COGNITIVE STYLES AND PERSUASIVE STYLES OF
ARAB, RUSSIAN, AND AMERICAN DIPLOMATS

BY
Daniel Milton Witmeyer III

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Daniel Milton Witmeyer III

Approved:  
Edmund S. Glenn, B.S.
Professor in charge of thesis on behalf of the
Advisory Committee

Approved:  
George A. Borden, Ph.D.
Chairperson of the Department of Communication

Approved:  
Virginia L. Burt
Dean of the College of Graduate Studies
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ABSTRACT

This research was designed to test quantitatively whether the Objective, Co-subjective, and Subjective categories of Edmund S. Glenn's Tripartite Model of cognitive styles are manifested in the persuasive styles of United Nations representatives. United States, Russian, and Middle Eastern Arab speakers were investigated, since observations in the literature suggested that they might be, respectively, Objective, Co-subjective, and Subjective. Records of the United Nations Security Council from 1967 were used, paragraphs being rated by three trained judges. American speakers were overwhelmingly Objective. Russian speakers were mostly Co-subjective. Arab speakers were predominantly Subjective. Speakers from other countries, from 1967 and 1973, were rated by the author alone, and some interesting preliminary results were obtained.
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

People tend to use their own way of doing things (culture) as their frame of reference. If they have little exposure to other ways (or cultures) they may believe that their way is the only way, or at least the only reasonable or correct way. Even with exposure to other cultures or sub-cultures we frequently orient ourselves from a basic presumption that our culture is right and all other cultures are wrong. That is, our attitude is that other cultures are different because they are defective in one or more important ways.

Where real communication is attempted between members of different cultures, it may become apparent that misunderstandings are the consequences of deeper differences. If we fail to look at the other (people) from a viewpoint of cultural-relativism the other person may seem to be less intelligent, childish, or somewhat psychotic.

What is going on is that different people see the world differently, and to a significant degree how we see
the world is culturally determined. The fact that different cultures perceive, and attempt to manipulate, different realities creates problems in communication between cultures. An understanding of the differences in their realities would be useful in attempting to improve communication.

The term "cognitive styles" has been used to refer to patterns of differences in perceptual and intellectual functioning. This functioning may be inferred from behavior in controlled or non-controlled situations. A number of dichotomies or dimensions have been generated by various researchers in cognitive styles and related areas. The relations between these variables are still often unclear. What is clear is that they are not all independent. If it were possible to graph them as axes in n-dimensional space we would expect clusters to appear; they are clearly not all orthogonal. These clusters would be a basis for deriving cognitive styles. At present this is only speculative thinking, and anyway, these variables have been created on different levels. What we are interested in is, what are the main clusters (cognitive styles), are they applicable abstractions of reality, and can they be
observed in patterns of behavior?

RATIONAL

Tonnies' Gemeinschaft--Gesellschaft dimension (Tönnies, 1931), Redfield's Folk Society (Redfield, 1947), and Zijderveld's Abstract Society (Zijderveld, 1970) are treatments of traditional vs. modern societies. Parsons's and Shils's Pattern Variables (Parsons, Shils, and Olds, 1951), comprise a system of five dichotomies for the analysis of social, personality, and cultural systems of action. Universalism-Particularism, Ascription-Achievement, Self-orientation--Collectivity-orientation, Specificity-Diffuseness, and Affectivity-Affective neutrality represent choices that one makes, which determine the meaning of a situation, before one acts. As such they might usefully be considered as components of cognitive style.

The research of Piaget on the development of concrete operational and formal operational thinking (Ginsburg and Opper, 1969) has inspired much related research (e.g., Bruner, Olver, and Greenfield, 1966), including cross-cultural studies of Piagetian intelligence (Greenfield, 1966; Maccoby and Modiano, 1966; Goodnow, 1970; Price-Williams, 1961; for a review of the literature, see Lloyd,
1972 or Dasen, 1972). Most of the cross-cultural work has been on conservation or other concrete operations: little has been done on formal structures (Lloyd, 1972; Dasen, 1972). The developmental levels dealt with in this research have not been integrated directly in cognitive styles models, but their importance to any over-all formulation is obvious. The connection may occur at the level of formal structures if, as Lloyd (1972, p. 137) observes, formal operations and abstract thinking are probably dependent on a Western education. (I take that to imply a cultural connection, not necessarily a formal education.)

Werner (1948) defines the level of development of mentality using five dimensions: syncretic-discrete, diffuse-articulated, indefinite-definite, rigid-flexible, labile-stable. The first of each pair of terms he associates with "primitive societies", the second with "advanced cultures". While the pairs are not exactly equivalent, they are related. Thus diffuse refers to a global quality of perception while syncretic is used for a global quality of functioning or activity.

Bernstein (1964), working with middle-class and working-class persons in England, discerned two types of language, which he labelled Restricted Code and Elaborated
Code. A restricted code has a smaller range of syntactic alternatives than does an elaborated code. The codes are generated by different forms of social relations, and in turn the codes partially determine what is relevant to the individual speaker or listener. Restricted code tends to be associated with attention to status and reduction in role discretion. It is available to all speakers, for making global, concrete statements. Elaborated code seems to develop from role relations with a range of discretion and more social isolation. Some speakers, (e.g., some members of the lower working class) do not have access to an elaborated code, which would allow more discrete, abstractive messages.

Witkin (Witkin, et al., 1962; Witkin, 1962; Witkin, 1967) has done the most experimental research into cognitive styles, which research has also generated the largest amount of work by other researchers, including cross-cultural studies. The exploration by Witkin and his co-workers of the developmental process of psychological differentiation has produced the Global-Articulated dimension of cognitive style. A more articulated style is characterized by greater analytical and structuring
ability: that is, a person with a more articulated cognitive style can perceive an item as discrete and separate from a structured ground, can restructure an organized field, and can impose structure on an unorganized field. The two abilities involved are breaking up of and creating structure. A more global, less differentiated, cognitive style is characterized by less analytic ability and greater difficulty in separating an item from its context.

The perceptual aspect of this is the Field-dependence--Field-independence dimension, as measured by the body-adjustment test (BAT), the rod-and-frame test (RFT), and the embedded-figures test (EFT), among other tests. These measure the subject's ability to overcome an embedding context, to separate relevant object from context, or to treat a perceptual field analytically. These perceptual tests load on an analytic factor in the Wechsler scales, but do not load on the verbal or attention-concentration factors. There is also a strong correlation of these perceptual tests with Guilford's adaptive-flexibility dimension. Einstellung problems test global-articulated intellectual functioning. Figure-drawing can be used to test articulation of body concept. Degree of
articulation of body concept, and of experience of self, are related to articulation of experience of the outside world.

Also of interest are the types of child-rearing which seem to foster field-dependence or field-independence. Mothers' body concept ratings correlate with children's differentiation. Field-independence seems to be fostered by allowing self-assertion and by encouraging responsibility on the part of the child. Harsh punishment and over-restriction tend to inhibit differentiation and create a more field-dependent child. Longitudinal studies have shown persistence of perceptual style. Finally, persons with a more articulated cognitive style seem to use more specialized emotional defenses, such as intellectualization and isolation (as well as global defenses), whereas more globally functioning persons tend to use more global defenses such as primitive denial and massive repression.

A number of people have used Witkin's tests of Field-dependence--Field-independence, or similar tests, in cross-cultural research. Dawson (1967), doing work with two tribes in Sierra Leone, got results tending to support
Witkin's findings on child-rearing and perceptual style, as well as finding a correlation of perceptual style with three-dimensional perception. Berry (1971), comparing both traditional and transitional groups from five different cultures, found that development of perceptual differentiation is partly a function of ecological demands. He also found that in six of ten groups there was no significant difference in field dependence with sex, contradicting Witkin's findings with only Euro-American and Hong Kong subjects. Wober (1966; 1967), working in Nigeria, obtained results with the rod-and-frame test which suggest that perceptual differentiation (field dependence) is not necessarily the same for all senses, but is influenced by the sensotype (sense orientation) of the person (or culture); (see also McLuhan, 1964).

Cohen (1969), working with American children from several social classes and ethnic groups, found cognitive style to be related to organization of primary groups. If family and friendship groups were shared-function groups, the subject tended to have a relational cognitive style. Formally organized (role structured) family and friendship groups tended to produce more analytical members.
Participation by one individual in both types of groups led to intermediate cognitive styles. The analytical-relational dimension and the field dependence dimension were not co-determinant. This may represent something like separation of perceptual and intellectual components of cognitive style. Unfortunately, her report lacks any quantitative data from which one might infer conclusions about this. Her ratings of subjects' analytic abilities and field dependence are based on a number of psychological, linguistic, and attitudinal tests whose correlations with each other and whose weights in the overall ratings are not specified.

Kagan, Moss, and Sigel (1963) start by distinguishing egocentric and stimulus centered conceptual orientations. This seems to correspond to the subject-dominating--environment-dominating continuum implied by transactional psychology (Glenn, 1973; see also Kilpatrick, 1961). They also list three conceptual categories: analytic-descriptive, inferential-categorical, and relational. One of their tests consisted of sorting drawings of people. Analytic-descriptive concepts thus formed involved objective attributes visible in each drawing in the group. Inferential-
categorical groupings were based on inferences about the stimulus pictures, inferences applicable separately to each picture. The concepts given as examples of this category seem to be roles, that is, social projections. Relational concepts consisted of interrelated stimuli, such that no individual card could be taken as an example of the concept, e.g., "a family". These were individual projections, that is, egocentric or subject-dominating. These three categories of conceptual style resemble Glenn's three types of cognitive styles: unfortunately the categorical-inferential category is given little attention in this study (Carter, 1977).

Kelly (1963) sees individuals as shaping their perceptions of and intellections about events by anticipating what will, or can, be. These anticipations are based on past experiences (replications of events) and constitute systems of dichotomous constructs. A construct is defined by a minimum of three items, at least two of which are similar and at least one of which is different. Thus a strong-weak dichotomy is defined by at least two examples of either strong or weak and at least one example of the contrasting category. The process of forming constructs,
the resulting constructs, and the use of one's constructs are not necessarily conscious. In any situation a person in effect chooses which alternative in a construct to apply and, since there are superordinal and subordinal constructs in a construction system, what one is doing is first making a choice at a more superordinal level about what choices to consider at a more concrete level. (Cf. Parsons, Shils, and Olds, 1951, regarding the Pattern Variables). This could apparently involve several levels consecutively.

A construct is a structure imposed upon an initially unorganized field of events (Kelly's construing of replications). This cognitive construction of reality can be seen as deriving from three types of experiences:

1) multiple, similar events involving transactions with the object environment, where the object environment dominates the transactions. In this type of case the similarity of the events is an abstraction made by the subject. The subject is called upon to impose some structure on the field by attending to relevant stimuli and separating those from the ground. The labeling of some events as similar likewise labels certain other events as dissimilar; both are part of the same construct (e.g.
heavy-light). But not all heavy things are experienced as identical. The subject also experiences to some extent the dissimilarities of these same events. Any one whole event may be grouped with many other sets of events for different purposes. In each case different specific parts of the event (or object) may be considered relevant; relevance is not fixed. An automobile may be a motor vehicle, heavy, hard, dangerous, fast, noisy, hot, blue, expensive, beautiful, distant, etc. Thus a given event or object might be considered as a specific example of many concepts. In addition, each event may differ perceptibly from other similar events with respect to relevant, defining aspects; there are intermediate cases, e.g., some heavy things are heavier than others. Again, the replications of the event would not be construed as identical and the dissimilar aspects of the whole event might become relevant in a different situation. This suggests flexibility and attention to specifics.

The second type of experience derives from our situation as social animals, and most particularly from language. While we can and do have transactions with other persons and even co-subjects (group members) that approximate
the type of object-dominated transaction previously described, in this second type of experience the language, both as medium and as content, dominates the transaction, (McLuhan, 1964). Language, as medium, provides us with an already structured field; with already abstracted events rather than with whole, intact events. Only relevant aspects are included, and the basis for relevance is defined. We are speaking here of language in general and not of langue or parole (deSaussure; Glenn, 1969, p. 115).

In this second type of experience the content of the language consists of universalized abstractions, that is constructs so abstracted that all co-subjects can share the identical constructs. These constructs do not involve any direct experience, by the subject, of any specific events where the construct is applicable. As always, a construct need not be verbalizable or even consciously known.

In a transaction where the subject dominates and where each event is a unique, irreducible whole, we have the third type of experience. At this extreme type there are few if any constructs since a construct requires the establishment of a similarity as a basis for difference
(dichotomy). Especially, there is no separation between an event and one's (subjective) reaction to the event.

The three types of experience presented here are ideal types and are of interest as such. Most experiences, and most constructs, are the result of transactions where neither object, language, nor subject dominate completely, to the exclusion of both others. At least two, and probably all three in most cases, are involved.

Variations in the relative influences of each type on construct formation, particularly with regard to the kinds of superordinal constructs which characterize a particular construction system (see, e.g., the Pattern Variables; Parsons and Shils, 1951) might be seen as corresponding to cognitive styles. In particular, relatively more than usual influence of object-dominated transactions and resulting constructs would correspond to Glenn's Objective cognitive style. More than usual influence of constructs derived from transactions dominated by language and co-subjective universals would correspond to Glenn's Co-subjective cognitive style. And more than usual influence of subjectively dominated transactions on the construction system corresponds to Glenn's Subjective cognitive
style.

While several models of cognitive styles have been proposed, as seen by the literature cited, this research is based on the premise that Glenn's Tripartite Model is useful and observable. It is the observability which will be tested.

DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESIS

Glenn's Tripartite Model involves three styles—Objective, Co-subjective, and Subjective—which are considered not as exclusive cases, but as types. Each is characterized by the domination of one constellation of elements.

The objective style is abstractive, non-affective, and inductive. The relevant aspects of the particular situation are attended to. The Co-subjective style is also abstractive and non-affective, but it is deductive: it emphasizes applying the correct general rule to the situation. The Subjective style involves less abstraction and much more emotion. A situation tends to be treated less analytically and more personally.

In any research on cognitive styles, language is involved at all stages and is a part of everything considered. This is true even of non-verbal studies. It
is most obviously true in a study such as the present one, where language is not only the medium within which we work, but is also an object of study.

The point here is that, in terms of the ideal types already discussed, Co-subjectivity is the dominant type. It probably dominates in the real world and it undoubtedly dominates what is studied. The Objective and Subjective ideal types of experiences cannot be talked of without adding some Co-subjectivity. Indeed, the extreme Subjective experience cannot even be thought about by the original experiencer without Co-subjectivity coming in.

Glenn observes that:

The socialization of the child usually precedes the adult subject's extensive experience with the nonhuman environment; it is only to the extent to which the adult world permits it that the subject acquires an immediate experience of the nonhuman object world, often only to the extent necessary to develop basic sensorimotor skills. This suggests that the social experience of the average human subject is more basic to him than much or even most of his object experience, and that he is likely to be more at ease in most social than in most nonhuman situation (Glenn, 1973, p. 104).

This, of course, is the basis for the various constructions
of reality which are characteristic of different human
groups, for while the objective reality of the nonhuman
environment varies somewhat, social realities are enor-
mosely more variable.

Given the ubiquitousness of a strong Co-subjectivity
in construction systems, most of the Co-subjectivity ne-
cessarily becomes background in discussing the differences
between the three real types of cognitive styles.

A Subjective cognitive style develops from ex-
perience which is shared with a relatively small group of
co-subjects, as well as from unique, personal experience.
This experience is often direct, tends to be subject-
dominated, and is highly affective (here "co-subjects" is
applicable only to members of primary groups). There is
room here for dreams and fantasies, and for much emotional
content. Reality tends to be defined in terms of the sub-
ject, or at most in terms of his or her primary groups.
This results in other people being defined in terms of their
relationships to the subject.

Using the dichotomies developed by the several re-
searchers previously discussed, a Subjective cognitive style
is characteristic of a Gemeinschaft culture or Folk Society.
It tends to emphasize affectivity, particularism, ascription, diffuseness, and a collectivity-orientation, as well as being syncretic, indefinite, rigid, and labile. This is reflected in the use of a Restricted Code in speech; that is, communication tends to be very syntagmatic with important nonverbal cues. Subjectivity seems to correlate with field-dependence and with global and relational cognitive styles.

A Co-subjective cognitive style develops not from experience which is shared by a small group of co-subjects, either immediately or later through the medium of language, but from experience which is shaped and even entirely created by one's co-subjects, through language. Here "co-subjects" refers to a very large group which is much more extensive than just those persons that one actually sees. Through language, constructs are shared by strangers, and there is concern with and stress on maintaining uniformity of meaning. Reality is defined deductively in terms of universals. Other persons, and one's relations to them, tend to be defined by status and role.

The Co-subjective category of cognitive styles does not fit quite as easily into the dichotomies previously
cited. Co-subjectivity would be expected to occur more often in modern Gesellschaft, Abstract societies. While it can be characterized as discrete, articulated, definite, stable, affectively neutral, universalistic, achievement-oriented, and specific, it would seem to be somewhere in the middle on the flexibility-rigidity and self-orientation-collectivity-orientation dimensions. Co-subjective speakers would be expected to use an Elaborated Code (paradigmatic), which might be slightly more predictable than that of very Objective speakers. Highly Co-subjective persons are relatively field-independent and could be considered as having articulated, analytical, and inferential-categorical cognitive styles.

An Objective style could be expected to develop where emphasis is laid on successful manipulation of the nonhuman environment by attention to relevant qualities (abstraction) of objects. Other humans may also be considered as objects. Reality is defined situationally and empirically, that is, inductively. Definitions of self, and of others and their relationships to the subject, are also situational and involve roles which are much more fluid than with the Co-subjective cognitive style.
An Objective cognitive style tends to be affectively neutral, self-oriented, neo-particularistic (Glenn, 1974), achievement-oriented, specific, discrete, articulated, definite, flexible, and stable. Persons with an Objective cognitive style use an Elaborated Code when speaking, and come mostly from a modern Gesellschaft, Abstract society. They would, like those with Co-subjective styles, be rated as having high field-independence, and as having articulated or analytical cognitive styles. However, they would be rated as having analytical-descriptive, rather than inferential-categorical, cognitive styles.

The Tripartite Model can be related to Glenn's older two-dimensional model, which has Associative-Abstractive and Universalistic-Particularistic axes. Subjective is associative and (paleo-)particularistic. Co-subjective is abstractive and universalistic. Objective is abstractive and (neo-)particularistic, or case-oriented, (Glenn, 1969a; Wedge, 1968).

These cognitive styles were related to somewhat more concrete persuasive styles for this research. A strongly Subjective persuasive style tends to lack focus. It may be very inconsistent. The discussion may be
generalized, but rather than a Co-subjective increase in abstraction, what one sees (hears) are transductive jumps, at the same level, to other topics which the speaker associates (at the moment) with the original topic, but which may not carry those associations for anyone else. The content may be very affective (emotional) with much expression of personal feelings (e.g., anger). Whatever is being discussed is dichotomized, or seen as black and white. The dichotomy is one of good vs. bad, which equates with we vs. they. The judgmental labels which are used have an affective quality and tend to run—that is, they tend to wash over everything associated with the primary object and perhaps over anything else which comes up. If you agree with me you are right, and good, not just on the question under discussion, but in general, whereas if you disagree with me your position is absolutely wrong and everything about you is suspect. Truth, or rightness, is not a matter of meaning, nor of some outside objective reality, but is personal and entirely relative to the speaker. That which supports me is true, that which I do not like is false. Thus obvious lies may be used, as any general truth is subservient to the speaker's position.
The Co-subjective style has a wider focus, with a stress on consistency over broad areas. Principles, rules, conventions, norms, what-is-generally-accepted-or-known, correct vs. incorrect judgment, are all invoked by Co-subjective persuaders. The focus of a discussion may be broadened from the specific question at hand (e.g., a particular grievance) to more general questions (e.g., a category of similar grievances and historical precedents). This shift to broad, general rules involves a relative inflexibility. There can only be one correct solution and so compromise is, in principle, wrong. No attention is paid to the positions of others except to point out their incorrectness. Some details may be ignored, especially if they conflict with the broad view. The correct solution is sought and found, not achieved. It is a matter of the proper application of the correct rules, not a matter of making something that works.

The Objective style is characterized by focus on the details of the question under discussion, which may be a unique problem or question. While perhaps related to other problems perceived as similar, it demands consideration of its differences, and has its own solutions. The
emphasis of the speaker is on what will work in this particular case, and there may be more than one possible solution or resolution. Compromise is considered, even sought, since in any two-sided question neither side is completely right or wrong, (although our position is, of course, more reasonable). The Objective persuader may admit the strengths of the other side's position while detailing why his or her position is stronger. The prime consideration is whether something will or will not work; whether or not it is feasible. Verifiable or verified facts are presented, judgmental labels are avoided, and attacks are aimed at what is said, not at other speakers personally. There is a tendency to respond to specific details in speeches. Objectively, one considers the details of the specific situation under discussion and balances them in an attempt to achieve the best possible solution.

HYPOTHESES AND SUPPORTING LITERATURE

While any one speaker may use elements of all three of these persuasive styles during the course of a speech, a paragraph, or even during one sentence, the major
hypothesis of this research is that:

1. culturally determined variations in cognitive style occur as described by Glenn's Tripartite Model of cognitive styles, and they can be reliably perceived by trained judges.

We chose first to look at the representatives of three cultural groups which might be examples of the three styles. The cultures chosen are three which are of great interest in international relations, and for which sufficient speeches were probably available in the material to be used. The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab nations of the Middle East were chosen.

In a semantic analysis comparing original statements and translations of speeches by English, Russian, and French speakers in the United Nations Security Council, Glenn (1966) suggests that English speakers tend to be case-particularistic and that Russians tend to be universalistic. Wedge and Muromcwe have noted that, regarding disarmament negotiations, "Western American negotiators favor partial and symmetrical exchanges of value, based on detailed rational argument and utilizing techniques of compromise". (Wedge and Muromcwe, 1965, p. 35).
Wedge, describing the differences between Americans and Brazilians discussing President Kennedy's assassination, observes that

...the response was different and typically American. Our approach was to gather, examine, and test the evidence in laborious detail. Having concluded, on the basis of facts, that the assassination was the act of a madman acting alone, we tried to communicate our conclusions. We failed completely with these students, for we expected them to give the same weight to evidence as we did" (Wedge, 1968, p. 32).

9. Controversies which have arisen in the United States since this study only serve to strengthen the point, for most of the arguments have turned on the adequacy of the evidence and the Warren Commission's procedures, not on a conspiratorial theory as the starting point. Even those polemists who obviously favor such a view are careful to search for evidential or procedural flaws to support their case. (Ibid., p. 200, note No. 9).

Elsewhere in the same article, Wedge labels the United States as abstractive and case-particularistic, using Glenn's two-dimensional model.

The literature, and personal experience, strongly suggest that among Americans we can expect to see the Objective style predominate.

Discussing Soviet disarmament negotiations, Wedge
and Muromcew (1965) concluded:

Throughout the records of the conference runs a pattern of absolutistic reasoning and an insistence on approaching each problem from the most general and universal position. Soviet representatives constantly demand settlement of general principles first, and will only then consider the specific instances, the technical and administrative details, and the practical issues. There is only one "right" way to solve problems, especially political ones, and that is to agree on the principle first, and having done that to proceed to the particulars. This absolutistic and deductive Soviet approach constantly clashes with the pragmatic and legalistic approach favored in the West. (p. 31)

Regarding compromise, they noted:

While [the West] clearly seeks compromise between conflicting positions, Soviet negotiators do not respond. This dynamic is not demonstrable in actual statements; it is conspicuous by its absence. Evidently, to the Soviet negotiator a compromise is not a practical adjustment of principles by partial concession, since principles are inviolable. Furthermore, there is only one "right" way to proceed, and the Soviet dogmatism of determinism denies the reality of alternative modes of action. Ideological absolutism does not permit deviation from the established position. An issue has to be negotiated as a whole--no concessions, however minor, are permissible. A concession, an accommodation, is evidently regarded as a sign of weakness and will only increase the opponent's demands. (Ibid., p. 33)
Bronfenbrenner observed another aspect of Russians in talks with ordinary people:

...perhaps the greatest contrast suggested by the results of the pseudo-experiment was the different power in the two cultures of exposure to facts versus feelings. In general, American respondents were influenced most by being presented with objective evidence about Soviet society; any feelings I may have had on the subject, including antagonistic ones, were best kept in the background. Quite the opposite was true with the Russians; if I wanted to convey something of the American outlook, I had to rely on emotion to carry the message. Communication was most successful when one spoke in the name of ideals and feelings rather than invoking evidence and logic. The lofty principle had to come first; only then could facts be introduced, and even so, preferably as inevitable deductive necessities, rather than as empirically independent observations. (Bronfenbrenner, 1964, p. 177)

These observations suggest universalism as a characteristic of the Russians, which would imply a relatively Co-subjective style, although Bronfenbrenner's article suggests considerable Subjectivity also.

The Middle East Arab countries here include Egypt, Libya, Sudan, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and all of the smaller nations of the Arabian Peninsula. While the Middle East is often taken to include a much larger area (cf. Patai, 1952), I have excluded here those
areas where Turkic or Iranian languages predominate, and
I have also excluded the Maghrib—Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia—
the former French colonies where French has greater in-
fluence among the educated (Patai, 1973). Excepting the
Black African South of Sudan (and of course Israeli areas),
this is an area where the poor majority speaks some variety
of colloquial Arabic and where the bilingual educated
classes still study classical Arabic.

Writing on the psychological influence of the
Arabic language on the Arabs, Shouby said:

... of all the aspects of this psychological
influence of the Arabic language, the follow-
ing may be selected as the most important:
general vagueness of thought; over-emphasis
on the psychological significance of the lin-
quistic symbols at the expense of their
meanings; stereotyped emotional responses;
overassertion and exaggeration; and two
levels of life. (Shouby, 1951, p. 694).

That[Arabic] is still largely charac-
terized by a rather primitive globality,
diffuseness, and rigidity has already been
mentioned. It remains to point out a con-
trary trend: the over attention to minute
detail, but without reintegrating these
details into a composite and well organized
whole. (Ibid., p. 700).

He also observed that these characteristics are not nec-
essarily limited to Arabs speaking Arabic: "Even when
he speaks a foreign language, an Arab shows signs of emotionality and impulsiveness of which he may not even be aware." (Ibid., p. 699)

While often influenced by Shouby, Hamady and other researchers do not treat the psychology of the Arabs in linguistic terms:

...in the conceptual process, he [the Arab] shows weakness--his ability to generalize is low and so is his capacity to grasp the whole. Poor in logic, the Arab shows also a lack of purposive directness in his thought. His methodological thinking is impaired and his abstractive faculty is defective. Furthermore, his aptitude for coordination and subsumption of thoughts is weak. (Hamady, 1960, p. 211)

Consequently, "The same could be said of Arab learning, which deals with innumerable details and seems to have no understanding for essential characteristics or for broad theoretical generalizations." (Ibid., p. 211)

Patai noted that "While Arab conduct is of the conforming type requiring the individual to behave in a manner approved by his social environment" (Patai, 1973, p. 310);

Arab thought processes are relatively more autonomous, that is, more independent of reality, than the thought processes typical of Western man. Nor is the Arab verbal
formulation influenced by reality to the degree to which it is in the West. Arab thought tends more to move on an ideal level, divorced from the Procrustean bed of reality. Arab speech likewise tends to express ideal thoughts. There is among the Arabs a relatively greater discrepancy between thought and speech on one hand and action on the other. In action, one is hemmed in by reality; thoughts and words, however, manage to maintain a relative independence from reality. (Ibid., p. 311)

Regarding the Arab style of persuasion, Laffin has summarized:

To the Arab there may be several truths about the one situation, depending on the type of language he is using. A linguistic truth overrides a perceptual one; that is, what language can be made to say about a situation has more validity than what the eyes or reason might say. Language is not used to reason, but to persuade.

"Meanings are not constant from one person to another." (Laffin, 1975, p. 81)

In terms of persuasive style, all of this is summarized in a quote from Kemal Karpat; "The most frequent form of persuasion in the Middle East is to appeal to the emotional and the personal, rather than to logical reasoning." (Quoted by Laffin, 1975, p. 62). Thus, we have a
description of Arab cognitive and persuasive styles
which corresponds closely with Glenn's Subjective style.

Therefore it is hypothesized that:

2. American United Nations representatives will tend to use an Objective persuasive style.

3. Russian United Nations representatives will tend to use a Co-subjective persuasive style.

4. Middle Eastern Arab United Nations representatives will tend to use a Subjective persuasive style.
CHAPTER II

PROCEDURES

To test the hypotheses we used copies of English versions of official verbatim records of four meetings of the United Nations Security Council held during 1967 (meetings 1355, 1358, 1360, and 1377) and English versions of provisional verbatim records of four 1973 meetings (1744, 1747, 1748, and 1754). These years were chosen so as to insure sufficient Arab speeches, since these meetings centered on the Middle East situation. The four meetings from 1967 were chosen randomly, until each cultural group, (i.e., Americans, Russians, and Arabs) was represented by at least one hundred paragraphs. The 1973 meeting records were obtained from the United States Department of State, and were presumably randomly chosen by them.

Paragraphs were rated as either Objective, Co-subjective, Subjective, Unclassifiable, or Procedural. Procedural paragraphs represent a small number of artefacts of the particular diplomatic situation. They include such things as greetings to the new president of the Security
Council (the position revolves each month). Paragraphs
may be Unclassifiable because more than one style of
persuasion is clearly represented and none is dominant,
or because no one style is very clearly represented (in
the judge's opinion). (See appendix for examples of
paragraphs.)

A pretest was run with myself as judge, using the
American, Russian, and Middle Eastern Arab speeches from
meetings 1355, 1358, 1360, and 1377, (1967). In these all
of the American and Arab speeches were originally in
English, and the Russian speeches were translated from
Russian. As this pretest gave significant results, judges
were trained by Professor Glenn in his COM 321 class (Fall
of 1976). Training took place over four class meetings,
after which a pretest using one of the 1973 meetings was
given. Three of the students were selected as judges on
the basis of understanding of the categories and ability to
follow directions. None of the students were informed, how-
soever, and all students were given copies of meetings 1355,
1358, 1360, and 1377, and were asked to rate all of the
paragraphs of the American, Russian, and Middle Eastern
Arab speakers. Other speakers were ignored.
Since the results from these three judges appeared to corroborate my pretest results, and because of financial inability to hire judges, further research, using the speeches of other national groups, from the eight meetings (1355, 1358, 1360, 1377, 1744, 1747, 1748, 1750), was limited to a pretest with myself as sole judge.

RESULTS, Part I

The three judges rated 101 American paragraphs, 118 Russian paragraphs, and 259 Arab paragraphs. All paragraphs which any judge rated as unclassifiable or procedural, or which for some reason any judge failed to rate, were discarded. This left 72 American paragraphs, 79 Russian paragraphs, and 172 Arab paragraphs. There was unanimous agreement on the ratings of 60 American paragraphs (83.3%), on 45 Russian paragraphs (57.0%), and on 106 Arab paragraphs (61.6%); or on 211 of 323 paragraphs in all. General reliability was, then, 65.3% for three judges.

Table 1 shows the distribution of all of the ratings, by all three judges, for the 323 paragraphs. Table 2 shows the distribution of the ratings, by persuasive style and cultural group, for the 211 paragraphs with unanimous ratings.
A chi-square test was run on the distribution in Table 1. \( X^2 = 901.4 \), which exceeds the necessary 13.815 needed at a .001 confidence level, with two degrees of freedom. A similar test run on the data in Table 2 yielded a chi-square value of 276.4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Persuasive Style</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Co-subjective</th>
<th>Subjective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Persuasive style vs. Cultural Group for 323 paragraphs x 3 judges.
### Persuasive Style

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Co-subjective</th>
<th>Subjective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Persuasive style vs. Cultural Group for paragraphs with unanimous ratings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Co-subjective</th>
<th>Subjective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Breakdown of Arab data from Table 2, by country.
RESULTS, Part II

I did a preliminary judging of American, Russian, and Arab speeches from the four 1973 meetings, and of the speeches of all other speakers from all eight meetings. Of these 1122 paragraphs, 177 were judged as procedural or unclassifiable, and were discarded. The results of the ratings of the other 945 paragraphs are given in Table 4. Thirty-one countries are included. Chi-square tests were run on the data from each country represented by thirty or more paragraphs in Table 4, using a presumption of random distribution as being one-third in each category. The chi-square test was also run on the data for Austria, using a correction for continuity of $\frac{1}{2}0.5$. (Blalock, 1960). These results are given in Table 5.
Table 4:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Co-subjective</th>
<th>Subjective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Israel</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Tunisia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Morocco</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Syria</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Egypt</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Sudan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Ethiopia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Pakistan</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. India</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Indonesia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. United States</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. United Kingdom</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Canada</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Australia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. France</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Denmark</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Austria</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Yugoslavia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Bulgaria</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Co-subjective</th>
<th>Subjective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21. Soviet Union</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Nigeria</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Kenya</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Mali</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Guinea</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Panama</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Peru</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Brazil</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Argentina</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. China (People's Republic)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. Japan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>289</strong></td>
<td><strong>291</strong></td>
<td><strong>365</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
United Kingdom 60.20
China (People's Republic) 39.35
Yugoslavia 38.32
Israel 34.74
Austria 20.02
Bulgaria 18.57
India 13.818
France 10.58
Sudan 8.60
Pakistan 4.47

Table 5: Results of Chi-square tests run on data of some countries from Table 4. Two degrees of freedom. Significance levels: .001 = 13.815, .01 = 9.210, .02 = 7.824, .05 = 5.991.
DISCUSSION

The materials used were two years of United Nations Security Council records. The two years chosen were those which assured many Arab as well as American and Russian speeches.

Part I of the results (Tables 1, 2 and 3) demonstrates that American United Nations representatives (two represented) overwhelmingly tend to use an Objective persuasive style, which presumably reflects an Objective cognitive style. Russian delegates (two represented) favored a Co-subjective style, although somewhat Subjective. The Arab speakers (seven represented) were mostly Subjective, and somewhat Co-subjective.

The Security Council meetings which were chosen all concerned Arab-Israeli wars. Since war is, for the participants, very emotional, and since the Subjective style is the style best suited to express emotion, it follows that we would expect an increase in Subjectivity (or at least an increase in the appearance of Subjectively rated paragraphs) when the speakers are discussing issues about which they feel strongly. Thus, it might be argued that the preponderance of Subjectively rated paragraphs from Arab
speakers merely reflects their reactions to the war(s) and is solely an artefact of the situation.

While it is quite reasonable to assume, following the above argument, that the Arab speakers were more emotional (and consequently were rated more Subjective) than they would have been at other meetings discussing less emotional issues, a look at the ratings of four Israeli speakers at the eight meetings (results Part II, Table 4, No. 1) clearly shows that the affective quality of the topic was not the only factor involved in the Arabs' Subjective ratings. I rated the Israeli's 82-Objective, 27-Co-subjective, and 43-Subjective, (and 17-Procedural or Un-classified). Even with a substantial number of Subjective paragraphs, due perhaps to the emotional nature of the confrontations, the generally Objective characteristic of the Israeli speakers is still apparent. Glenn has already suggested that the Arab-Israeli divergence in cognitive styles is a serious hindrance to settlement of the Middle East situation, (Glenn, N.D.).

It might be noted, somewhat tentatively considering the numbers involved, that Egyptian and Sudanese speakers (see Table 3, and Table 4, nos. 5 and 7) were rated more
Co-subjective than Subjective. This may be due to the strong European influence since the early Nineteenth century.

While all of the American and Arab speeches from 1967 used in the statistical analysis were delivered in English, the Soviet speeches were translated from Russian. In addition, other speeches from 1967 and 1973 were originally given in all five official United Nations languages (English, French, Spanish, Russian, Chinese), but only English translations were used here. (Also, one Yugoslavian representative spoke in Serbo-Croatian, but his delegation provided English translations.)

It could be argued, in the case of translations, that any pattern which emerges is either an artefact of translation or a linguistic necessity in the original language. We can look, in Part II of the results, at the English speaking representatives of Canada, Austria, and Saudi Arabia (Table 4, nos. 14, 18, 6) as well as the French-speaking representatives of France, Bulgaria, and Morocco (Table 4, nos. 16, 20, 3), to see that a translational artefact is unlikely and that, at least in French and English, there is no linguistic necessity. This suggests that while
a speaker may be limited by the linguistic style of his or her governing class, which is still a matter of choice, he or she is not limited by linguistic necessity. This is true for Spanish and probably Russian. Whether it applies to all languages is a difficult question.

A Subjective style must be universally possible, as affect is universally expressible. Therefore, the occurrence of a Co-subjective or Objective style shows the possibility of choice in that language. There may still be languages which eliminate or severely restrict the possibility of using anything but a Subjective persuasive style. This does not seem to apply, however to any language which is used to teach, and do research in, Western science and engineering. If this reasoning is correct, then one could assume that all of the styles are possible in any of the five United Nations languages, although one or another may be easier to use in a given language because of greater frequency of use by native speakers. Important to this line of argument is the level of analysis used here. It is neither syntactical nor semantical, but emphasizes pragmatics (Morris, 1955).

In considering the range of validity or
generalizability of these results, one must consider that United Nations delegates are professional communicators and that they are chosen for their positions at least partly for their communications skills. While, as Wedge (1968, p. 27) notes, "... diplomats tend to acquire a common culture. They become more like each other than are the countries they represent," it seems reasonable to assume that, to the extent that there are differences in the persuasive styles used by diplomats from different cultural groups or nations, the persuasive styles of the speakers are representative of the styles considered most effective among the governing classes in their respective countries.

In particular we might expect public speeches to be in the style most approved by home governments since most substantive negotiations are carried on in private, sometimes through intermediaries. This is particularly true for the Arab countries.

The results, then, are only assumed to be applicable to the governing classes of the nations represented and not necessarily to any larger group. One cannot assume equivalence, for instance, of the Egyptian fellahin and the
governing class in Cairo, or of the Muslim populations of the Central Asian Soviet Socialist Republics and the Russian party elite in Moscow. The limits of generalizability may be very narrow for some nations.

Part II of the results, which was done with only one judge, must be interpreted with much caution and qualification. It is essentially just a pretest. With this qualification, several things may be (tentatively) discussed regarding Part II.

As noted earlier, the Israelis seem to be mostly Objective, and the Arab ratings agree with Part I. The Russian speaker was rated more Subjective than the Russian delegates from 1967 (Table 1 and Table 4, no. 21), but this is not inconsistent with the literature cited.

The two French-speaking representatives from the Maghrib (Tunisia and Morocco; Table 4, nos. 2 and 3) appear Subjective. The two representatives from the United Kingdom and the Canadian representative, together with the American representative (Table 4, Nos. 12, 13, 14), present a picture of Western, English-speaking nations as very Objective. (Again, all assumptions of validity or generalizability are limited to the governing classes.)
The two representatives from France appear mostly Objective, but also fairly Co-subjective. The Austrian and the two Yugoslavian delegates were definitely Co-subjective. Finally, the Bulgarian and Russian speakers were both Co-subjective and Subjective, (Table 4, nos. 16, 18, 19, 20, 21). This is suggestive of a trend, from Western Europe (United Kingdom) to Eastern Europe, corresponding to a trend from Objective to Co-subjective and towards Subjective.
CHAPTER III

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Research in the area of cognitive styles and their correlates has resulted in descriptions of many dichotomous constructs. While these have been created on several different levels of super- and subordination, inspection of the published research indicates much overlap, sometimes obscured by variations in terminology. Some research in the area was reviewed. Three types of construction systems, derived from three ideal types of experiences, were described.

Glenn's Tripartite Model of cognitive styles was proposed as the best explanation of observed phenomena, and the model was described. Objective, Co-subjective, and Subjective persuasive styles were derived from the cognitive styles. It was hypothesized that:

1. Culturally determined variations in persuasive style, as derived from Glenn's Tripartite Model of cognitive styles, occur and can be reliably perceived by trained judges.
Literature was cited indicating that Americans tend to use an Objective style, Russians tend to use a Co-subjective style, and Arabs tend to use a Subjective style. Since the material to be used was speeches by United Nations representatives at Security Council meetings, it was further hypothesized that:

2. United States representatives would use mostly an Objective style.

3. Russian representatives would use mostly a Co-subjective style.

4. Middle Eastern Arab speakers would use mostly a Subjective style.

Three trained judges rated paragraphs of American, Russian, and Middle Eastern Arab speakers from 1967. The level of reliability (65.3%) and the distribution of ratings supports the major hypothesis. The distribution of ratings of American, Russian, and Arab speakers confirms the second, third, and fourth hypotheses. One judge rated speeches by representatives of other nations, and these results were presented and discussed.

The results indicate that Glenn's model of three types of cognitive styles (and persuasive styles) can be
perceived through the variation in the persuasive styles used by diplomats from several countries and cultural groups. Use of this model in the description of any group should include the variation in style, as well as the dominant style, as groups are likely not to be homogeneous on this dimension and the variation may be as interesting as the modal style.

The differences in persuasive style exhibited by representatives of the governments involved in some long-lasting disputes, (as for instance the Arabs and Israel, India and China, Russia and the United States), may indicate a serious problem in intercultural communication, (Glenn, 1966, 1969, N.D.). This could not only interfere with the communication necessary to resolve the basic conflict, but may also exasperbate the conflict.

This method of pragmatic analysis of transcriptions of verbal material, as suggested by Glenn, has shown itself to be a useful research methodology for studying cognitive styles through their expression as persuasive styles. If one is interested in the application of cognitive styles models to the problems of intercultural communication, then this methodology potentially provides a means of...
determining, through study of persuasive style, (and at a distance), some of the basic reality assumptions and orientations (constructs) of a culture or government.

It might be of interest to test correlations of subjects' scores on psychological tests of cognitive style (e.g., Embedded-figures-test) with ratings of the subjects by persuasive style. Analyses of persuasive style might be easier and cheaper than some of the perceptual testing used in cross-cultural studies, as persuasive style might be studied at a distance using materials collected by other researchers.

FURTHER RESEARCH

It seems desirable to extend the range of this study in two directions. The first would be the use of more extensive United Nations records to analyze (rate) speeches by representatives of many (or all) U.N. countries, including as many speakers as possible from each country. This would be a larger and more costly undertaking than was this present study.

The second type of study would be of a larger range of the population of each country, that is, of more social classes and of more geographical areas within each country.
This might involve differentiating ethnic groups rather than just national groups. Obtaining and choosing representative written materials (or taped verbal materials) would be an enormous task and would involve either translations or very many multilingual judges.
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCES


N.D. Theory of meaning, culture and political culture. Unpublished paper.


APPENDIX

Examples of rated paragraphs.

Objective:

91. On 17 May, as the world well remembers, President Nasser, citing the supposed danger of an Israel invasion of Syria, requested the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force. And when UNEF vacated Sharm el Eheikh, the United Arab Republic immediately reimposed its blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba, after ten years of free and peaceful navigation of that Gulf. (Mr. Goldberg, U.S., meeting 1358)

101. Mr. TOMEH (Syria): I should like to draw the attention of the members of the Council to the supplemental information which has been received by the Secretary-General and distributed to the Council since the start of this meeting. This information is contained in document S/7930/Add.7, dated 14 June 1967; paragraph 1 (vi) (c) reads as follows:

"Movement of Israel forces approximately 2 km east along Kuneitra-Damascus Road since 0515 hours, Zebra, 11 June (Report from observers, Damascus)." (Meeting 1360)

116. We know from the statements of Israel statesmen, and in particular from that made yesterday by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel and just published in The New York Times, that Israel makes a definite claim to keep some of the territories seized from the
Arab States. (Mr. Kuznetsov, U.S.S.R., meeting 1377)

The shooting became particularly violent at 2038 hours when Egyptian forces opened fire on the Israel bridgehead on the west bank of the Suez Canal from the east and from the north. At 2056 hours the Egyptians opened fire from north of Deversoir. Later, Israeli forces were shelled from bazookas. At 2123 hours Egyptians again opened fire on the Israeli bridgehead. At 2132 hours there was bazooka shelling, and at 2134 hours the bazooka shelling of Israeli forces intensified and was extended in area. (Mr. Tekoah, Israel, meeting 1748, p.7)

74. Our draft resolution goes far beyond the resolutions of the Security Council under which Mr. Bunche so successfully operated. Our draft proposes a far more specific mandate. But it seems to my delegation and to the United States Government that what is far more important than a list of written principles is the existence on both sides of a sufficient practical will to make peace. The peace-making process is not quick or easy, nor is it a kind of magic which enables each side to realize its maximum demands. The only magic in peace-making is the awareness of each side that the benefits of peace and tranquility are valuable enough to justify very great efforts in the search for it, as well as the acceptance of compromise and accommodation by both sides on the actual terms. And the items cannot be spelled out in advance; they must be spelled out on the ground. (Mr. Goldberg, U.S., meeting 1377)
42. Some people at this table may perhaps believe that the aggressor has a right to keep the territories he has seized and to flout the rights of other peoples. But we should like to ask how it should be appropriate to describe the piratical acts of any State which, for instance, seized a part of the territory of Argentina or Brazil, Denmark or Canada, and then said that it would not withdraw from the territories it had seized until the Governments of those countries had complied with the demands of the aggressor and gone down on their knees before him. It is this which is the crux of the matter at the present time. And we believe that members of the Security Council must approach the solution to this problem with a full sense of responsibility and with all seriousness, having full regard to the consequences which might arise from a failure in this case to observe the most important principles of international law and the vital provisions of the United Nations Charter. (Mr. Fedorenko, U.S.S.R., meeting 1358)

6. The Security Council, in its ardent search for peace, must undoubtedly be guided and inspired by the United Nations Charter. In this connexion, three fundamental considerations, on which present and future deliberations should be based and from which action and conclusions must necessarily follow, should be made clear: first, that one of the cornerstones of the Charter is the non-recognition of the fruits of aggression; second, that any solution of the present crisis which does not recognize that principle is a negation of the Charter itself; third, that the new international order envisaged in the Charter and inspired by the tragic experiences of mankind involved the renunciation for ever of the use of force for aggressive
purposes, recognition of the illegitimacy of and non-recognition of any right based on conquest. (Mr. Daoudy, Syria, meeting 1377)

The Middle East crisis is a problem of the widest international proportions and constitutes today the most acute and the most dangerous hotbed of war in the world. It is so by reason of the interests that are involved in it, the forces and factors that are engaged in it, and the fundamental principles of international relations and rights of peoples and States that are implicated in it. (Mr. Minic, Yugoslavia, meeting 1744, p. 6)

But it is not only the Arab States and Israel which have suffered. For many years now the interests of many countries in Europe, Africa and Asia have been closely affected. The will is strong in these three continents for lasting peace in the Middle East and they have the opportunity to express it in this debate. (Sir Donald Maitland, United Kingdom, meeting 1747, p. 36)

In the present situation my Government is motivated by a single overriding concern which must take precedence, in our view, over all other considerations: the concern for human life. This concern is increased because of the existence of strong and ancient bonds of respect and friendship between our people and all the peoples of the Middle East. (Mr. Jankowitsch, Austria, meeting 1744, p. 16)
Subjective:

159. We are very tenacious, we Arabs and, mind you, the Jews of the area are very tenacious. Otherwise they would not have remained Jews till today. In spite of all the adversities that the people of the area have suffered, we are still tenacious. More tenacious, but may not survive the atom bomb. If anyone of you here lose it, then that is the end of mankind. (Mr. Baroody, Saudi Arabia, meeting 1358)

The dispatch of the so-called United Nations Emergency Force will turn sovereign Arab States in the Middle East into an area under international control with infinite evil consequences in its wake and will pave the way for further international intervention in the Middle East with the super-Powers (sic) as the behind-the-scenes bosses. The fierce contention between the two super-Powers on the question of the composition of the so-called Emergency Force during the informal consultations in the past two days once again testified to the correctness of the aforesaid judgment of the Chinese delegation.
(Mr. Huang, China, meeting 1754, p. 7)

196. I am a Jew; I am a Zionist. It is a privilege to be a Jew; it is a privilege to be a Zionist. It is a source of pride to be a Jew; it is a source of pride to be a Zionist. Zionism is the finest expression of the national liberation of the people. It has restored an ancient nation to its ancestral home. It has created there cities, towns, villages, farms, new forms of society, a national spirit and a true patriotism which expresses itself in service and in sacrifice. These have elicited the admiration of multitudes of people throughout
the world, in Africa, in Asia, in the Americas in Europe, from all walks of life who see in Zionism and who see in Israel the fulfillment of a divine prophecy and a sublime historical reparation. (Mr. Kidron, Israel, meeting 1358)

104. This is a very serious situation. The Israelis are using the same tactics as those used by the Nazis in the Holy Land in 1947. The, in March, April and May, 1948, they started massacres, such as that of Deir Yassin and others. (Mr. El-Farra, Jordan, meeting 1355)

In his drive to annihilate the Jewish people, Hitler began by distorting the image of the Jew, by rewriting Jewish history, by fabricating some of the most odious historic and racial theories. The Arab governments, in their campaign to complete Hitler's crimes against the Jewish people and destroy the Jewish State, have adopted the same method of falsifying Jewish history, and in particular the meaning of the Zionist movement and the significance of its ideals. (Mr. Tekoah, Israel, meeting 1747, p. 42)

"The entire world was relieved and gratified to hear of the decision of the Security Council on 22 October on a cease fire and a cessation of all hostilities in the Middle East. The Egyptian leaders have stated their readiness to fulfill this decision of the Security Council and to put an end to hostilities on the Egypt-Israel front. Agreement with that Security Council decision was also stated by the Government of Israel. However, the Tel Aviv statement was actually a blatant falsehood
under the cover of which the Israeli military teacherously threw itself on the positions of the Egyptian troops and also on populated civilian points in Egypt." (Mr. Malik, U.S.S.R., meeting 1748, p. 51)

An exchange between Mr. Goldberg of the United States and Mr. Tomeh of Syria (from meeting 1355) may illustrate the differences between Objective and Subjective speakers:

176. The representative of Syria made a statement in reference to a remark of mine. I will recall the circumstances of that remark. The remark was made in the context of a malicious and false accusation that United States aircraft from carriers had participated in an attack. And I said, with respect to that remark, that people ought to put up some evidence that such an accusation was true. There has been no evidence offered. There can be no evidence offered of that because there is no basis for that accusation. That accusation was a false and malicious and scandalous one. That is the remark I made, and I was impelled to make it because of the dangers indicating to anyone involvement on the part of the United States, which has never been the case in this particular situation.

184. Mr. TOMEH (Syria): I would not reply to the distinguished representative of the United States were it not for some of the very words that he used in reference to my statement when he said, referring to a previous statement, that it was a malicious, false, and scandalous accusation. I confirm categorically that the United States has helped Israel in its invasion of the United Arab Republic and Jordan and is
to be held responsible for whatever de-
struction and killing have taken place in
the United Arab Republic and Jordan and
are taking place right now in my own
country, Syria. If anything is scandalous
it is the policy of the United States,
which has been shameful for the last
twenty years vis-a-vis the Arab world and
vis-a-vis the Arab nation.

191. Mr. GOLDBERG (United States of America):
Ambassador Tomeh's personal comments, which
are in violation of every type of diplomatic
usage, are beneath contempt, and I would not
even purport to dignify them with an answer.
The remark to which I referred and which I
said was utterly false and malicious was the
remark that carrier planes from the Sixth Fleet
had intervened in this conflict, and I challenge
anybody, including the Ambassador, to bring
evidence before the Council to this effect.

196. Mr. TOMEH (Syria): I shall ignore the
venomous attack made personally against me by
the representative of the United States. I
would only say this, that it is not enough to
belong to a great power. The United States with
one bomb can destroy the whole of Syria. But
it is much greater and much stronger to belong
to a great cultural and intellectual tradition.
And this I am proud of.