information programs moving haphazardly in and out of control by the State Department and autonomy and resulted in a structure which appears to lack organizational logic.

Several basic questions are involved with the organizational structure problem. First, does the U.S. Government want an agency to propagandize, or does it want an agency to be faithfully obligated to the truth. It does not seem feasible to place the two functions in one agency. Second, perhaps the "rather heretical notion" that U.S.I.A. might become a "public corporation with semi-independence from and less identification with the federal government and its changing political coloration" should be questioned in realistic terms. Third, the Voice of America has a unique position and role within U.S.I.A., and perhaps it cannot function within the existing organizational
framework.

The recent Stanton Commission report, "International Information Education and Cultural Relations Recommendations for the Future," has probed exactly these kinds of questions involving the structure of U.S.I.A. and the functional problems which result. The Commission made three basic recommendations regarding the future of U.S.I.A. as an Agency. The three recommendations reflect some of the problems discussed throughout the paper:

1. Since the first two functions, policy articulation and advisement, require close contact with policy-makers and since U.S.I.A. is an independent Agency, it becomes difficult for U.S.I.A. to handle these functions at the present. Thus, the Commission has recommended that all U.S.I.A. personnel involved with policy articulation and advisement be returned to the State Department. These persons would be grouped under an Office of Policy Information within the State Department headed by a Deputy Under Secretary of State. This office would handle the U.S.I.A.'s Wireless File, policy guidance matters, policy articulation
on the Voice, and the advisement function.

2. The exchange of persons and cultural exchange program, in the present organizational structure, has been initiated by the State Department and implemented by U.S.I.A. in the field. The situation was inefficient as the exchanges (State) and the media promotion (U.S.I.A.) were separate functions. The Stanton report proposes to create a separate autonomous agency, Information and Cultural Affairs Agency, which would report not to the President but to the Secretary of State and would handle all aspects of the exchange program.

3. The Voice was recognized by the Commission as a unique instrument, a "medium which must combine policy and general information." It must be both of these, as well as a newscaster, since the "strength of America's ideological appeal depends in large measure upon our devotion to the free flow of news." The Voice, in view of its three functions, could fall into three possible organizational locations. Thus, to protect all three functions, the Commission recommended that the Voice, as an independent agency,
be placed under a board of overseers (not the same Board which handles Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty) who would be sensitive to the V.O.A.'s distinct needs.\textsuperscript{22}

This kind of recognition of various U.S.I.A. problems and recommendations for their improvement suggests a continuing emphasis on the role of public diplomacy in United States foreign affairs. Concern for foreign opinion and the right to freedom of information has characterized U.S. information programs since the Creel Committee in 1917. Based on the expansion of communication media in today's society, this concern has become even more prominent. Coupled with this is the increase in international interdependence. Nations can no longer assume an isolationist viewpoint in light of situations such as the "gasoline crisis" of 1975. Increased interdependence then leads to a re-emphasis of public diplomacy as a means of explaining the context of policies and programs. Thus, information programs must not only be maintained, but expanded to include these more sophisticated functions.

An information service tends to act as a liaison in
this expanded role of public diplomacy. It must gather policy information from the government and cultural information from the society and then process it for dissemination abroad. Thus, the U.S.I.A.'s ability to communicate with policy-makers in a reciprocal manner becomes vital. To be effective, the Agency must have efficient means of gaining access to information, and of recycling information it receives from foreign audiences.

This study has attempted to discern what might benefit and what does not seem to benefit this flow of information between the two sectors. Four major areas of concern were delineated: (1) the role of the Agency, (2) the individuals who head both the Agency and the administration, (3) the environment, and (4) the organizational concept. It would appear that certain measures could be taken in all four areas to improve relations. First, the role of the Agency must be clearly defined, even if it implies a restructuring of the organization which, according to the Stanton report, it does. Second, the individual chosen to head such an agency must be thoroughly qualified in the many facets required of him in this
role. Third, a clear route for advisement must be established to allow information agency officials to relay useful information to policy-makers. Fourth, in light of a clearly specified role, a restructuring of the existing Agency may be necessary.

In view of the emerging importance of public diplomacy today, an information agency will remain an integral part of foreign affairs. Its ability to communicate with other governmental sectors, whether it be the State Department or the White House, shall also remain essential. Perhaps, the restructuring suggested by the Stanton Commission will aid this process. In any case, even though an information agency deals primarily with communication internationally, its ability to communicate internally and within the governmental structure will continue to be a vital concern.
Footnotes

Chapter V


2 Karl E. Mundt, "An Overview of the Program," in Bernays and Hershey, op. cit., p. 35.


7 See Appendix A for a complete text of the 1963 Presidential Directive.

8 See Appendix B for an Agency definition of its own role in 1963.

9 Bennis, op. cit., p. 9.

11 Bennis, op. cit., p. 136.

12 However, it is worth noting that some recent authors have suggested that Rowan did strive for an "expanded role in foreign policy decision-making at the White House level." See John Esterline and Robert Black, Inside Foreign Policy, (Palo Alto, California: Mayfield Publishing Co., 1975.)

13 Bennis, op. cit., p. 118.


16 "White propaganda" can be considered propaganda that can be traced to a well-known, publicized source, as opposed to "gray propaganda" which usually indicates that the propaganda source is less well-known or identifiable, and "black propaganda" which indicates an unidentified source. (The terms are frequently used in labelling international broadcasts.)

17 Bennis, op. cit., p. 203.


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PERSONAL INTERVIEWS


APPENDIX A

THE KENNEDY DIRECTIVE

The mission of the United States Information Agency is to help achieve United States foreign policy objectives by: (a) influencing public attitudes in other nations, and (b) advising the President, his representatives abroad, and the various departments and agencies of the implications of foreign opinion for present and contemplated United States policies, programs, and official statements.

The influencing of attitudes is to be carried out by overt use of the various techniques of communications -- personal contact, radio broadcasting, libraries, book publications and distribution, press, motion pictures, television, exhibits, English language instruction, and others. In so doing, the Agency shall be guided by the following:

1. Individual country programs should specifically and directly support country and regional objectives determined by the president and set forth in official policy pronouncements, both classified and unclassified.

2. Agency activities should (a) encourage constructive public support abroad for the goal of a peaceful world community of free and independent states, free to choose their own future and their own system so long as it does not threaten the freedom of others; (b) identify the United States as a strong, democratic, dynamic nation qualified for its leadership of world efforts toward this goal; and (c) unmask and counter hostile attempts to distort or frustrate the objectives and policies of the United States. These activities should emphasize the ways in which the United States policies harmonize with those of other peoples and governments, and
those aspects of American life and culture which facilitate sympathetic understanding of United States policies.

The advisory function is to be carried out at various levels in Washington, and within the Country Team at United States diplomatic missions abroad. While the Director of the United States Information Agency shall take the initiative in offering counsel when he deems it advisable, the various departments and agencies should seek such counsel when considering policies and programs which may substantially affect or be affected by foreign opinion. Consultation with the United States Information Agency is essential when programs affecting Communications media in other countries are contemplated.

United States Information Agency staffs abroad, acting under the supervision of the Chiefs of Mission, are responsible for the conduct of overt public relations and cultural activities -- i.e., those activities intended to inform or influence foreign public opinion -- for agencies of the United States government except for Commands of the Department of Defense.

Issued: February 25, 1963
(U.S.I.A. Archives)
APPENDIX B

THE U. S. I. A. MISSION

In carrying out the mission assigned the U.S.I.A. by law and Presidential directive, U.S.I.A.:

Supports the foreign policy of the United States by direct communication with people of other nations.

Builds understanding of the United States, its institutions, culture and policies among other people; and shares with them information, thought, and experience that can contribute toward achieving mutual goals.

Advises the U.S. government on public opinion abroad and its implications for the United States.

Specifically this means that the Agency:

Serves as official voice of the U.S. government through the media and through the U.S.I.A. role as press spokesman for the Ambassador and Country Team abroad.

Informs foreign audiences about the United States, U.S. policies, and issues of mutual concern.

Provides through the Voice of America, an accurate, objective, and comprehensive service of world news.

Acts as an advocate for the views and policies of the United States, correcting distortions of our position and falsehoods about our country.

Advises within the executive branch on foreign opinion.
Plays a role in the cultural relations of the United States with other nations, both through its responsibility for administering abroad the educational and cultural programs of the Department of State.

Issued: March, 1963
(U.S.I.A. Archives)