THE RHETORIC OF WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY JR.
AND THE UNIVERSAL AMERICAN AUDIENCE

BY
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

PURPOSES AND PROCEDURES

In this study of the rhetoric of William F. Buckley Jr., the investigator will attempt the following:

(1) To essay what Karlyn Kohrs Campbell has called in her book *Critiques of Contemporary Rhetoric* the first stage of rhetorical criticism, a "descriptive analysis." An attempt will be made "to discover the unique and defining characteristics" that make Buckley's discourse "distinctive." In this effort the concern will be solely with the conservative's "choice of persuasive strategies," the broader ploys by which one moves his audience to believe and to act. As Campbell suggests, an effort will be made to "support each label with evidence."

(2) To accomplish what Campbell calls the next step in the critical process, an appraisal of the "relation" of Buckley's rhetoric "to its milieu." An attempt will be made to disclose "the intrinsic elements—the external limitations, constraints, or influences on the rhetorician's choices."
The elements of the rhetorical problem represent the obstacles that prevent the author from accomplishing his purpose immediately and easily. These elements include the audience, the historical-cultural context, other persuasive forces, and the rhetorician himself...

At this stage the critic is concerned with discovering as much information as possible about the persons usually exposed to the discourse. Such a concern will be expressed and this query will be raised: in the absence of positive empirical data, is it likely that William F. Buckley, given the nature of his rhetoric, moves those nurtured in an Anglo-American culture to belief and to action, given the way they naturally develop?

As he undertakes to answer this question, the investigator will commence the following:

(3) To construct what Campbell describes as the final stage of rhetorical criticism, an "interpretative analysis." She asks this question:

... Does the rhetorician suggest criteria for judging his work? Frequently the authors of persuasive discourses suggest standards for evaluation, which are inherent in statements of their beliefs about the proper analysis of an issue and the purpose of their discourses. This question suggests the critic should take the rhetorician "on his own terms." Interpretable, Buckley will be taken "on his own terms."

The methodology used will be to let the polemicist set the standards by which the observer is to judge him. Specifically this Buckley criterion will be applied:

Buckley declares that he and the other conservative theorists at National Review are the people's scholars,
in contrast to impractical and uncomprehending liberal "abstractionists," who do not understand the nature, needs, and aspirations of the American citizen. Accordingly, the investigator will examine the extent to which the author's rhetoric is in consonance with, or reflective of, the American character.

In effect, Buckley will judge himself.

SCOPE OF STUDY

Representative samples of all of Buckley's rhetorical works—his books, his articles, his speeches, his television discussions—will be assayed as to their likely impact on, and their patent relationship to, the universal American audience. The concept of the universal American audience is a variation on the concept of the universal audience as developed by Chaim Perelman in his volume *The New Rhetoric.*

The universal American audience is comprised potentially of all American adults. That Buckley appears to be addressing Americans in general is indicated by the fact that he is the second most widely published newspaper columnist in the country, newspapers being the common denominator of journalism; by the fact that his television program has appeared on both commercial and public stations in all parts of America; by the fact that on his broadcast he
interviews moderates, liberals, and radicals, as well as conservatives; and by the fact that, were he addressing conservatives only, he could do so rather effectively writing for America's foremost right-wing journal, his own *National Review*.

Perelman has laid the greatest possible stress on the need for the rhetor to understand his audience and to "adapt himself" to it.11 In fact, he has defined argumentation as essentially "a function of the audience being addressed."12 He has suggested that "... we might characterize each speaker by the image he himself holds of the universal audience that he is trying to win over to his view";13 that, in addition, "... each culture ... has its own conception of the universal audience."14 He has offered in the next sentence that "the study of these variations would be very instructive, ... ."15 Therefore, this inquiry will seek to discover the similarities and dissimilarities between the conception of what Americans are like implied in Buckley's rhetoric, and the conception Americans have of themselves inherent in how they act.

**IMPORTANCE OF STUDY**

William F. Buckley Jr. is, if not the greatest, then the most omnipresent and protean, conservative
persuader in the United States today. He is, first, the editor of America's most influential conservative magazine, *National Review*. For it, he has himself written numberless articles, commentaries, and "asides." Buckley is also the author of a thrice-a-week syndicated newspaper column which appears nationally in 348 journals. He is an incessant contributor to such disparate magazines as *Harper's, Playboy, and TV Guide*. His books are many. A new one seems to make its appearance yearly with the regularity of the seasons. The conservative's weekly television program, *Firing Line*, has been making its mark on the country for almost a decade and has been for the past several years a staple of the public network. Since the 1950's the lecture circuit has made stringent demands on his time. Last but not least, Buckley has himself directly entered the political arena, running for Mayor of New York in 1965, heading the United States Information Agency during the first Nixon Administration, and operating within the councils of the Republican party's right wing. With the possible exception of Senator Barry Goldwater, his is the foremost voice of American conservatism.

Therefore, a study of Buckley's rhetoric is important. Buckley is, in his own right, a pre-eminent conservative voice. His articulations fashion a significant part of the image contemporary conservatism projects to
the American citizen. His approach to the problems of persuasion must be assumed influential in the work of other conservative polemicists.

Because the subject of this study is not only the rhetoric of the polemicist in question, but also the nature of the audience he addresses, of importance too is whatever light can be shed on how Americans are likely to respond to suasive appeals. Audience analysis was a primary feature of rhetorical theory as early as Aristotle, whose monumental *Rhetoric* reads as if it were the world's first great treatise on psychology. Rhetoric founded on assumptions and values not shared by the listeners to whom it is addressed is likely to be ineffective. Contemporary American speakers and their critics are working in the dark to the extent that they do not know the contemporary American citizen.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

One doctoral dissertation has so far focused, in part, on Buckley's rhetoric. Thomas F. Mader, in his monograph "Coriolanus and God: A Burkeian View of William Buckley," applied Kenneth Burke's dramatistic theory to a speech the publicist delivered at St. John's University, New York City, in 1962. Mr. Mader found that in the speech, entitled "The True Meaning of the Right Wing," the
orator tried to achieve identification with his audience by manipulation of the standard Burkeian concepts of hierarchy, guilt, victimage, and redemption; that he used several modes of appeal; that he made dramatic use of thesis and antithesis; and that the address satisfied Professor Burke's definition of eloquence by its synthesis of identification and persuasion through symbolic and formal charges.

However remarkable Mr. Mader found the Buckley speech as eristic literature, though, the empirical element created a different impression. The investigator ascertained and analysed the reaction of audience members and concluded that the speech was a failure in terms of Buckley's purposes and the audience's expectations. Buckley did not persuade; but, concluded Mader, his performance had its compensations, both for the audience and for Buckley.

Two master's theses have appeared on this subject. James T. Brooks Jr., in an analysis of seven Buckley speeches titled "A Study of William F. Buckley Jr.'s Theory and Practice of Persuasion," remarked, among other things, Buckley's penchant for deductive argumentation from certain "truths" personally intuited. Brooks maintained also that the conservative is inconsistent, owing to his claim on the one hand that he does "not alter speeches to suit
the values and fancies of audiences,"19 and his transparent manipulation of language and arrangement to achieve effect, on the other. The investigator concluded, though, that "as a persuader Buckley doesn't seem to be accomplishing very much at all."20 How Brooks arrived at this judgment is not clear. He offered no inductive or deductive proof as to why Buckley has so failed.

In "A Rhetorical Analysis of Three Speeches by William Frank Buckley Jr.," Carolyn Mae Ory asserted that the polemicist relies heavily in his speeches, on ethical and emotional proof, but conspicuously stints on logical proof, that is, logical proof that goes beyond mere numbered or lettered points.21 His speeches, Miss Ory claimed, are devoid of documentary evidence; but she found him vigorous in his attempt to compensate for this deficiency through devices that establish sagacity. Ory concluded that, though charming, magnetic, and deft in delivery, Buckley does not persuade, or even effectively communicate his more substantive propositions, because his audiences do not understand him.

BUCKLEY'S BACKGROUND

Buckley came by his conservative predispositions, it would seem, almost genetically. His father, William F. Buckley Sr., amassed a considerable fortune through
speculation in oil, particularly in Central and South America. So aggressive a capitalist was he that the authorities expelled him from Mexico during that country's revolution. This ouster instilled in the elder Buckley, and perhaps also his children, "a life-long distrust of revolutionary and socialist governments," according to his daughter Priscilla.

The young William Buckley matriculated at excellent preparatory schools between his family's frequent travels. Among them were the Millbrook School in New York and Beaumont in England. After graduating from Millbrook in 1944, Buckley briefly attended the University of Mexico, then entered World War II with army intelligence.

Buckley's celebrated career at Yale, 1946-1950, followed thereafter. The conservative made the prestigious clubs, toured with the debating team, chaired the Daily News, stung the campus with crisp editorials, and graduated Cum Laude. Of special note was his selection as Alumni Day orator his senior year. Conspicuously honored, Buckley composed the speech, but did not deliver it, refusing to revise the talk at the bidding of President Seymour. In the address, the student indicted the university for failure to inculcate the religious and political principles on which the school was founded; to which it still gave, on occasion, devout lip service; and by which the alumni, one
would presume, ordered their lives; indeed, not only for
dereliction in regard to the preservation of these ideals,
but also for acquiescence in the effort of so many instruc-
tors to supplant the precepts with atheism and socialism,
the student speaker claimed. The speech, together with
much of the material informing his newspaper editorials,
germinated into *God and Man at Yale*, which Buckley pub-
lished one year after graduation.25

With *God and Man at Yale* Buckley exploded onto the
national scene. He soon was debating the issues raised in
the book with academicians across the country. Then he
became a peripatetic lecturer in his own right. In 1955 he
founded *National Review*, assembling for it an impressive
cast of conservative scholars. In 1962 the editor's "On
the Right" column, which appeared in each fortnightly
issue of the magazine, was syndicated nationally for once-
a-week newspaper publication. Since 1964 Buckley has been
writing three articles a week for the Washington Star syn-
dication. His commentaries appear in more than three hun-
dred journals.26

Buckley's career as television host, interviewer,
and gadfly began in 1967. *Firing Line* was first distrib-
uted through independent syndication to approximately
ninety stations. Since 1971 the one-hour talk program has
been shown once a week on the more than two hundred outlets
of the Public Broadcasting System.\textsuperscript{27} During these busy years of editing, lecturing, broadcasting, and newspaper and magazine writing, Buckley has found time to publish eleven more books, only four of which are compilations of his articles.\textsuperscript{28} No wonder James J. Kilpatrick, himself a renowned polemicist, asserts that "on our side of the political fence, Buckley . . . is \textit{Numero Uno."}\textsuperscript{29}
CHAPTER 2
AN ANALYSIS OF THE PERSUASIVE STRATEGEMS
IN THE RHETORIC OF WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY

INTRODUCTION

What are the "means of persuasion" William F. Buckley tends to use with regularity?

In this chapter there will, first of all, be a treatment of the means of persuasion as historically categorized by rhetoricians. Included in this preface will be a brief examination of the likely impact of these rhetorical elements on American audiences. In Chapter 3 this approach will be developed in greater depth.

Next there will appear a dissection of the broad approaches and appeals which characterize the rhetoric of William F. Buckley, those by which the author seeks to preempt rhetorically strategic ground.

Finally, there will be an analysis of the specifically offensive rhetorical maneuvers typical of Buckley's books, articles, and television discussions.
Aristotle discerned three fundamental means by which a speechmaker can induce trust and influence action. He can use ethos, pathos, and logos. Traditionally, ethos is defined as the rhetor's character, moral standing, or reputation, and the good will he can elicit from the audience. A feature some contemporary rhetoricians add to the concept is sagacity or perceived expertness. Quintilian so valued this rhetorical element he made it the cornerstone of his system: "... the perfect orator ... cannot exist unless he is above all a good man." Ethos can encompass the invoking of moral sanctions as part of one's appeal, building up oneself at the expense of supposedly immoral opponents, and showing off one's familiarity with every detail that relates to the issue. But, in terms of cogency, such maneuvers are secondary to the quality of one's prior "image." The commonplace, "What you do makes so much noise I can't hear what you're saying," strikes fairly close to the truth.

If damaged, though, one's ethos can be repaired, in part, by sterling conduct and the passage of time, and to some extent by how one delivers the speech. Furthermore, one's rectitude or depravity does not impinge on one's reader and one's auditor with equivalent force. An
author is somewhat detached from his public; communication by paper and print is a more abstract, less relational coming together. Hence for the penman, virtue is important, but not so immediately imperative. The speechmaker, on the other hand, conjures up feelings and associations far more powerfully. Huddled together in a bedimmed lecture hall, audience and orator interact intensely.

Ethos is at least a silent part of every polemic, however, even journalistic. The propagandist can exploit it to advantage or live with it reluctantly. He cannot entirely escape it. People "consider the source."

Somewhat more manageable are pathos and logos. Pathos denotes that quality which moves us to pity or sorrow or, in the terms broader sense, any other strong emotion. Often it suggests more the art or trick one employs to achieve the effect rather than the result itself. Here again, the orator has an advantage, if it is an impassioned response one is after. He can recount the most poignant tales and anecdotes, or drape about himself the most sentimental symbols of his culture, and he can also dramatize them with voice and gesture. Either way, pathos appears a telling mode of persuasion. Men, even intelligent ones, think with their glands more than they would care to admit.

Logos, or logic, would be, one would suspect,
America's basic rhetorical resource. The intellectual heritage of the United States is Protestant; its politics, democratic; its temperament, dry. In America, feeling would defer to reason, one might think, at least to an extent unknown in authoritarian countries or among volatile populations. But American culture is not that simple. Social countercurrents erode to some extent the appeal of syllogism and enthymeme. Americans are practical, non-doctrinaire, case-oriented, in contrast to, say, the French, who are analytical, word-obsessed, universal-oriented. In France, thoughts and governmental Departments alike are precisely arranged, neatly subdivided. The idea of someone's getting his mail and water from a nearby city; his zoning laws, fire protection, and voting facilities from his township; and his constabulary services from the state is foreign to the Gallic mind. Like the New York subway—which weaves along according to population disbursement, not symmetrical design—it does not "make sense." One could illustrate further. There is so much in American society that seems "irrational" and "inconsistent." Americans codify lofty principles, then bend them to make them fit reality. "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . ." Congress makes such laws anyway, with the help of the Supreme Court. "No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law . . . ."5 States can, and do, if the citizen is "mentally ill," so that community life may continue more smoothly. (Although now the committed person must be treated.) Americans always ask, "Will it work? Will it enhance function?" Americans ask only as an afterthought, "Is it logically watertight?"

So as a culture, the people of the United States are ambivalent toward logos and wary of pathos, at least in relation to the rest of the world. Even ethos, despite its power, Americans can abstract from the occasion as no other people can. Almost subconsciously, Americans ask, what has reputation to do with the immediate concern? The speaker and the writer are playing a specialized role. Americans judge them on the basis of their present performance of that role in a manner quite unexampled.

In short, Americans—like other Anglo-Saxons, but more so—are not easily moved by speaking or writing per se. The newspapers may tell them to vote one way. They may vote another.

What does Buckley do, then, to convince this fairly obdurate audience?

BROAD APPROACHES: PRE-EMPTION OF RHETORICALLY STRATEGIC GROUND

To begin with, there are those maneuvers by which
Buckley pre-empts rhetoric ally strategic ground. He seizes the advantage, first of all, by invoking the sanctions of religion. That this conservative believes Christian values undergird his political ideals, and that religious imagery informs his work, are plain. There is, for example, this passage in which the author weds belief in God and the divine sanction to an individualist, and hence conservative, view of life:

If God exists, a given man cannot be a Communist for so long as (a) he recognizes that God exists and (b) he understands Communism to be founded on a negation of God. But if God does not exist, it follows that Communism or some suitable variant of it is the secularist derivation of a nonbelief in God, which, having the effect of denying the individual a divine spark, tends naturally to advance the claims of the collectivity over those of the individual, as the focal point of social effort.6

Here also conservatism, identified indirectly as that view currently "not fashionable," appears as the only value system founded on "a religious base":

What is not fashionable are some of those certitudes and intuitions that most of us here in this room aim to serve—such certitudes as that there is a religious base in life, and therefore a transhistorical meaning to the human experience.7

Buckley is not always roundabout in his exclusion of liberals from divine favor. Here he pointedly represents them as being outside of Heavenly grace or spiritually uncomprehending:

God alone knows, and I am sure He is despondent over it, what exactly is going on in the mind of Mr.
Averell Harriman, in Moscow this week as principal reagent of said demarche . . . 8

But he [Father John Murray] is never so specific as to identify himself with any current movement, except of course the Christian movement, and many Liberals will read this book with incomplete understanding, I like to feel, hovering over a few animadversions against right-wing stereotypes, and hastily drawing the conclusion that he is really on their side.9

The natural antithesis between the liberal infidel and the conservative believer turns up again and again in Buckley's polemics. After assailing too-much-this-worldly "liberal egalitarian dogma" and asserting that it may be destroyed by the racial views of a Professor Shockley, the columnist neatly draws a line on the other side of which one is, ostensibly, not likely to find liberals or egalitarians:

But this would not be the case for those whose values are Christian, and whose belief is in metaphysical equality.10

The equating of conservative attitudes with Christian fidelity would appear a potentially effective expedient. The most religiously traditional sections of the country are also the most politically right-wing. Orthodox believers have had no difficulty at all rejecting the validity of whatever faith the religious liberal claims he has. Buckley nourishes those predispositions often and well.

Second, Buckley pre-empts rhetorically strategic ground by arrogating to his own side patriotism and the blessings of national tradition. This appeal, like that
of religion, has strong emotional pull. And here, too, on his own behalf the conservative can make a plausible prima-facie case. If he advocates maintaining the status quo, one honors the past and its traditions more palpably than the innovator, it would superficially appear. The Founding Fathers did not, after all, support Social Security, the progressive income tax, or racial integration. Hence, the debater will speak of liberals "... like Norman Mailer, who have cut themselves off from the Great Tradition ... " And excerpts from Buckley's tribute to Douglas MacArthur on the occasion of the General's death show how subtly and piquantly one can solicit patriotic feelings and toward what attitudes they naturally incline:

MacArthur was the last of the great Americans. It isn't at all certain that America is capable of producing another man of MacArthur's caste. Such men spring from the loins of nations in whose blood courage runs, and we are grown anemic. That is why so many have spoken of an age that would die with MacArthur. An age where, occasionally, heroes arose, acknowledging as their imperatives that duty, honor, and country which MacArthur cherished, but which the nation that rejected him has no stomach for, preferring the adulterated substitutes of our age of modulation.

If we as a nation must die, we can find no better words to die by, this side of Scripture, than his, given at his last public appearance at West Point:

"The shadows are lengthening for me. The twilight is here. My days of old have vanished—tone and tint. They have gone glimmering through the dreams of things that were. Their memory is one of wondrous beauty, watered by tears and coaxed and caressed by the smiles of yesterday. I listen vainly, but with thirsty ear, for the witching melody of faint bugles blowing
reveille, of far drums beating the long roll... But in the evening of my memory always there echoes and re-echoes: Duty, honor, country.12

To God, the author adds country. And another rhetorically esteemed virtue, courage.

Thus, Buckley occupies rhetorically strategic ground not only by appropriating religion and patriotism, but also by proclaiming his valor, in contrast to his opponents' pusillanimity, and by playing upon his listeners' heroic sensibilities. Here is another dramatic call to arms, sounded at the expense of craven liberals:

The implicit logic of those of our leaders who decline to fight for Cuba is the logic of defeat. Ultimately their arguments must, by logical necessity, come down to surrender. And indeed this exactly is the naked word that is finally being used today by a few brave cowards... "Better Red than Dead," he [Kenneth Tynan] writes, "seems an obvious doctrine for anyone not consumed by a death-wish: I would rather live on my knees than die on my knees."

Well, assuming it is death toward which we are headed as a result of our determination to stay free, let it be said that Mr. Tynan would not need to die on his knees, but rather standing up. Which is how those of his ancestors died before Runnymede, at Agincourt and Hastings, at Dunkirk, who fought for the freedom of their descendants to exhibit their moral idiocy... The implicit cogency of surrender will, they feel sure, overcome in due course the defiant rhetoric, and ease us into a course of conclusive appeasement. It is implied by Messrs. [John] Crosby and Tynan that the right wing seeks a war. But in fact we seek to avoid war: and the surest way to avoid war is to assert our willingness to wage it... .

... To win this one it's going to take nerve, and take courage, and take a certain kind of humility, the humility that makes man acknowledge the demands of duty... .

... Why our great retreat from duty? Because our leaders are, when all is said and done, scared.13
Buckley does not forswear capitalizing on the supposed sexual element in cowardice and courage:

But these [the liberals] are in fact the warmongers, for they whet the appetite of the enemy as surely as the stripteaser, by her progressive revelations, whets the appetite of the crowd. "However I survey the future," concludes Kenneth Tynan, "there seems to be nothing noble" in dying. "I want my wife to have another child, and I want to see that child learn to walk." Those in the West of civilized mind and heart are engaged in trying to make just that possible, the birth of another child to Kenneth Tynan, always assuming he has left the virility to procreate one.14

There exists, we discover, a committee that will inform young draftable Americans how to beat the draft. Among the quaint suggestions being offered is that a draftee feign homosexuality. I expect some of those who would try this dodge could make pretty convincing demonstrations.15

No ordinary man wants to be thought homosexual.

Buckley's implication seems to be that if you do not want to "stand up" to the communists, you may have earned that label.

Last, Buckley pre-empted rhetorically strategic ground by employing the syllogism and the logician's technical terms. The utilization of religion, patriotism, and bravery as persuasive devices involves, basically, an appeal to pathos, no matter how appropriate to one's program such an appeal might seem, or how inherently rational one's entreaty. The expedient now considered, logos itself—or more accurately, the analytical ornamentation with which Buckley embellishes his arguments—would seem on the surface to draw the observer nearer the essences
of suasive American discourse, since feeling is not an element in the appeal. However, the audience in question is inclined toward the case at hand, that is, toward the example and inductive argument from it; and is relatively unresponsive to the universal, that is, to the generalization and deductive argument from it. So it is not the syllogistic kind of reasoning that Americans take well to.

Perhaps, again, Buckley's tactic in using the syllogism and the logician's technical terms is really an attempt at ethical proof. "Notice how erudite and obtrusively rational I am," he may be saying. "You surely must believe what I tell you."

However Americans do in fact react to deductive reasoning, or whatever kind of appeal he is consciously making in the following instances, Buckley's syllogistic, or quasi-syllogistic, mode of proof strikes one as unique. Most disputants content themselves with the enthymeme when developing their case deductively, an enthymeme being a syllogism in which one of the premises or the conclusion is not explicitly stated. To best illustrate what an enthymeme is, one might begin by citing an example of a complete syllogism. The following is a typical one:

All men are mortal;
Socrates is a man;
Therefore, Socrates is mortal.

In most rhetorical discourse such an argument would be shortened to something like this: All men are
mortal, so Socrates is mortal. Here what is called the "minor premise" is missing. Or the argument might be couched in this variant form: Socrates is a man; therefore Socrates is mortal. In this case the "major premise" is missing. The speaker is not arguing any the less syllogistically or logically when he employs such enthymemes. He is simply being less formal and less pretentious. He knows the audience is capable of filling in the missing link.

Buckley characteristically goes beyond the enthymeme to set up a full-blown syllogism. Here is an illustration:

Some years ago, after Mrs. [Eleanor] Roosevelt had written a column likening McCarthyism to Hitlerism, I suggested on a television program that symbolic of the sluggishness of Liberal-directed anti-Communism was the fact that should Eleanor Roosevelt happen upon Senator McCarthy at a cocktail party she would probably refuse to shake hands with him, whereas she would almost as surely shake Vishinsky's hand at the same party. (Andrei Vishinsky was then head of the Soviet delegation in New York.) A day or two later, a reporter brought the remark to her attention. "What about it?" he asked. Mrs. Roosevelt answered emphatically that she would shake hands with both Vishinsky and McCarthy at any future affair, that in point of fact she once had shaken McCarthy's hand (the memory was evidently seared upon her mind); and that, of course, she had seen a great deal of Vishinsky while she was with the UN, hammering out the Declaration of Human Rights.

Still later, in her question and answer column in the Women's Home Companion, the question appeared, "In a recent column you defended your right to shake hands with Mr. Vishinsky, and Senator McCarthy. Would you also have felt it was right to shake hands with Adolf Hitler?" To which Mrs. Roosevelt answered, "In Adolf Hitler's early days I might have considered it, but after he had begun his mass killings I don't
think I could have borne it."
I suggest Mrs. Roosevelt's philosophy of handshaking does not emerge from the data. If we were to set up a syllogism, here is how it would look:

Proposition A: E. R. will not shake hands with those who are guilty of mass killings.

Proposition B: E. R. will shake hands with Andrei Vishinsky.

Conclusion: Vishinsky is not guilty of mass killings.

But Vishinsky was guilty of mass killings. Mrs. Roosevelt knew of that... What could she have been trying to say? That there were differences between Hitler and Vishinsky of the type one takes stock of before extending one's hand?

The proceeding example is one of any number... that demonstrate Mrs. Roosevelt's lack of intellectual rigor [italics in the original].

In Chapter 3 the investigator will explore how culturally appropriate Buckley's argument is. One need only note that the dialectician's case looks good on the surface. The syllogism appears valid enough—that is to say, the conclusion follows in a formal sense, from the premises Buckley has fashioned—and so there is superficial reason to surmise, indeed, that Mrs. Roosevelt is inconsistent.

Sometimes the author will merely suggest the syllogistic mode with carefully ordered points set off by formal-looking letters or numbers, or with high-sounding "premises." The "godless communism" quotation on page 17 is one example of this obtrusive ratiocination. There exist many others.

More often, Buckley will imply intellectual rigor by employing the logician's, and the rhetorician's, technical terms. *A priori*’s, *a posteriori*’s, *a fortiori*’s,
ergo's, soritical's, zeugma's, distributive middle's, tu quoque's, acposiopesis's, paralepsa, ignoratio elenchis, etc., shine like shafts of reason through the pages of his works. This jargon, combined with his syllogizations, casts a glow of formal thought upon his theses. Certainly the untutored reader or listener would get the impression he was in the presence of a great mind.

In sum, Buckley pre-empts rhetorically strategic ground indeed. He claims for himself and his side religion, patriotism, valor, and logic.

SOME OFFENSIVE RHETORICAL MANEUVERS

Moving from the broader rhetorical appeals which characterize the books, articles, and television discussions of William F. Buckley, the study will now focus upon some of the more specifically offensive ploys and devices by which the polemicist would appear to be countering his opponents and attempting to win favor with his audience.

Buckley's most striking offensive strategem is the assault on the intelligence of one's adversary. Since, as has been noted, there exists today a tendency to regard ethos as consisting not only of perceived trustworthiness and good character, but also of perceived expertness, one can describe this kind of onslaught as an attack on the
ethos of the opponent, an endeavor to destroy his credibility and his standing as an authority, and to enhance one's own. Whatever his conscious motivations, Buckley is a combative forensic foe indeed:

I shall be assuming that in most respects the liberal ideologists are, like Don Quixote, wholly normal, with fully developed powers of thought, that they see things as they are, and live their lives according to the word; but that, like Don Quixote, whenever anything touches upon their mania, they become irresponsible. . . . Cross a Liberal on duty, and he becomes a man of hurtling irrationality.18

It [the deference liberals show toward Mrs. Roosevelt] may be because a) they are aware that Mrs. Roosevelt's close personal and political association with her husband have sic invested her with a glamor that is highly utilitarian, or because b) (this explanation is both more plausible and more charitable), Mrs. Roosevelt's polemical life is lived right in the heart of the Liberal mania, with the result that, themselves bereft of their senses, they are incapable of recognizing that Mrs Roosevelt is bereft of hers.19

Buckley suggests it is more humane to call someone dense then to defame him as a schemer.

Even the editor's favorite liberal, Murray Kempton, whom the conservative has, on occasion, fulsomely eulogized, is not immune: "Ah, the capacity for systematic thought!—X never had it . . . ."20 Whether or not the assault is leavened with flattery, there is so very often in the Buckley rhetoric an assault:

I mention this horror story[about a progressor who, according to Buckley, "ignorantly" challenged the validity of the "denial-of-the-consequent" syllogism about Mrs. Roosevelt, above] for the benefit of those who cannot bring themselves to believe what I propose to say about the helplessness of the Liberal
mind when face to face with elementary logical problems in which ideological Heroes and Villains are involved.21

I grant that following Mrs. Roosevelt in search of irrationality is like following a burning fuse in search of an explosive; one never has to wait very long.22

The left-crazies have dominated the college scene, and therefore the news . . . .23

Really, the liberals are something—one needs to remind oneself how very kooky they can be.24

They ostensibly can be quite stupid. The liberals who harass the House Un-American Activities Committee are "a collection of kooks and kooks' lawyers."25 The Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy "is headed for cuckooland."26

The New York Review of Books is "the last court of appeal for highbrow screwballs."27 Marlon Brando possesses an "inflamed ninny-mind."28 The assistant librarian at Tulane University is a "harebrain" for removing National Review from the browsing room shelves.29 And Professor Hughes of Harvard operates in a "Freak House" with other "political queers."30 All according to Buckley. This is name-calling, to be sure, but name-calling aimed at the intellect.

President Dwight Eisenhower would appear in the Buckley rhetoric to be a special case, almost the Republican Eleanor Roosevelt:

[Eisenhower is] a renowned ignoramus . . . who, never in his lifetime, so far as is known, has generated a single thought that could engage the attention of serious men . . . .31
... His Eisenhower's occupancy of high office is the result of a raging national ignorance. ... [There persists] the stubborn, the invincible ignorance of Dwight Eisenhower ... 32

From Eisenhower the press expected only the endless confused banalities, which checked any chance of purposeful thought. ... No man who ever listened to Mr. Eisenhower discuss our problems walked away expecting a coherent national policy. But Mr. Kennedy uses whole sentences with subjects, objects and verbs. 33

These are just a few examples of Buckley's recourse to this device. There are many others. 34

Another specifically offensive maneuver in the rhetoric of William Buckley, less aggressive and perhaps more artful, is his tendency to twit, to lightly poke fun at, his adversary, often quite humorously. One way the conservative delivers these taunts is through an ingratiating and distinctive use of capital letters:

Beyond that, there seems to have been no general sociological criticism of Truman Capote's party, though no doubt if the society editors had thought to telephone the Reverend William Sloane Coffin of Yale collect, he'd have given them a very good argument for the abolition of Truman Capote, which one supposes he has programmed after he gets around to abolishing Skull and Bones, which he is now working on, so as to Prevent Watts. 35

On Friday May 15 Walter Cronkite telephoned Gettysburg to see if he couldn't talk Mr. Eisenhower into denouncing the Horrible Extremism of Senator Goldwater. 36

No, our professor of Philosophy simply rescinded his order to wear coats and ties to dinner, aghast at the revelation that, albeit subconsciously, he had entertained an Undemocratic Thought. 37

An inveterate listmaker, the columnist can carry his itemizations to disarming absurdity:
It remains extraordinary that at a time when intellectuals can grasp the complexity of the statement that E equals mc squared, so many of them should have so much difficulty understanding what, for instance, Whittaker Chambers means by asking the question of "whether the West deserves to be saved." What, Professor Irving Howe demands to know, is the West? "The Salk vaccine or Jim Crow? Anesthesia or torture? Shakespeare or Spillane? The seven-hour day or child labor?" Whittaker Chambers or Irving Howe? [Italics in the original].38

Still, it is a relief . . . to read a novel [Norman Mailer's An American Dream] in which the protagonist doesn't depend for his salvation on life rafts cast out into the sea of hope by Marx, Freud, or U Thant.39

In brief, the essayist can mock his opponent by coining droll titles:

Herbert Matthew and Fidel Castro: I got my job through The New York Times40

The Violation of Arthur Schlesinger41

Doings at Dr. Hutchins' Zoo42

Full Moon for Kempton43

And by writing the piquant epilogue:

And surely it is some sort of threat to the national sense of humor, on which of course democratic institutions rely at moments of special stress, when a professional comedian can sum up his indictment in the following terms:

PAAR. "He is even anti-self determination for colonial peoples. . . . Here's the kind of thing Mr. Buckley has said. An interviewer once asked him 'You mean that the colored nations of Africa should not have the right of self-determination?'

"He said: 'No, not until they are ready to form governments.'

"And they said: 'Well, when do you think they will be?'

"He said: 'When they stop eating each other.'

"That's what Mr. Buckley said. And there's that whole lack of humanity I think in his philosophy."44

A third specifically offensive thrust which
characterizes his rhetoric is Buckley's inclination to grasp for advantage even where, as it were, the point seems trivial and irrelevant, definitely not central to the debate. An instance of this preoccupation is found in The Unmaking of a Mayor. The candidate needed to devote a considerable portion of his speeches to an item by item analysis of the linguistic "errors" of then Congressman John Lindsay, his Republican opponent. The purpose of the ploy may have been to ridicule Mr. Lindsay's intelligence, but here his method was qualitatively different. He did not address his adversary with some pejorative. He instead focused on trifling and immaterial "faux pas":

Mr. Lindsay . . . says of Mr. Abraham Beame that he "promises not progress but procrastination, not ideas but indifference, not energy but evasiveness, not advancement but apathy."

What is wrong with that sentence—other than its suicidal search for alliteration? What is wrong with it is that it is unintelligible. How can an orderly mind maintain that Mr. Beame "promises procrastination"? And in what sense is "evasiveness" the opposite of "energy"?

As for your servant, Mr. Lindsay accused me of seeking to downgrade and vitiate, to divide, to negate, and to prey upon the tensions and fears among our people." Now (a) I would be very happy, indeed, to "vitate" the tensions and fears of our people— that, in fact, is why I am running for office. So why should Mr. Lindsay (unless he favors validating the fears of the people), criticize this? And (b) how on earth does one "divide" a "tension," let alone a "fear"? And how can one simultaneously "vitate a tension," and "prey upon it?" [Sic; italics in the original.]

One need not demonstrate that Mr. Lindsay's phrasing is not all that imprecise. The point is that the Congressman's
way with transitive verbs had not a great deal to do with the issues confronting the voters of New York City in 1965. Buckley found it expedient to seize upon this minutia in order to undermine his opponent's position. It is a characteristic maneuver.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter there has been presented a descriptive analysis of the persuasive stratagems in the rhetoric of William F. Buckley. By way of introduction, the classical elements in persuasion—ethos, pathos, and logos—were defined. In general terms, the investigator outlined the likely power each of these modes exerts on Americans. In chapters 3 and 4 this line of inquiry will be developed in greater depth.

Some of the broad approaches found in Buckley's work were then listed and described, as well as the devices by which he pre-empts rhetorically strategic ground. They involved the author's appeals to religion, patriotism, and valor, and his use of the syllogism and many other trappings of formal logic to suggest rigorous thought, such as the jargon of the logician.

Cited were a few of the specifically offensive rhetorical maneuvers which Buckley is inclined to employ. They are the conservative's recurrent assault on the opponent's intelligence; the use of humor and mockery;
and the exploitation of the supposed, trivial, and irrelevant mistakes of the adversary.
CHAPTER 3

THE EXTERNAL LIMITATIONS

INTRODUCTION

After an examination of the modes of persuasion which characterize the rhetoric of William F. Buckley, the critic must turn next to this question: what is the nature of the audience Buckley seeks to persuade? Because this study deals with not one particular persuasive effort, either oratorical or literary, but rather with the sum total of the conservative's oral and written rhetoric, the audience the investigator is concerned with is the aggregate of potential readers of Buckley's books and articles, and potential listeners to Firing Line. The audience addressed in his newspaper column "On the Right" is especially a broadly based common denominator readership. The audience is therefore the American people.

This aggregate audience will be called the universal American audience by way of variation on Chaim Perelman's concept of the universal audience. As noted, Perelman has laid the greatest possible stress on the need for the rhetor to understand his audience and to "adapt
himself" to it. He has defined argumentation as essentially "a function of the audience being addressed." He has suggested that "... we might characterize each speaker by the image he himself holds of the universal audience that he is trying to win over to his view"; that, in addition, "... each culture ... has its own conception of the universal audience." He has offered in the next sentence that "the study of these variations would be very instructive." Therefore, our inquiry will seek to discover the similarities and dissimilarities between the conception of what Americans are like implied in Buckley's rhetoric, and the conception Americans apparently have of themselves inherent in how they act.

More specifically, the critic will raise these questions: given the quality of his rhetoric, is Buckley's thought, is Buckley's demeanor, are Buckley's standard maneuvers likely to move to belief and to action those nurtured in the Anglo-American culture, the universal American audience? Do his thought, his demeanor, and his characteristic appeals reflect the values, expectations, and mores of Americans? Do they dovetail with the culturally patterned inclinations of people reared in the United States? And therefore are Americans likely to identify with these views and modes, and in them see themselves reflected? First, though, the nature of this audience must be examined.
Perelman states:

The study of audiences could also be a study for sociology, since a man's opinions depend not so much on his own character, as on his social environment, on the people he associates with and lives among. . . . Every social circle or milieu is distinguishable in terms of its dominant opinions and unquestioned beliefs, of the premises that it takes for granted without hesitation; these views form an integral part of its culture, and an orator wishing to persuade a particular audience must of necessity adapt himself to it.¹

This effort to determine the milieu, the external limitations and obstacles facing the American rhetor, will be a sociological one, since American thought and action are determined by such broad-gauged evolution.²

Mankind has developed culturally, from the tribal village to the modern industrial state, along two major axes: from associative to abstractive, and from universal-oriented to case-oriented.³ The primitive community (one uses the word "primitive" circumspectly; the aboriginal cultures yet extant exhibit great complexity⁴) is associative in that human relationships there are established and shaped by face-to-face contacts, or associations. A tribesman relates to everyone else in terms of intrinsic personhood because he knows everybody, physically impinges on everybody, with whom he needs to have dealings. In this pristine order, the family, in its extended form, is the pre-eminent unit, the bonds of blood which unite it not
yet loosened by countervailing pressures. Father, mother, son, daughter, daughter-in-law, grandfather, grandmother, etc., attach to one another indissolubly by the strongest of all associations. The structure of society is thus the structure of kinship. The "government," if one can call it that, is a gerontocracy.5

The primitive community is also, as one would suspect, undifferentiated in function and in thought. With the exception of divergent sexual roles, everybody "does the same thing," be it hunt, gather, or what you will. There are no abstracted professions, no divisions of labor into priest, soldier, hunter, or farmer, to complicate the primal association. Likewise, in the tribesman's organization of phenomena, criterial boundaries are few.Animate things are alive, but so also are some of the inanimate. Religion is magic and magic is everywhere. The man from the neighboring tribe is an ethical outsider whom one can kill without a qualm. One does not "know" him, so therefore the rules do not apply. There is little self-consciousness, almost no reflection on the "I" which mediates experience.6

The primeval state is, then, an emotive existence, structured by "first-name" relationships and bounded by the limits of proximity. It expresses itself in the dream-like free associations of art, myth, and religion.

The tribal village is structured, too, by at least
one other agency, the primitive's next most salient trait: rigid universal orientation. The care-free savage of The Social Contract, loping through the savanna unfettered and untamed, is an invention. Rousseau notwithstanding, man was born, culturally, in chains, a slave to arbitrary and categorical rules, a bondsman to tradition. There was, and remains, for the primitive, no need for police: without question he obeys. He is fearful; he is superstitious. He might spend up to one third of his waking hours attending to ritual. His life is hence stylized, arranged around a series of habits. It is as distant from practicality as life can be. To the tribesman material goods matter little. His is a search for honor, for the commodity of traditional value, be it a necklace of a long-toothed boar. (Not that primitive man doesn't pursue pragmatic activities in an intelligent manner. He does. But they do not constitute his obsession.) The "noble savage" is tied, as is no other, to the capricious, to the traditional, to the given, to the aprioristic. Infinitely more than Macbeth, he is "cabin'd, cribb'd, confined, bound in to saucy doubts and fears."7

How did primitive man evolve into the abstractive, case-oriented American with whom the persuader deals? The changes, certainly the associative-abstractive modifications, transpired—gradually of course—as vertically distinct groups (i.e., tribes, clusters of tribes, nations)
came into contact; and as horizontally separated groups (castes, stratified classes, etc.—obviously evolutionary developments in themselves) mixed, intercommunicated, and became socially mobile. Plainly, population growth, wars, technological advancement, and missionary religions, to cite just a few of the means, were instrumental in flinging people together. This commingling generated ambiguous signals, which the blending cultures reconciled through abstraction and codification of rules.\textsuperscript{8} Specific do's and don't's, supported by sound reason, circling outward in ever-widening arcs of applicability; more and more pronounced function-related differentiation; and an increasing capacity to disjoin considerations of person from public business are some of the general consequences of these encounters. Put in terms other than associative to abstractive, these transformations represent, to various degrees, the movement from Gemeinschaft, or community, to Gesellschaft, society;\textsuperscript{9} from charisma to bureaucracy;\textsuperscript{10} from ascription to achievement;\textsuperscript{11} from law of status to law of contract;\textsuperscript{12} from relational to analytical;\textsuperscript{13} from prelogical to logical;\textsuperscript{14} from diffuseness and affectivity to specificity and affective neutrality;\textsuperscript{15} from syncretic, indefinite, and rigid to discrete, definite, and flexible.\textsuperscript{16}

Instances of nascent abstractiveness are several. For one, primitive communities evolved discrete roles,
based on function, such as that of priest. In so doing
the tribesman abstracted from the identity of, say, the
priest a portion of his personhood and regarded him hence-
forward more in terms of what he did, less in terms of
what he was. Totemism, too, was and is an initial form of
abstraction, a classification of clans on the basis of
which they arrange exogamous exchanges of women. An ani-
mal, a bird, or a plant became the distinguishing sign of
one's family cluster. More advanced abstraction came
with the crowning of a god-king in whom all the magic,
before diffused among myriad entities, was concentrated.
Ancient Egypt, Sumer, Mexico, and Peru are examples.

Intermediate societies (Medieval Europe, the
Ottoman Empire, present-day India) manifest even greater
abstraction, but yet remain by our standards intensely
associative. These cultures were and are stratified, a
form of abstraction, but movement between the classes is
disallowed, an associative trait. Each group dresses in a
peculiar fashion; physical and racial differences tend to
be emphasized. As to law and mores, these societies are
ascriptive, status-oriented. Each class adheres to a
codified set of rules (abstractiveness), but the codes are
different for each (associativeness). Society attributes
certain rights, a certain identity, according to one's
station. (There are vestiges of this associative adjust-
ment in Anglo-America even today. Peers are tried by
peers; rich men simply do not sustain equal punishment in American jurisprudence; Southern whites suffer, or did suffer until the past decade, comparatively little for perpetrating racial crimes.)

As to development along the universal-oriented to case-oriented axis, intermediate cultures demonstrate change, but not striking change. They are not quite so superstitious, nor are they so much in the thrall of ritual as are the primitives, but enslavement to the "general principle" persists. In Western Europe the Middle Ages were, for example, a time of word obsession, words corresponding as they do to universal categories. In economics, individual market considerations were, on the whole, irrelevant; the doctrine of the "just price" overroad practicality. Universalia ante rem distinguished the age.20

What of conditions at present vis-a-vis both these sets of polarities? Clearly, with few exceptions, the Far East continues frozen at the intermediate stage. As he moves westward, the observer meets with ever more pronounced abstractiveness and case-orientation, discovering in the United States the consummately practical, function-beset civilization.21 (Of course, all modern societies are an amalgam of every kind of tendency. It is a question of mix. The American blend is most "modern," owing to an Anglo-Saxon patrimony and the exigencies of the "melting
pot.") America is, compared to say Eastern Europe or Southern Italy, a cold, emotionally barren landscape. Its family arrangement is nuclear—father, mother, children—and even these elemental threads are unraveling through the tug of technology, mobility, affluence, overpopulation, and the tightening pressures of cybernation. Except perhaps for the first generation ethnic, Americans establish friendships easily and terminate them as fast. They use only parts of one another, those parts which correspond to their functional relationship. They enjoy acquaintances on the job, in the neighborhood, and at the club, most quite probably with different individuals. They possess no lifelong confidant with whom they share their whole person. Achievement haunted, the typical American defines himself with his work, or defines himself virtually not at all.

There are exceptions to this general pattern, of course. In addition to immigrants, American Negroes sit back along the axis a trifle. They tend to be more ascipitive, less achievement-oriented, an expression no doubt of their African heritage and their exclusion from the American mainstream. Furthermore, the lower middle class and the upper class display signs of social atavism less frequently found in the upper middle class. In the lower middle class there persists a trace of the peasant psychology (work for a traditional level of well-being,
no more) and prejudice. In the upper class there endure concepts of status peculiar to more associative societies, and there abides also inordinate prejudice.

As for case-orientation, the word American is synonymous with the practical, the pragmatic, the common-sensical. Universalia post rem breeds Yankee ingenuity. In the United States it is almost always facts over words. Not so in Russia. Nor, to a lesser extent, in France. There the idea, the universal, the categorical articulation takes precedence. In America, for example, laws of evidence are exceedingly strict (facts, not words, are paramount); in France they are less so; in the Soviet Union they are nonexistent. The Russians build beautiful Leningrad—the future, the ideal—while living in hovels. They will manufacture the one "best" product, as designed by their planners, to serve the needs of a nation. To Americans the term is meaningless. "Best" automobile? For whom? It depends on the case. If one were to ask a Russian why his society is so elitist—in a country founded on reason, there must be an elite—he would recite Marx to the effect that there simply cannot exist an elite in a socialist society, ipso facto, instead of describing people's actual modes of life. (These propensities have to do mainly not with the Revolution, but rather with the Russian character which made the Revolution possible.)

"Principles" do not, in contrast, paralyse
Americans, at least not for long. Between the E. C. Knight decision (1904) and that of Jones and Laughlin (1937), the Supreme Court came close to reversing itself on the question of the government's power to control commerce and manufacturing, by taking into consideration intent, an essence not delimited in cold language.28 The same can be said for the school desegregation overturn. Again, not being believers, Americans, as well as the British, need but two political parties, the coalitions in the U. S. exuding minimal ideology.29 So case-oriented, in fact, are Republicans and Democrats that they can accommodate Jacob Javits and Roman Hruska on the one hand, and Hubert Humphrey and Richard Eastland on the other. To the logician these political miscellanies make no sense. For those who want simply "to get the job done" or "to make things work," not die for their private vision, the system is ingenious. The more a people are forced to bend and compromise within the context of party, the less trouble they will have after their congress convenes, after their president takes office. The interest groups in multi-party (i.e., universal-oriented) countries only then begin to fight, and with ponderably less predisposition to give in.

Furthermore, American democracy without doubt literally survived because the nation was not insistently "logical" about it. Americans enfranchised, at first, not even every Caucasian male; but at the socially propitious
moments, the suffrage was extended. The same is true of England and Switzerland. Almost every other country that has tried democracy attempted it whole (universalism), with frequently calamitous results. Germany's "professor's constitution" of 1848 was a magnificently labored work, complete with footnotes. It did not last. The Weimar constitution was perhaps the most democratic document of modern times. There were plebiscites on everything. It, too, failed. Democracy is perhaps not really compatible with stringent universalism. Counting noses is "irrational" to those who see the "truth."

Hence, a society is behcoved to enlarge the franchise, or to transform itself in any way, but slowly, for too much change too fast produces information overload and social dislocation. It is a "conservative," case-oriented principle that liberals frequently do not learn. But although it ought not move too swiftly, a culture has just as certainly to reconcile ambiguous signals, in due time—an abstractive precept conservatives must surely recognize. A harmonization of America's two most salient characteristics, abstractive and case-orientation, thus grows more difficult in the era of Future Shock.

It becomes a trying resolution in one other respect also. Case-orientation has meant for Americans in the past decentralized decision-making, another conspicuous conservative tenet, another prominent American trait. Americans
are poor planners. It is not their style. Buckley articulates well this ingrained predisposition:

... A conservative assumption is that the private arrangement tends to be superior to the public arrangement because ... it is more flexible, permitting an infinity of adjustments based on an infinity of preferences ... it is less categorical, and therefore less arbitrary ... it is less wasteful, in that it is disciplined by the competing pressures of alternative modes of activity ... it is more ingenious, in that it encourages ... a variety of approaches ... it resists the natural tendency toward the centripetalization of power in government, which is the prime historical oppressor ... [italics in the original].32

But when a country's economy converts from one of local and regional differentiation to one of national integration and homogenization, from one of atomized farms to one of conglomerated industries, what does the pragmatist do? It would seem he does rather much what Americans have done for the past ninety years. In his paste-and-patch, sift-and-fill manner, he deals with the problem where he finds it, i.e., on a more abstracted level of operation, trying his best under the circumstances to sustain the national character. Decentralization as an article of faith metamorphoses, in the new context, into a rigid apriorism, a categorical axiom that defies common sense. In the Electronic Age, the abstractiveness of Americans may have to clash with their accustomed modes of case-orientation; the "break-the-taboo" facet of case-concern may have to take precedence over what was, a century ago, the appropriate type of American accommodation. As a unique, localized
phenomenon, the "case," Americans have seen, has long ago left the small town.

CONCLUSION

An attempt has been made in this chapter to pinpoint the external limitations and obstacles facing the persuader who, particularly through the newspaper and on television, addresses a conglomerate audience. This has been attempted through the concept of the universal American audience inferred from the work of Chaim Perelman. Following Perelman's suggestion that "the study of audiences could also be a study for sociology...", the investigator has identified the patterned inclinations, values, mores, and expectations of Americans. He has accomplished this aim through a detailed analysis of the evolution of cultures.

Mankind, it was shown, has evolved, first of all, from what one can call an "associative" or friendly mode of response to an "abstractive" or businesslike attitude in interpersonal dealings. That is, in primitive communities people relate to one another in terms of intrinsic personhood, on the basis of face-to-face intimacies, or associations. There is, or was in these cultures, also, little differentiation of function, hence scant need for one to treat another not as a first-name acquaintance, but rather as a role.
Gradually human societies enlarged, differentiated occupationally, and commingled, generating in the process ambiguous signals, which were reconciled by abstraction through codification of rules. Citizens in these more advanced societies grew to regard their fellows, by necessity, more in terms of what they did, less in terms of what they were, in and of themselves—America becoming the most highly evolved culture, the consummately abstractive, function-obsessed civilization. These developments have rendered Americans unemotional, open to relationships with strangers and even those unfriendly to them, and dedicated to the even-handed rule of law.

Societies have developed in another important manner also. They have gone from obsession with universal principles, rules, and taboos, handed down from father to son, to concern for the case at hand and the evidence of the senses. They have moved from an enslavement to the traditional to an appreciation of the practical. In doctrinaire America, preconceived notions give way to facts, strong beliefs disolve into toleration, words yield to realities. Therefore political parties remain few and unideological.

The question was raised whether or not the in-character case-orientated response of Americans to present-day industrial integration expresses itself in the call for traditional decentralized decision-making. It was argued
that American pragmatism is more essentially evinced through "doing what needs to be done," dealing with national problems at the national level when local solutions do not work, regardless of what tradition prescribes.
CHAPTER 4

AN INTERPRETATIVE ANALYSIS

INTRODUCTION

In the preceding chapter the investigator completed the second step in the critical process, the determination of the "milieu," the "extrinsic elements—the external limitations, constraints, or influences on the rhetorician's choices," the "... obstacles that prevent the author from accomplishing his purpose...."

The specific questions the critic must now raise are these: given the quality of his rhetoric, is Buckley's thought, is Buckley's demeanor, are Buckley's standard maneuvers likely to move to belief and to action those nurtured in the Anglo-American culture, the universal American audience? Do his thought, his demeanor, and his characteristic appeals reflect the values, expectations, and mores of Americans? Do they dovetail with the culturally patterned inclinations of people reared in the United States? And therefore are Americans likely to identify with these views and modes, and in them see themselves reflected?
Fortuitously, in the case of Buckley's rhetoric, the investigator, in answering these questions, will have implemented also the third step in the critical process, the "interpretative analysis." For the criterion by which he can interpretatively judge Buckley's work is the standard suggested by these remarks:

. . . The people are, though infinitely manipulable, impossibly feckless—in their own peculiar way, conservative.¹

The beauty of New York is threatened by the schematic designs upon it of the social abstractionists who do not look up from their drawing boards long enough to recognize what it is that makes for human attachments—to little buildings and shops, to areas of repose and excitement: to all those [elements] that so greatly inconvenience the big-think social planners.²

What the Senate did [when it guaranteed jury trials in civil rights cases] was to leave undisturbed the mechanism that spans the abstractions by which a society is guided and the actual, sublunary requirements of the individual community. In that sense the vote was a conservative victory.³

. . . [Our] institutions [are] dominated by Jacobinical abstractions about equality.⁴

In these passages, Buckley indicates the terms on which the critic should take him, the touchstone by which the analyst ought to measure the relevance of his rhetoric. Does Buckley himself understand and reflect the values and mores of these "conservative" American citizens, in contrast to the impractical and uncomprehending "abstractionists," who supposedly do not understand the nature, needs, and aspirations of the American people? Is, as he himself implies, the rhetoric of William Buckley in consonance with,
or reflective of, the American character?

In this chapter, based as it is on the analysis in Chapter 3, it will be shown that Buckley does not reflect the values and mores of Americans, even those of the conservative businessman; that he does not understand the nature, needs, and aspirations of his people; that his rhetoric is not in consonance with the American character; that he is at times oblivious of, at other times scornful of, the formidable "limitations," "constraints," and "obstacles" that, in America, "prevent the author from accomplishing his purpose"; that Buckley is, in his rhetoric, culturally archaic. These dislocations and discordancies may be demonstrated by describing and illustrating first the associative-emotional, then the associative-relational-undetached, and finally the universal-oriented, elements in the Buckley rhetoric.

Moreover, it may be inferred that because the cultural dislocations in his rhetoric are so multifarious and pronounced, Buckley does not likely make converts, in significant numbers, to his brand of conservatism.

The term archaic, as used here, does not involve dredging up the rusted insight about a laissez-faire libertarian in an era of mixed economy. It refers to a time lapse measured not in decades, but rather in centuries. Buckley is, culturally, like a sixteenth century Englishman, or a nineteenth century Continental European, in a
twentieth century American milieu. He is sixteenth century in that his psychological-emotional involvement reflects a mode of response which predates the science of Galileo and Newton and the empirical philosophies they inspired. He is European in that his responses tend toward the associative and his theorizations toward the universal and the categorical.6

THE ASSOCIATIVE-EMOTIONAL ELEMENT IN THE BUCKLEY RHETORIC

Buckley's emotional engagement and associative attitudes are considered first. The reader will recall the reference to how man has evolved culturally from associative to abstractive in his modes of relationship, Americans being the most role-conscious people on earth. Noted, too, were the Protestant heritage, the dry temperament, and the tertiary significance assigned the emotions in the philosophy that has shaped them. One can now appraise the cumulative impact of these habits of mind. The abstractive ness of Americans—in this context, their inclination to detach from the identity of someone his intrinsic personhood and to regard him as a function—would make them in and of itself a proper people. For Americans, business is business. They do not disclose their true feelings on the job.

But this tendency their Protestant origins have
amplified. The most radical Reformers were at the very outset hostile to the emotional-aesthetic element in Roman Catholicism, for dogmatic reasons. The moving ceremony of the Mass, the emotive statuary, the stained-glass beauty of the cathedrals were thought a kind of idolatry. Church should be a place and time, instead, for a dour searching of the soul and for a cerebral explication of the Scriptures. Feeling was, for the Calvinist or Nonconformist, a kind of static along the wires of spiritual communication. John Locke's categories were made to order for this type of faith. The mental substance was equated with the soul; the isolated Protestant was reinforced in his conviction that God spoke to him directly, through the Bible and through the Voice inside, not through outward "appearance"; and the doctrinal irrelevance of aestheticism was provided supplementary support. Religion, philosophy, and cultural predisposition—all coalesced to make the Anglo-American one a Puritanical society indeed. Americans abstract from the business at hand that which they are not very good at expressing anyway—feeling.

In light of this, what does Buckley instead proclaim? He announces in one passage that "... my enemy is Gore Vidal." Even in metaphor, this is, for an American, archaic language. He laments that the word "truth" has, in our century, grown atavistic. However, "enemy" is, in the context, for more intensely dated when
applied, "on the job," to a mere ideological opponent.

An observer might ask, also, where these views fit, in twentieth century America?

But another factor that militates against purposive discourse is the developing taboo first on strong opinions, second on their expression in relentless language. Ours is becoming a land of lotus eaters, the gates to which are guarded by the dragons I have described. The tendency, these days, is to yield to the passion for modulation. Even in literature, one does not often find oneself concerned with kings and knaves, fair maidens and heroes, treachery and honor, right and wrong; one speaks in greys, and muted hues, of social problems, and life adjustment, and co-existence and interredal amity. Increasingly, we are called upon to modulate our voices. Increasingly, the convention of tact brings us to modulate not only our voices, but also our dogmas.

Buckley seems oblivious of the fact that there is no way contemporary Americans can, in the generality, possess strongly held views. Cultural pressures preclude it. Not only does it seem Americans can express their feelings but moderately. Not only are they so compulsively polite, when function calls. But they are, in addition, too pluralistic, too case-oriented, too pragmatic to own such opinions in the first place. They have difficulty feeling strongly about people, let alone sweeping ideas.

But Buckley feels. He feels inordinately intensely:

To call the greatest genius who ever lived[Bach] an "old, dead punk," the least of whose cantatas will do more to elevate the human spirit than all the black student unions born and unborn, is not so much contemptible as pitiable: conducive of that kind of separation one feels from animals, rather than from other human beings.**
Fight him, fight the tyrants [communists] everywhere: but do not ask them to your quarters, merely to spit upon them; and do not ask them to your quarters if you cannot spit upon them. . . .

Like Negroes who disparage Bach, communists would appear, in the Buckley view, hardly human:

The Communist . . . has renounced the bond . . . he cannot speak to us, and we cannot speak to him, because however deep we reach, we cannot find a common vocabulary . . . .

I think of a great Christian prayer, serene, beatific, but before it is quite over, we find ourselves asking our Maker to be so thoughtful as to "cast into hell those evil spirits [communists] who roam through the world seeking the destruction of souls." Even the obverse of our author's passion betrays this cultural estrangement: "why Galbraith-hating is an impossible activity," Buckley titles a book review. One asks himself who else would remark such a "quandary."

THE ASSOCIATIVE-RELATIONAL-UNDETACHED STRAIN IN THE BUCKLEY RHETORIC

More profoundly associative—i.e., archaic—than his bluntness and his emotionalism is Buckley's inability to prescind from the whole person the role he plays. The reader will recall the syllogism with which Buckley taunts Mrs. Roosevelt. The former First Lady had shaken the hand of Soviet Ambassador Andre Vishinsky while both of them were delegates to the United Nations. She maintained, nonetheless, that she could not have so greeted Adolph Hitler "after he had begun his mass killings." Because the
Russian was guilty of mass murders also, "Mrs. Roosevelt's lack of intellectual rigor" is evident, Buckley asserts. He then asks this question:

What could she have been trying to say? That there were differences between Hitler and Vishinsky of the type one takes stock of before extending one's hand [italics in the original]?

It would appear that is precisely what she was trying to say, and with good reason.

To begin with, the term "guilty" must, in fact, connote palpably different shadings with reference to Hitler and Mr. Vishinsky. The Ambassador, a functionary, though no doubt guilty in a substantive sense of the word, was not nearly so culpable as Germany's Fuhrer, the supreme authority of his nation, an all-powerful dictator who could at will extinguish or preserve the lives of millions without securing the consent of other parties. Though one does not hold Mr. Buckley responsible for all that appears in the magazine he edits, one can note National Review's tendentiously different attitude toward Adolf Eichmann. The part Eichmann played in the mass slaughter of Jews was routine, mechanical, "banal."

This is not to exculpate Mr. Vishinsky from his patent sins. It is rather to affirm that one can, if one chooses—especially when one is constrained to do so by the of course's of one's culture—rationally to distinguish between the functionary and the policy-maker in questions of
national turpitude. It is a distinction Buckley's syllogism fails to make for what appear to be reasons of self-interest and cultural misunderstanding.

More important and more pertinent to the issue of how Mrs. Roosevelt ought to receive a fellow delegate to the United Nations is the query, how do Americans naturally behave in such a context? The answer: they shake hands. It is genuinely "un-American," to borrow a pejorative from a legislative committee of which Buckley is most fond,18 to permit associative antipathies to override regard for function, especially when the function in question—here Mrs. Roosevelt's—coincides exactly with that of the figure at issue, and particularly when these operatives fill together the role of peace emissary. To reiterate: the inclination to make function-centered distinctions, to remove from consideration, at work, irrelevant data, is called "abstractionlessness," and it characterizes the most highly evolved cultures.

Contrary to the dictates of his culture and by the example of his rhetoric, Buckley contends that one should not abstract. One should rather seek to be "a man totally engaged."19 The columnist assails Cardinal Cooke of New York for being "... photographed speaking amicably to the leader of the [New York State] Assembly that passed the abortion bill a few months before."20 He attacks President Nixon for having "... toasted Chairman Mao, Chou En-lai,
and the whole lot of them" during the historic China
trip.\(^{21}\) He balks at the thought, back in the late 1950's, that a "monster" like Khrushchev "... will walk the floors
trod by Washington and Jefferson, and sleep in Lincoln's
bed";\(^{22}\) so disquieting is that prospect for the editor that
he entreats his readers to cover the country with stickers
proclaiming "Khrushchev Not Welcome Here" ("PUT THEM
EVERYWHERE ..."),\(^{23}\) beseeches New Yorkers to make the
Premier's two days in their city "... the most embarrass-
ing and uncomfortable ... he ever spent," conducts a
contest around the question "What to Do When Khrushchev
Comes to New York,"\(^{24}\) and publishes as the top-listed entry
this admonition: "KILL the bastard."\(^{25}\) He and his magazine
despair over Van Cliburn's Moscow triumph,\(^{26}\) admonish that
the audience not stand for the playing of the Soviet
national anthem before a Moiseyev Dance Company performance
at the Metropolitan Opera House,\(^{27}\) and lament Andrei
Gromyko's attendance at John Foster Dulles's funeral.\(^{28}\)

Note should be taken, too, of what dumfounds
Buckley:

He [Murray Kempton] has no trouble at all mixing easily
with those whom the next morning he will berate with a
passionate wit.\(^{29}\)

There is a wonderful amiability among Englishmen of
conflicting political faiths which, for an American [so
Buckley feels], is strange and awesome. ... In England
one can hurl insults at a man in Parliament or in the
press, today, and tomorrow serve as godfather to his
child. ... The English carry it too far, to be sure. On the
day I met with the galaxy of journalists I described, Jacob Malik was entertaining at the Soviet Embassy, a brilliant affair celebrating what the bourgeois press of the world persists in calling the Russian Revolution; and sure enough, exactly one year after the British diplomatic corps... had refused to take tea at the Soviet Embassy party as a protest against the rape of Hungary, there they were—all of them, from Selwyn Lloyd on down, beaming away.30

Again, as in the "Can't Hate Galbraith" article, the expositor must call attention—as though such behavior were, in America, unique—to the "trans-ideological decencies" which characterize his relationship with a liberal lady with whom he corresponds.31 Buckley acts much like the Latin American or "Old Country" businessman who finds it anomalous to share off-hour friendships with a competitor. That is to say, he polemizes like one.32

On the question of whether college alumni should support their Alma Mater, Buckley is similarly associative and counter-cultural. Alumni should underwrite their former schools not because of all that these institutions have done for them, Buckley offers. Their beneficence should require an extra fillip, i.e., a preferential admissions' policy with respect to alumni offspring.33 The commentator's thinking appears to take an abstractive turn in the "Self-Interview" he published while running for membership in the Yale Corporation. Why isn't the debt one owes for what a particular university bestowed on him "... repayable to the Cause of Higher Education..."34 in general, he asks, rather than to, say, Yale, which
really needs the funds at issue far less than Tuskegee—if, that is, Yale does not promise to grant one's own son or daughter special consideration. The authentically abstractive attitude would, however, require one more step: the debt one owes would be "... repayable to the Cause of Higher Education ..." in general no matter what admissions' standards one's college would adopt. As it stands, Buckley's argument is associative: family first. 35

THE UNIVERSAL ORIENTATION IN THE BUCKLEY RHETORIC

As to the other polarity, mankind has moved, as has been indicated, from a preoccupation with universal rules and principles to a concentration upon particular cases, the consummately situation-centered culture being that of the United States. But in charging Buckley with universalism, the present writer must recount that the indictment rests, in part, on the assumption that American society and the solutions to its problems, such as they are, have radically changed. Individualism and decentralization expressed the inherent character of this nation when it was young. In a vast, underpopulated, agrarian society, case-orientation meant local, uncoordinated decision-making. The country was regionalized, its people were separated, its difficulties were particularized, to an extent one can scarcely imagine today. But America's troubles are not
partitioned quite so discretely in the twentieth century. They do not spend themselves at the point where the individual and the local community intersect. As unique phenomena, amenable to a localized solution and no other, they went forth from the provinces, it has been maintained, a hundred years ago. The Industrial Revolution and its accompanying transformations—the division of labor, the increase in population, the growth of technology, the headlong ramification and integration of all economic and social relationships—have relocated "the case." That this is the issue Buckley acknowledges:

Are we to fight the machine? Can conservatism assimilate it? Whittaker Chambers once wrote me that "the rock core of the Conservative Position can be held realistically only if Conservation will accommodate itself to the needs and hopes of the masses—needs and hopes which like the masses themselves, are the product of machines."

What forms must this accommodation take? The welfare state! is the non-Communist answer one mostly hears. It is necessary, we are told, to comprehend the interdependence of life in an industrial society, and the social consequences of any action by a single part of it, on other parts. Let the steel workers go on strike, and spark-plug salesmen will in due course be out of work. There must be laws to mitigate the helplessness of the individual link in the industrial chain that the machine has built.

Indeed. The machine must be accepted, and conservatives must not live by programs that were written as though the machine did not exist, or could be made to go away: that is the proper kind of realism. The big question is whether the essential planks of conservatism were anachronized by the machine; the big answer is that they were not. "Those who remain in the world, if they will not surrender on its terms, must maneuver within its terms [says Mr. Chambers]. That is what Conservatives must decide: how much to give in order to
survive at all; how much to give in order not to give up the basic principles [italics in the original]."36

But recognizing the question and leaping to an unsupported conclusion ("... the big answer is that they were not") do not, by themselves, adequately deal with the new reality. Without further demonstration, such a bald, traditionalist demurrer hardly shows the pragmatic American where he can now, in the era of "interdependence," get hold of the "case."

However one resolves for himself the issue of where, in contemporary America, the "case" lies, Buckley's infatuation with "principles" cannot be gainsaid:

... Truths, the great dogmas of the West, are totally unchanged ... .37

... The American Right is based ... on the assumption that some questions are closed ... .38

The aims of education are to forward knowledge and right conduct—at the expense of some points of view ... . Academic freedom is conceived as a permanent instrument of doctrinal egalitarianism; it is always there to remind us that we can never know anything for sure: which I view as another way of saying we cannot really know what are the aims of education ...

Schools ought not to be neutral. School should not proceed as though the wisdom of our fathers were too tentative to serve as an educational base ... . Certain great truths have been apprehended. In the field of morality, all the basic truths have been apprehended ... [Students should be taught to] give their allegiance to the great certitudes of the West ... .39

As one might expect from the above, this theorist abhors the "epistemological skepticism of Mill, and Holmes, and Dewey—and Ramsey Clark"; the "ideological toothlessness"
of Dwight Eisenhower; and the "soul-free," "great accommodator," "weather vane" statecraft of John Kennedy. Their pronouncements would seem flaccid when placed beside the Buckley rhetoric, where the "immutable postulates," the "strong opinions," and the changeless "dogmas" march by with regularity.

Not only does the conservative's language sound "relentless"; his proposals in their substance tend toward the implacable and the categorical also:

It comes down to this: either the United States uses its resources to help other countries [here, South Vietnam] resist communication, or else it does not.41

Here is another example of the "either-or fallacy":

Well—and of course it is obvious that he [President Nixon] doesn't desire unemployment. If it had been a trained economist of the Keynesian school who was there, he'd have replied to my counter-question: "Because Nixon adopts old-fashioned remedies for curbing inflation." Counter-question: "What are new-fangled remedies for curbing inflation?" To which the only appropriate answer is: a totalitarian economy. In fact, there is nothing in between.42

And another:

I think New York has yet to come to terms with a largely philosophical question: do people have a "right" to public transportation? If they do, they ought to ride free. If they don't, they ought to pay what it costs. This is a basic difference between conservatives and liberals. Do you pay for what you use? I'm in favor of paying.43

Buckley carries the black-white disjunction to inordinate lengths in this passage:

So far as one can see from a very quick survey of the kind of legislation the Amendment [to ban "any discrimination whatsoever based on sex"] would inconvenience,
it would result in at least the loss of as many special privileges (e.g., alimony, maternal leave, protection against rape, etc.) as the ladies would gain.\textsuperscript{44}

To Buckley, the Amendment would, in effect, sanction physical assault. That is, the author enjoins his following to treat a person altogether like a woman, or altogether like a man. One ought not make an inconsistent accommodation to differences in gender.

Even when writing of a Supreme Court candidate of the caliber of Harold Carswell, Buckley's passion for the categorical letter remains undiminished:

\textsuperscript{...} If mediocrity means that when you read the the Constitution and the Constitution says two plus two equals four, and you therefore rule that two plus two equals four, rather than rule that it depends on whether you had an underprivileged educational background, then precisely what we need is a little more mediocrity; and I for one hope Mr. Carswell overwhelms the court with it.\textsuperscript{45}

In other words, intent should not be the interpretative criterion, but rather literal meaning. This is the approach of a culture more archaic than that of the United States.

Perhaps the most telling example of Buckley's universalist inclinations is this attempt to harness the ultimate weapon to the intractable idea:

\textsuperscript{...} We should automate the act of retaliation—precisely in order to effect deterrence. How? By contriving self-starting devices which would respond instantly and automatically to a nuclear blast against us.\textsuperscript{46}

It would appear that the syllogistic form itself
betrays a mind absorbed in universal categories. But in fact Buckley admits to such proclivities. In his column "Chop Down That Tree," the theorist pledges his "allegiance to deductive reasoning." Buckley seems tropistically biased toward the rule, toward the taboo.

And the dynamics of the American political system appear to escape him. He would purge the Republican party in order to make it conservative. He would do so, first of all, by bidding John Lindsay to leave. Lindsey was, to Buckley, a rank "interloper," "an embarrassment to the two-party system" out "to unsex the Republican Party," "a Republican largely as a matter of baptismal affirmation." Next, Buckley ridicules Senator Jacob Javits' right to Republican party membership. He quotes with approbation George Sodolsky to the effect that "... Javits has about as much business in the Republican Party as Leon Trotsky." Senator Goodell, too, is an impostor:

Insofar as gentlemen with the voting record of Charles Goodell succeed, through the machinations of party bosses, in imposing themselves as representatives of the Republican Party in the Senate of the United States, there is resentment. Resentment by those who believe that the Republican Party is indifferent to what they understand to be Republican principles. Indeed, this pundit assails all "... those Republicans ... who, for reasons of personal eccentricity, choose to call themselves Republicans ..." without first converting to conservatism. In fact, National Review as an institution desires nothing less than ideological
realignments, even multi-party government.\textsuperscript{52}

With respect to religious institutions, also, Buckley plumps for ideological purity. He would cleanse the Roman Catholic Church by extinguishing its liberal heterodoxy, by at least broaching the subject of excommunicating its "heretics":

Where does charity lie? In permitting such (liberal) "Catholics" to continue so to label themselves; or in excommunicating them? The Pope is unquestionably reluctant to excommunicate. That is the ultimate sanction of the Church, not to be used loosely. On the other hand, the sanction itself dissipates if the Church deteriorates into amorphous impotence.

Professor Jeffrey Hart of Dartmouth, a recent convert to Catholicism, wrote recently that he wondered why the left-wing (so-called) of the American Catholic Church does not do the obvious thing: namely embrace some form of Protestantism.\textsuperscript{53}

Such actions and attitudes are European, universalistic—archaic. When he denounces the "empty" methodologies of modernity—democracy, academic freedom, etc.—Buckley here too calls into question the inexorable nature of his society. In effect, he hurls scornful imprecations at thousands of years of cultural evolution. The conservative almost admits as much: ". . . The age is at fault . . ." ". . . an age I am proud to despise"; ". . . I resent the swift tides of history"; ". . . I . . . curse this century . . . ."\textsuperscript{54}

These claims are made with the admission that, as maledictory and rigid as he does become, the theorist is by no means the most unbending conservative extant. He
can, on occasion, be flexible. But he assumes a less implacable posture only infrequently.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, and in the undergirding analysis in Chapter 3, it has been demonstrated that the rhetoric of William F. Buckley does not reflect the values and mores of Americans; that he does not understand the nature, needs, and aspirations of this people; that his rhetoric is not in consonance with the American character; that he appears mostly oblivious of, at other times scornful of, the formidable "limitations," "constraints," and "obstacles" that, in America, "prevent the author from accomplishing his purpose"; that Buckley is, in his rhetoric, counter-cultural.

These conclusions have been reached, first of all, through an analysis of American culture, the character of the people it has shaped, and the sociological background from which it has emerged and against which it stands out. The investigator has shown that Americans are abstractive and case-oriented in their attitudes, behavior, and responses. He has shown further that Buckley's rhetoric abundantly evinces counter-cultural associative characteristics in the form of intensely emotional, impassioned, and extreme language, the kind that is studded with such invective as "enemy," "animal," "hating," "spit upon them,"
and "cast into hell"; and counter-cultural associative characteristics of a relational, undetached type so alien to, and untypical of, the prescinding, compartmentalized American. The investigator has further demonstrated that Buckley is obsessed with universal principles, once-delivered dogmas, closed questions, exclusive either-or approaches to issues, literal-meaning rather than intent-focused interpretations of law, deductive reasoning, and ideologized politics.

The investigator infers from these observations that Americans do not see their values, expectations, and mores reflected in Buckley's articulations; that their "conception of the universal audience," that is, themselves, diverges markedly from that of the engaged and dogmatic author; that they do not identify with his views and modes of expression; that Buckley does not likely make converts, in significant numbers, to his brand of conservatism.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

In this study an attempt has been made to write a valid critique of the rhetoric of William F. Buckley Jr. by applying the three-stage methodology of Karlyn Kohrs Campbell. The study encompassed the Buckley rhetoric in general—books, magazine articles, newspaper columns, speeches, impromptu debates, etc.—and its impact on what has been called in this inquiry "the universal American audience." This concept has been deduced and inferred from the idea of the universal audience developed by Chaim Perelman. The steps followed and the conclusions reached in the present inquiry were as follows:

First, a "descriptive analysis" was essayed. It was shown that some of Buckley's characteristic rhetorical maneuvers involve an effort to pre-empt—that is to say, appropriate for his side, the conservative side, alone—these formidable rhetorical appeals: those based on religion, patriotism, valor, and logic. Next it was demonstrated that Buckley is an aggressive forensic infighter. Some of his more offensive rhetorical thrusts were seen to be the attack
on the opponent's intelligence; the use of humor and mockery; and the exploitation of the supposed and irrelevant mistakes of the adversary.

Second, according to the Campbell methodology, there was an effort made to appraise the "relation" of Buckley's rhetoric "to its milieu," an attempt to lay bare "the extrinsic elements—the external limitations, constraints, or influences on the rhetorician's choices," and the extent to which the rhetor has overcome these "obstacles" of "historical-cultural context." In consonance with the suggestions of both Campbell and Perelman, an attempt was made to discover "as much information as possible about the persons usually exposed to the discourse." An examination was then made of representative passages from Buckley's polemics as to their likely impact on these "persons," these persons comprising the universal American audience.

Fortuitously, as the second stage of the study was undertaken, the third stage was attempted also. For as Campbell suggested, the third stage of rhetorical analysis, the "interpretative analysis," involves the application of a standard of judgment to the rhetoric in question. This criterion, Campbell offered, can be selected from those implied in the work of the subject under study himself. Noted were several excerpts from Buckley's books and articles that indicate that this controversialist believes
the American people are basically, though "recklessly," "conservative," and that he and other rightists understand them better and reflect their values better than the "social abstractionists," that is to say, the liberals.

What was in fact shown about the universal American audience was the following: that Americans in general appear to be exceedingly "abstractive," in contrast to citizens in more archaic societies, who are more "associative." That is, Americans tend to be function-oriented; relatively unemotional; open to relationships with strangers and even those unfriendly to them, especially when the demands of their job or function call for such abstraction or compartmentalization; consummately inclined to detach from the business at hand considerations which are irrelevant; and dedicated to the even-handed rule of law.

Americans were shown also to be "case-oriented," in contrast to those in more archaic or "universalistic" societies. That is, for Americans, facts and "cases" come before universals or generalizations; the lessons of present experience supersede traditional ways of doings things; strong beliefs dissolve into toleration; words yield to realities; the nondoctrinaire approach prevails in politics, making the two-party system almost the emblem of what it means to be Anglo-American.

In contrast, the rhetoric of William Buckley was seen to be studded with archaic and counter-cultural
associative and universalistic elements. Buckley's rhetoric was seen to exhibit pronounced associative-emotional traits of an intensity and stridency Americans would not likely identify with and be moved by. This body of rhetoric displays also, it was shown, elements of associative "engagement," an inclination on the part of the author not to detach or abstract from consideration data Americans in general would regard as irrelevant. It was shown, too, that the subject is frequently universalistic in his thinking and polemicizing; European, especially with respect to his call for ideological purity in the Republican party.

By inference it was concluded that Americans do not see their values, expectations, and mores reflected in Buckley's articulations; that their "conception of the universal audience," that is, their conception of themselves, as evidenced by the way they characteristically behave and react, diverges markedly from that of the engaged and dogmatic author; that they do not identify with his views and modes of expression; that Buckley does not likely make converts, in significant numbers, to his brand of conservatism. In America, the Buckley rhetoric can have, it would appear, only limited appeal.

Plainly this study has not been an empirical one. Opinions have not been sampled from listeners and readers before and after exposure to Buckley's appeals. An avenue for further inquiry could be the assembling and assessing
of all available, pertinent data on the impact of Buckley's books, television programs, newspaper columns, etc., not as to what that impact indicates about Buckley as political entertainer, but what it suggests, if anything, about his power to change minds and to reinforce like-minded ideologues.
NOTES

CHAPTER 1


2Ibid. 3Ibid. 4Ibid., p. 15.

5Ibid., p. 13. 6Ibid., p. 19. 7Ibid.

8Ibid., p. 21. 9Ibid., p. 22.


11Ibid., pp. 20, 23-26. 12Ibid., p. 44.

13Ibid., p. 33. 14Ibid. 15Ibid.


19Ibid., p. 47. 20Ibid., p. 83.


22L. Clayton Dubois, "The First Family of Conservatism," The New York Times Magazine, August 9, 1970,

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28In addition to God and Man at Yale and Cruising Speed, cited above, Mr. Buckley's volumes are as follows: McCarthy and His Enemies, coauthored with Brent Bozell (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1964); Up from Liberalism (New York: Iven Obolensky, Inc., 1959); Rumbles Left and Right (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1963); The Unmaking of a Mayor (New York: The Viking Press, Inc., 1963); The Jeweler's Eye (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1968); The Governor Listens (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1970); Inveighing To Will Go (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1972); Four Reforms (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1973); Execution Ave and Other Contemporary Ballads (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1975); a novel, Saving the Queen (New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1976); and numerous other works the conservative has edited or contributed to.


CHAPTER 2

1"... As a rule we trust men of probity more...


4The Constitution of the United States of America, Amendments, Article I.

5Constitution, Amendments, Article XIV.


8William F. Buckley Jr., "Will They Take Ave?" National Review, July 30, 1963, p. 51. (Except for the first reference in each chapter, National Review will hereafter be referred to as NR.)


11Buckley, "Instructing Norman Mailer on the True Meaning of the American Right Wing," Rumbles, p. 83.


14Ibid., p. 90.


For more of Mr. Buckley's use of the syllogism see also, e.g., William F. Buckley Jr., "McGovern Has the


19Ibid., p. 29.


21Buckley, Liberalism, p. 28. 22Ibid.


26Buckley, Quotations, p. 252. 27Ibid., p. 201.


33Editorial, "JFK Cloying?" NR, April 8, 1961,


36Buckley, Quotations, p. 49.


40Buckley, Rumbles, p. 60.

41Buckley, Jeweler's Eye, p. 251.

42Ibid., p. 236.


CHAPTER 3


2And "...the prevailing mode of thought is the matrix of all institutions—economic as well as political and social institutions." Karl Pribram, Conflicting Patterns of Thought (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1949), p. 4. If thought patterns proceed and determine behavior patterns,
how important it must be for the would-be persuader to reflect those of his culture.

3Most of the material on the cultural development of mankind has been derived from the work of Professor Edmund S. Glenn of the University of Delaware, particularly from his course at the university on intercultural communications. See also Edmund S. Glenn, "Cohen's 'Conceptual Styles': a Comment," American Anthropologist, vol. 72, No. 6 (December, 1970); Glenn, "A Cognitive Approach to the Analysis of Cultures and of Culture Change," General Systems, Vol. 11 (1966), pp. 115-32; Glenn, "The Two Faces of Nationalism," Comparative Political Studies (1970).


7Macbeth III.iv.24-25; Durkheim, op. cit., pp. 351-414.


11Ibid.


20. Pribram, Conflicting Patterns, pp. 7-8, 16.


29. Pribram, op. cit., p. 16.


31. Ibid., pp. 617-18, 622-29.
CHAPTER 4


6See Chapter 3 for the analysis on which these assertions are based, and for a description of the social inclinations and cultural heritage of the American people.

7Naturally there occurred some reaction to this parched intellectualism within the Protestant Church itself, for example in Pietism. See Williston Walker, A History of the Christian Church (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959), pp. 444-54.


9Buckley, Liberalism, p. 128.


11Buckley, Quotations, p. 11. 12Ibid., p. 40.


16 See above, pp. 23-24.


18 Buckley (ed.), Committee, pp. 23 ff.


22 Editorial, "Mr. Eisenhower Falls to the Summit," NR, August 15, 1959, p. 263.

23 Advertisement, NR, August 29, 1959, pp. 293, 312. "We dream of great cities plastered with these simple stickers, the badge of honor." Editorial, "How to Protest?" NR, August 29, 1959, p. 294.


25 "Notes and Asides," NR, August 30, 1958, p. 152. See also Buckley, "On the Visit of Khrushchev to the United States in 1959," Rumbles, pp. 42-48. "Mr. Gallop confirmed the popularity of the President's decision—which, it turns out, exceeds even the popularity of the President himself." (P. 43.) Mr. Buckley cannot understand it.


31 Buckley, Cruising Speed, p. 166.

32 From all accounts, William F. Buckley Jr., the private man, is a charming and cordial human being who can perform favors for liberals and conservatives alike. He even offered to take the editor of America to lunch at the time of one of their intermittent squabbles. (Buckley, "Catholic Liberals, Catholic Conservatives, etc.," Rumbles, p. 161.) Examined here, though, is not Mr. Buckley's social life, but rather his rhetoric.


34 Buckley, "Buckley Run," p. 120.

35 One more example of Mr. Buckley's associativeness, vis-a-vis the academy: from the Harvard Crimson the theorist quotes disapprovingly these characteristics of "... contemporary liberal education ... . "Even the religious person, moreover the believer in salvation through a particular church, must divorce his role of believer from the role of teacher. If he would teach he cannot by direct methods fish for souls." William F. Buckley Jr., "At Harvard, Sir, We Do Not Fish for Souls—II," NR, January 30, 1960, pp. 75-77.

In other words, Mr. Buckley is suggesting that one should not abstract explicit sectarian witness from one's on-the-job role as secular teacher. He should not "modulate" his "dogmas."

36 Buckley, Liberalism, pp. 211-212.

38Buckley, Quotations, p. 43.


47NR, December 31, 1962, p. 504.

48William F. Buckley Jr., The Unmaking of a Mayor (New York: The Viking Press, Inc., 1966), pp. 6-7, 63-74. See also Buckley, Quotations, pp. 165, 167.

49Buckley, "The Agony of Mr. Nixon," Governor, p. 28. See also Buckley, Quotations, p. 98.


51Buckley, Quotations, p. 242.


54Buckley, Quotations, pp. 154, 183, 222.

55Once in a while Mr. Buckley can "... distinguish between paradigmatic political writing, and prudential approaches to concrete situations." Editorial, "Is Goldwater Moving Left," NR, October 22, 1963, p. 338. Here are a few examples:

"... Massive efforts to help the Negro must be made ... in order realistically to help to achieve desirable results ... and prevent the 'hot summer.'" William F. Buckley Jr., "The Great Opportunity of 1965," NR, August 8, 1967, p. 842.

"The dawning consciousness of the political way up the ladder is racing through the ghettos. Strategically it may be dangerous, since the temptation is universal to substitute political for economic means of self-aggrandizement; but tactical rewards are considerable." William F. Buckley Jr., "Up from Watts," NR, June 17, 1969, pp. 610-11.

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